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Preface
“We would like to inform our passengers that we are approaching the harbour. All passengers 
are requested to leave their cabin and leave their magnetic cards at the reception desk.” I 
remember it was 7.00 a.m. We were on the ferry from Porto Torres on Sardinia to Genoa. My 
family and I reluctantly got up and took a quick breakfast. We packed our bags, left our cabin, 
and walked up to the reception desk, which was located on the sixth floor. We probably still 
had to wait for a short time before it was possible to get to our car. My wife asked me, just to 
be sure, to check out two floors below if the car deck was still closed. I went down the first 
set of stairs and then … there it was … the rope! It was a simple rope attached on both sides 
of the stairs leading down to the fourth floor. Consequently, I could not get to the car deck 
without taking the rope off. But … could I really not go past the rope? It was probably put there 
so that no one would go down further. So, I decided to take a quick peek, without moving the 
rope, to see if I could establish whether the door of the car park was still closed. And, indeed, 
it was. So, slightly relieved that I did not have to touch the rope but had still been able to the 
answer my wife’s question, I returned to the reception desk and told my wife that we had to 
wait a bit longer.
Ten minutes later we all walked down the stairs. There were 15 minutes or so remaining 
before we were supposed to disembark at the harbour. And there it was again … the rope! 
This time several people had already gathered around the rope. But it seemed no one had 
passed it. The rope seemed to have a power that prevented people from passing. While we 
were waiting, the crowd kept on growing. People were getting restless. It was already after 
8.30, the time we were supposed to embark. A man with a little dog lifted the rope … what 
was he going to do? He just decided to sit on the first step of the stairs. In the meantime, I 
had discovered that not everyone was as impressed by the power of the rope as we were. 
About five people were already by the door that gave access to the floor where the cars were 
parked. Nevertheless, everyone else was still waiting at the top of the stairs behind a slack 
rope. It seemed that the rope was widely accepted as a sign, a barrier that was not supposed 
to be passed. The rope affected, or rather determined, people’s behaviour until the announcer 
told us that we had arrived at the harbour and that the disembarcation procedures would 
begin. Then, the force of the rope diminished quickly while a passenger unclipped the rope, 
and we all walked down the stairs.
During these events I was constantly thinking of my research and noted a striking resemblance 
between the rope and a management accounting instrument. The rope was an instrument to 
affect or rather guide the behaviour of people. And in fact it did. I noticed that this is exactly 
what the management of an organisation attempts to do by introduction of an accounting 
instruments. In the study presented in this thesis, the management team of the municipality 
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of The Hague decided to introduce a shared service centre with a governance structure 
that includes instruments such as transfer pricing, contracts, and benchmarking. These 
instruments were thought to guide people’s behaviour in order to achieve a higher level of 
efficiency and an improvement in the quality of support processes. This goal would only 
be reached, however, if the instruments were widely accepted and actually guided people’s 
behaviour. Whether or not this happened and why is explored in this research.
You probably have made decisions in life, which you would not have taken if you look back on 
them. At the age of 28, I was just married and we were buying a house. A beautiful house full 
of character. It was built in 1929 and located close to the beach and only a 20-minute bike ride 
from the centre of The Hague. Traffic was light and the kerbs showed clear signs of children 
playing outside. This was a highly attractive to us because we were also considering starting 
a family. Also, a beautiful lilac was in blossom in the front garden. My wife had said: “If it is the 
house with the lilac, we will buy it!” And so we did. 
Yet, we noticed that much work had to be done. The house needed a new kitchen and a new 
bathroom. Additionally, some rewiring had to be done, the walls had to be plastered, one wall 
had to be knocked down, and the roof needed to be insulated. But what could be expected 
for that kind of money? We could do some DIY ourselves so that would be okay. If we knew 
then what we had to experience while rebuilding the house, I would almost say that we would 
not have bought it, but my wife would probably disagree. Nevertheless, I often thought: “What 
were we thinking when we started? And how on earth am I going to solve this problem? Will 
this project ever be finished?”
These are questions I also asked myself (and so did my wife for that matter) during the 
writing of this thesis. Why did I embark on this adventure, particularly since I am not even 
actively pursuing an academic career? As such, I sometimes feel myself to be a surrogate 
scientist, practising science in his spare time. Looking back, if I had known what lay ahead 
ahead of me, I do not know whether I would have taken on the task of writing a PhD thesis. 
If I had known that I was starting a process that would take me over six years to complete … 
a process that would take much of my spare time and which I would be thinking of constantly 
when I was not working on it. Thus, I am thankful that I did not know all of this when I started 
this adventure. Because there are also things in life which you know in advance you would 
regret if you had not tried doing it. Somehow, writing a PhD thesis is such a thing for me. 
However, feeling the need to do something is one thing, having the opportunity to do it is 
another. In this respect, I feel that I was always in the lucky position of meeting people at the 
right time, people who for some reason noticed something about me, of which I was unaware 
of, offering me the invaluable opportunities in my work and the chance to work as a scientist-
practitioner. I am particularly grateful to prof. dr. Goos Minderman, who strongly encouraged 
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me to start this PhD project. When I finished my thesis for the Master of Science in Accounting 
and Control with the Zijlstra Centre, he asked me to consider writing a PhD thesis on the 
same subject, namely management control in a municipality. However, at that time, I had just 
bought the house mentioned earlier, so I had no spare time. Several years later, when I was a 
guest lecturer at Zijlstra Centre, he posed the same question. He also suggested writing down 
what I wanted to research and we would just start from there. So, we decided to proceed. At 
that point, prof. dr. Hans Bossert joined us and guided the start of my project. Subsequently, 
time and effort were devoted to finding and designing a solid research proposal. Prof. dr. 
Bossert repeatedly challenged the questions I wanted to research, until he said my ideas 
good enough to share my ideas with a broader audience. Accordingly, I presented my ideas 
to the professors and researchers of the Zijlstra Centre, an audience that included prof. dr. Ed 
Vosselman. He replied to my ideas with the, for me, memorable words: “Those are interesting 
things you have just said. However, it is based on a rather outdated theoretical framework, in 
my opinion.” And so, he was asked if he would also be interested in guiding my PhD research. 
Fortunately, he accepted the invitation. From then on, the research gained in focus, in theory, 
and in research practice. Unfortunately, prof. dr. Bossert left the Zijlstra Centre and was no 
longer able to guide me in my project. After some time, it was felt necessary to add a promotor 
to the team. This happened at about the same time that Ed and I presented our ideas at the 
10th ENROAC conference. Prof. dr. Ivo De Loo attended our session and was interested 
in the ideas we had presented. We explored therefore whether he would be interested in 
joining our project and happily he was. With his critical, but always constructive, feedback the 
research and thesis were taken to the next level, leading to the results that I proudly present 
in this thesis
Also, within the Municipality of The Hague I met people who gave me room to practise my 
hobby, so to speak. I should mention Gerard Boot, who was the Director of Finance of the 
municipality at the time I started my research. He also strongly encouraged me to start this 
research. I am also grateful to Pablo Hunnego, who was the director of the shared service 
centre for most of the time while I was conducting my research, and who was my boss. He 
allowed me to work flexible hours so that I could easily spend time on my thesis. Furthermore, 
he participated in my research without hesitation. Similarly, other colleagues were willing 
to participate in this research. I should also mention Trudy Loeffen, my last manager within 
the municipality. She motivated me to finish my thesis and allowed me to spend much time 
working on this research, even in periods when work pressure was high. I am grateful to 
Odin van der Stelt. He thoroughly revised my rather rickety English texts and pushed the text 
up to a new level. Catherine Walker performed a final revision of the text. As a result of her 
comments and suggestions the texts are now consistent to her as well I express my gratitude. 
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These people inspired and guided me during my research, but this research could not have 
been conducted, of course, without the continuing support of my family. My wife Maartje, 
who accepted many evenings alone on the couch. My children, Emelie, Thije and Lieke, who 
often accepted the answer “Sorry, dad has to study” after asking if I wanted to play with them. 
Without their support and understanding this research would have ended somewhere else 
and way earlier, without any results, I am afraid.
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CHAPTER 1
 Introduction
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Introduction
1.1 What happens when theory is put to practice?
“Theory is all good, but it is a man’s job and we have to get used to working together” (Deputy 
Municipal Secretary, Municipality of The Hague).
For thirteen years, I was active as a management accountant in the Municipality of The Hague. 
During this period, I experienced many significant changes in this municipality. One of the 
major changes I observed and was actively involved in was the introduction and constitution 
of a shared service centre (SSC): a way of organizing mainly supportive services within an 
organisation that should result in significant cost reductions, while improving the quality of 
service delivery (Bergeron, 2003; Herbert & Seal, 2012; Jansen & Joha, 2006). 
I participated in several teams appointed to prepare the introduction of the SSC. One of the 
teams received the assignment to devise a cost allocation method for exchanges between the 
SSC and the departments of the municipality. Although debates were fierce at times, we were 
able to draft a proposal meant to be put into practice to effectuate cost allocations. It was this 
process of putting the proposal into practice that led to this study. I served as the management 
accountant of the new SSC and in this role I was responsible for implementing the method 
of cost allocation that was proposed. To me, the process was intriguing, but also frustrating, 
mainly because putting the proposal into practice was not as straightforward as I had expected. 
The cost allocation method was part of a concept called the ‘governance’ of the SSC. In 
the municipality, this concept referred to the accountability structure that accompanied the 
introduction of the SSC. This structure described who was responsible for what, and in what 
way he or she was going to be held accountable. Several committees were added to the 
accountability structure that already existed within the municipality. The addition of these 
committees to an established structure led to several situations in which it was unclear, at 
least to me, to whom I had to refer for decisions on the service delivery and for cost allocations 
involving the services delivered by the SSC. Experiences such as these made me wonder 
whether or not we had made the right choices when we designed the governance structure 
and the cost allocation method. However, I gradually began to realize that the implementation 
of the SSC in the municipality involved more than just, for example, the use of techniques to 
calculate costs and the prices of products and services. Among others, it also involved the 
behaviour of people who had a choice whether or not to value the development of the SSC. 
This thesis thus originated from my experiences as a management accountant in the 
Municipality of The Hague. The next sections discuss the objective and significance of the 
study reported in this thesis. The research method is then addressed. The chapter ends with 
an outline of the thesis.
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 11.2 Research approach and research questions
The main objective of my research was to gain a clear understanding of what happened 
in the municipal practice after the introduction of a new governance structure (of an SSC). 
I aimed to contribute to the scientific discipline of management accounting and control by 
focussing on the overarching question of why and how the governance structure for the 
shared service centre came into shape. My ambition was to contribute to the knowledge 
production in the scientific discipline by theorizing on the governance and control structure 
on the basis of a case study concerning a shared service centre within a public organisation, 
the municipality of The Hague. Originally, I focussed on choices we had made in the design 
process of the governance structure and of the SSC itself. I particularly wondered whether 
the choices were rational. Rationality in this research is consistent with Simon (1982) 
refers to as ‘substantive rationality’. This means that rationality refers to the choices that 
are made, and the focus is on what is decided, not how it is decided. These choices are 
made by economic actors who have specific goals. In this part of the research, for example, 
the assumption is that an actor strives to minimalize transaction costs. Consequently he 
or she will choose his or her actions in such a way that the actions will contribute to the 
achievement of the goal. From a transaction cost economics perspective, a certain type of 
transaction will result in the choice of the certain, appropriate type of governance structure. 
As such, the first part of the research is conducted from what is called a rational economic 
perspective. The question that guides this part of the research is the following:
How can the choices made by a municipality on the design of a governance structure 
for an SSC be understood from a rational economic perspective?
In chapter 4 this question is addressed. Transaction cost economics offers an economic 
framework to describe and understand the rationality of choices be made in a governance 
structure (Covaleski, 2001; Speklé, 2001; Williamson, 1979). This perspective is used 
in combination with more specific views on the governance of an internal marketplace 
(Vosselman, 1995) and the governance of shared services (Grant et al., 2007; Minnaar & 
Vosselman, 2013). In using this combination of perspectives, the goal is to explain not only the 
governance structure in a broad sense, including the intended arrangements for the internal 
marketplace, and the roles and responsibilities of individuals and councils in the governance 
and management control of the SSC. 
The answer to this research question turned out to be not as unequivocal as I had initially 
thought. Discrepancies were observed between the actual choices made in the municipality 
and the choices that might be expected from a rational economic perspective. In real life, 
the development of the governance structure and of its parts also seemed to depend on the 
value people attached to it. In other words, if people are not inclined to accept the invitation 
525761-L-bw-Jellema
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the structure is offering, the development process may take a different route to that which 
common economic theory would suggest.
My second question therefore addresses the process of the development of the governance 
structure, instead of focussing ‘just’ on discrete design choices. Specifically, this development 
is studied by exploring the process leading up to the introduction and further modification of 
the cost allocation method (which was a part of the governance structure of the SSC). In this 
part of the research, the governance structure is seen as an actor. In this view, the governance 
structure is able to influence the behaviour of other actors, if the structure is considered to be 
a relevant actor by these actors and is thus able to exert power. This view is elaborated upon 
in chapter 5. Accordingly, the question central in that chapter is:
How does a governance structure and, more specifically, a cost allocation method 
develop in practice?
The answer to this question is explored using a relational perspective, which is based on 
actor-network theory (Law, 1986; Callon, 1999; Latour, 2005, 2008) and on the concepts of 
framing and overflowing (Callon, 1998) and of translation (Callon et al., 2012). 
Both perspectives, the rational and the relational, provide different but complementary views of the 
governance structure. As discussed in chapter 6, together they can offer a more comprehensive 
understanding of the development and performance of a governance structure in its context. 
In the next sections, the research method is outlined and both the scientific relevance and the 
practical relevance of the research are addressed.
1.3 Research method
Because I was a practitioner within the organisation, I played an active role in the development 
process under study. As such, I was an ‘embedded’ researcher, which brings several 
advantages to research. For example, access to relevant data and documents might be a 
challenge when conducting field research. Similarly, researchers might experience difficulties 
in contacting key players or attending meetings (Baxter & Chua, 1998). However, given 
my position, access to documents and key players was relatively easy. Several methods 
of data collection were used. First, relevant documents were studied. These were official 
documents and drafts of plans and documents, and official and unofficial notes of meetings. 
Moreover, several key players were interviewed at different stages of the process. These 
interviews were presented to the interviewees for feedback (Denzin, 1989). Furthermore, I 
attended meetings in my the role of manager that were part of the process under scrutiny. 
My position in the organisation demands that I exercise reflexivity in my role as a researcher. 
Reflexivity refers to a cognitive process that any researcher should go through when assessing 
his or her own thinking (Johnson & Duberley, 2003). This means that the researcher should 
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 1consider his or her own position in the constitution of the issues under study; that is, should 
consider the way in which his or her own beliefs impact the building of knowledge and 
what role language plays in the constitution of knowledge (Çalas & Smircich, 1999). Also, 
the researcher should understand that his or her own beliefs are affected by the context 
in which he or she is operating as both a researcher and a practitioner (Cunliffe, 2003). 
As a practitioner, I was part of the process I was studying as a researcher. As such, the 
theoretical frameworks I used in my research affected my thinking as a practitioner. This 
became clear, for example, in several meetings where I, in my role as a practitioner, used 
these theoretical frameworks in debates with my colleagues. In turn, my thinking about the 
theoretical frameworks was influenced by discussions with members of several research 
groups. Also, my own critical and reflective thinking contributed to my interpretations of theory 
and practice. This process was particularly relevant while I was performing the research 
reported in this thesis, and I elaborate upon this in chapter 3.
1.4 Scientific relevance
This research adds to the existing body of research on the choices involved in the development 
of a governance structure for shared service centres, specifically in public organisations. It 
builds on research using a rational perspective on governance in general (Covaleski, 2001; 
Speklé, 2001; Williamson, 1979, 1981) and, more specifically, on the governance of an SSC 
(Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Vosselman, 1995) in the context of public organisations (Grant 
et al., 2007; Janssen & Joha, 2006). 
This research addresses two questions. The first question concerns the choices that can be 
made in the governance structure that guides transactions in intrafirm relations. According 
to transaction cost economics theory, a transaction is governed by a market, by a hierarchy 
within an organisation or by a hybrid between a market and a hierarchy, depending on the 
character of the transaction. The transactions in this research were guided by a hybrid form of 
governance in which the hierarchy is extended with market-like instruments, such as contracts, 
transfer pricing, and benchmarking. The present research contributes to the literature on the 
choices made within a governance structure of an SSC. Specifically, Minnaar and Vosselman 
(2013) showed that, in the context of a private-sector firm and an interfirm SSC, the choices 
in the governance structure are not based on transaction costs, but on economies of scale. 
The present research shows similar findings in a different context, namely the public sector 
and an intrafirm SSC.
The second question concerns the organisational arrangements of a governance structure of 
an SSC. This issue is studied in the Municipality of The Hague using insights from Vosselman 
(1995) on the roles and responsibilities in an internal marketplace and insights from Grant et 
al. (2007) and De Haes and Grembergen (2008) on the governance structure of an SSC. In 
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this theoretical context, the results of this research offer several adjustments to the model of 
management control of an internal marketplace developed by Vosselman (1995), adjustments 
that enable collective action to be taken within the governance structure. For example, in 
the municipality an integral customer council has been established in which the SSC and 
its customers are aligning the services of the SSC with the needs of customers. Moreover, 
in this part of the research the results indicate that using a rational perspective does not 
give us a comprehensive understanding of what actually happens in practice. Developing 
the governance structure turned out not be a straightforward process of design choices and 
implementation. Based on these findings, it is argued that a relational perspective might 
provide a better understanding of the process of the development of a governance structure 
(see also Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013).
From a relational perspective, the present study connects to research that considers 
management accounting as an actor. It also takes the view taken by Callon and Çaliskan 
(2009, 2010) that processes of economisation form the starting point of the exploration. 
The concept of translation (Callon et al., 2012) has proved to be useful in the study of the 
emergence and development of a governance frame. From an insider’s perspective, this 
research shows that actors built a dominant coalition with the purpose of changing the current 
state of the organisation. In terms of Callon et al. (2012), the organisation can be considered 
to be a ‘macrocosm’. Project groups (‘microcosms’) are established to produce a frame for 
governance that is transported back into the macrocosm in order to bring about the change 
that is desired by the powerful coalition. This frame is a construction that offers cognitive 
boundaries for the interactions. It serves as a frame of reference for actors, when they choose 
to accept the invitation offered by the frame. As such, the frame stabilises the execution of 
the transactions. For example, within the Municipality of The Hague the general management 
team wanted to introduce an SSC as a means to realise budget cuts that were imposed 
by the City Council. A governance frame designed to govern the SSC was constructed by 
a project group. In this project group, I participated as a management accountant working 
within the Municipality of The Hague. The translation process as depicted by Callon et al. 
(2012) offers a useful frame of reference for exploring the process by which the governance 
frame was developed. Kastberg (2014) shows in his research that the concepts of framing 
and overflowing provide an useful theoretical framework when studying the development of a 
governance frame of a shared service centre in a municipal context.
The translation process includes not only framing, but also overflowing. Overflows are 
deviations from the frame and unintended outcomes that emerge in the macrocosm. These 
overflows are inevitable because frames are never complete. Subsequently, if a coalition 
emerges from these overflows that is strong enough to initiate an alteration of the frame, a 
process of reframing starts. In the present study, for example, this process became evident 
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 1when, in the macrocosm, information was received that there was widespread discontent 
with the way the governance frame was performing. A coalition emerged, claiming that the 
underperformance of the governance frame was caused by the roles and responsibilities 
of those involved in the frame haring not been clearly defined. The results of this research 
expand the notions of framing and overflowing as developed by Callon (2009) and show 
that in practice iterative cycles of framing of overflowing emerge as a consequence of the 
introduction of new management accounting initiatives in an existing organisational context. 
1.5 Practical relevance
The results of this research offer several insights that may be helpful for practitioners who engage 
in the development of a governance structure for an SSC, as well as for those who participated 
actively in the governance. From a rational perspective, the results offer a useful frame of 
reference for assessing choices on the governance structure of an SSC. They also strengthen 
the relational perspective by indicating that the development of a governance structure is not a 
straightforward process of design choices and implementation. Rather, when a concept such 
as the governance structure of an SSC enters the context in which it is supposed to function, 
the interests of human actors and the values they attach to the concept are crucial determinants 
of whether or not the initiative will gain relevance. For example, a concept that is highly valued 
by the management but not, or not as much, by employees is likely to perform differently 
to how management expects. The present research demonstrates that the introduction 
of customer councils as part of a new governance frame into an organisation with its own 
existing councils and committees (e.g., a standing committee for management accountants) 
leads to a situation in which the customer councils have to struggle for their position in the 
organisation. For example, the newly proposed councils had to compete with the committee 
for management accountants over who had the authority to decide on financial matters. The 
development of this struggle depends on coalitions that are built around the issues at hand. 
The practical implication is that new concepts require continuous management attention. 
The insights from this research on the position and role of the governance frame itself 
and how it may affect daily practice offer practitioners a way to understand the processes 
they experience when new concepts are introduced. This understanding may enhance 
the performance of these initiatives because it offers the management and management 
accountants a way to comprehend what happens when new accounting concepts such as 
cost allocation contracts or benchmarking are introduced. Within this, understanding is also 
needed of the network in which the accounting concepts performs and this yields a wider 
range of possibilities to enhance the performance of the new accounting concept.
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1.6 Outline of the thesis
The subsequent parts of this thesis are structured as depicted in figure 1. In chapter 2 the 
concept of the SSC is discussed. Special attention is devoted to the history of this concept in 
the public sector. In this chapter, it is shown that the use and development of the SSC concept 
in the public sector results from the widespread acceptance of the New Public Management 
within public organisations. Chapter 3 elaborates upon the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning this research. Ontological, epistemological, and methodological questions 
are addressed and the position of the researcher is considered. The latter issue is relevant 
because the researcher was also a practitioner in the process under scrutiny. Therefore, 
the position of the researcher – that is, his own views and beliefs relating to the topic under 
scrutiny and to the academic world – need to be considered carefully. In chapters 4 and 5, 
the practice of the Municipality of The Hague is explored using the different perspectives 
introduced in this chapter. Finally, chapter 6 presents the conclusions and discusses the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research. 
 
Figure 1. Outline of the thesis 
 
Figure 1. Outline of the thesis
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Introduction to shared services in the public 
sector and the municipality of The Hague 
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2.1 Introduction
The promise of a shared service is compelling. Significant cost reductions up to 25%–30% are 
thought to be possible while the quality of service delivery is supposed to improve (Bergeron, 
2003; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Herbert & Seal, 2012). Encouraged mainly by the consultancy 
literature, many organisations, including those in the public sector, have introduced the 
concept of a shared service centre (Janssen & Joha, 2006; Herbert & Seal, 2012). Since the 
beginning of this millennium, local governments in the Netherlands have also established this 
type of organisation1 (Strikwerda, 2010). A Google search on shared service centres in Dutch 
municipalities2 yields 34,000 hits. It appears that many municipalities have implemented a 
shared service centre. A study conducted in 2005 by Ernst & Young showed that 56% of the 
Dutch municipalities had implemented a shared service centre of some sort. These included 
the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, among others.3
One important implication of introducing a shared service centre is that it changes the 
accountability structure within an organisation. This change results from the introduction of 
market-like instruments, such as contracts, within the hierarchy of an organisation. A hybrid 
governance structure emerges that entails elements of both markets and hierarchies (Herbert 
& Seal, 2012). Elements of hierarchies are present because the shared service centre resides 
within an organisation and management is typically concerned with governing hierarchical 
relations. Elements of markets are introduced because services will be delivered based on 
contracts and cost settlement, which typically happens when goods or services are bought 
by a party in the market. For a hybrid governance structure to work properly, a balance has 
to be found between vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (market-like) relations (Kastberg, 
2014). An important question in this context is whether or not external suppliers other than 
the shared service centre are allowed to deliver goods and services to the different units in 
an organisation. Is it allowable for example, to buy a computer from a computer store when 
the shared service centre delivers the same product? Competition with external suppliers is 
believed to increase efficiency, but economies of scale may be lost if too many customers 
choose to bypass the shared service centre. 
This chapter considers the emergence of a shared service centre to be a product of New 
Public Management (NPM) practices. In so doing, the concept of shared services is thought 
to provide one of the answers to the ever-growing pressure to improve financial results and 
increase the transparency of organisations (Ter Bogt, 2008). 
1 Several studies have been done on shared service centres in local government.  Examples of this research have been 
published by the Dutch Association of Municipalities in 2004 and Ernst & Young in 2005
2 Google search on ‘shared service centre Gemeente’ (shared service centre municipality) performed on September 
26th, 2016.
3 More information on municipalities that have introduced a shared service centre can be found on www.
sharedservicesbijdeoverheid.nl
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This chapter starts with an exploration of the NPM concept, with special emphasis on local 
government organisations as they are the focus of this study. The shared service centre 
concept and its characteristics are then elaborated upon. Attention is paid to the implications 
of the introduction of an SSC for the governance of an organisation. Next, the object of this 
research is introduced, namely the Dutch municipality of The Hague. The chapter ends with 
some concluding remarks.
2.2 Shared services in the context of New Public Management
New Public Management as a movement originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the 
United Kingdom and the United States (Pollit, 2000; Gruening, 2001; Laspey & Pallot, 2003; 
Ter Bogt, 2004; 2008; Budding, 2008). NPM is based on alleged ‘best practice’ management 
styles in the private sector and aims to improve government and public administration 
practices by making them more effective and efficient (Budding, 2008; Ter Bogt, 2008). NPM 
“projects a distinctive style of management – a highly rationalist perspective on management 
actions in which choices flow from objective analyses and the evaluation of alternatives.” 
(Lapsley & Pallot, 2000, p. 216). An important characteristic of NPM is “the idea of a shift in 
emphasis from policy making to management skills, from a stress on process to a stress on 
output, from orderly hierarchies to an intendedly more competitive basis for providing public 
services, from fixed to variable pay and from an uniform and inclusive public service to a 
variant structure with more emphasis on contract provision” (Hood, 1995, p. 95).  
These important characteristics of NPM provide two cardinal elements that can be used 
to compare public administration to the private sector. The first cardinal element is the 
organisation and methods of accountability. Four features can be distinguished here: (1) 
the structure of the organisation, (2) the character of the relationships between and within 
units, (3) the management style that is stressed, and (4) the focus on efficiency. The second 
cardinal element concerns the issue  of how far management behaviour should be guided by 
rules and regulation, or how much decision-making discretion a manager should have. The 
features that relate to this element are concerned with: (5) the character of the management 
style, (6) the way that performance of management is evaluated, and (7) the focus of control 
(Hood, 1995; Budding, 2008). 
The table, presented below, highlights these features of new public management compared 
to the traditional public administration view.
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Table 1: Differences between traditional public administration and new public management (based 
on: Hood, 1995; Budding, 2008). 
Feature Traditional public administration
New Public 
Management
Organisation & 
Accounting
1. The structure 
of the 
organisation
Centralised, including uniform 
control
Divisionalised with 
units organised by 
product
2. Relationships 
between and 
within units
Unspecified and open-ended 
agreements Contract-based
3. Styles and 
practices Governmental ethics and styles
Private ethics and 
styles
4. Budgeting 
focus Stable, focused on budget
Efficiency-oriented, 
aimed at cutting 
resources
5. Management Inactive; policy skills and knowledge of rules are important
Visible, hands-on 
management
Rules & 
regulations
6. Performance 
orientation Qualitative, implicit standards
Explicit, related 
to clearly defined 
targets
7. Focus of 
control Focused on rules and procedures
Focused on output 
and results
In the Netherlands NPM reforms have been fashionable since the 1980s (Ter Bogt, 2008; 
Budding, 2008). From 1985 Dutch local governments have been required to apply accrual 
accounting. Over the subsequent years municipalities have introduced other aspects 
of NPM, such as output budgeting and cost allocation, in order to become more efficient 
(Ter Bogt, 2004). In 1987 the Dutch central government started a project termed the Public 
Management Initiative (PMI). This project had a big impact on the organisations of provinces 
and municipalities. Its “main objectives were to rationalize day-to-day management, to make 
government organisations more ‘businesslike’, and to increase efficiency and effectiveness.” 
(Ter Bogt, 2008, p. 212). PMI had a strong focus on rational management and economic 
efficiency and on the effectiveness of these organisations (Ter Bogt, 2008).
Traditional public management was thought to be inflexible and bureaucratic. Governmental 
organisations were traditionally very strongly oriented to budget and processes and were thus 
controlled by means of financial budgets and administrative procedures (Ter Bogt, 2008). 
In these organisations values such as accuracy, equality, and justice were deemed more 
important than efficiency and effectiveness. With the NPM reforms efficiency and effectiveness 
gained in relevance. This was thought to be necessary to provide a solution to budget deficits 
and the criticism from society at that time about the functioning of the government.
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With the PMI private-sector management techniques were introduced in municipal 
organisations. Organisations that were initially centrally controlled were converted into 
divisionalised structures. These divisions were organised on the basis of ‘products’ or policy 
fields, such as welfare, education, urban development, or urban maintenance (Ter Bogt, 
2008). The divisions were headed by integral managers4; hands-on managers with distinctive 
decision-making authority. Management was to be held accountable for the results achieved. 
These results, also referred to as output, were specified in a management contract draw up 
between the different layers of management (Budding, 2008). 
Such reforms are widespread within Dutch local government. However, the choices that 
are made differ between organisations. Different municipal organisations, for example, vary 
greatly in their focus on the results that are to be achieved (Ter Bogt, 2008; Van Hengel, Groot 
& Budding, 2014). One of the factors involved in the varying choices among organisations 
is political, and relates to differences in opinion and focus in the political bodies of different 
municipalities, such as a Board of Mayors and Deputy Mayors and the City Council. Political 
representatives do not always feel the need to relate the performance of the organisation to 
political agreements, because it is not always in their interest to do so. Also, the performance 
indicators that are used to measure the results are not always believed to be a sufficiently clear 
indication of what has actually been achieved. This may lead to a diminished focus on results 
(Van Hengel, Groot & Budding, 2014). Consequently, the accounting and control systems that 
are usually part of NPM become more or less ‘decoupled’ from the decision-making structure 
in public organisations, or at best only ‘loosely coupled’ to it (Lapsey & Pallot, 2003; Van 
Hengel, Budding & Groot, 2015). Despite this, NPM reforms were popular, possibly due to 
the effect of external pressure on local government organisations to adopt NPM management 
practices. In the political context of local government, local authorities seek legitimisation of 
their activities by doing what other local government organisations do (Lapsey & Pallot, 2003; 
Ter Bogt, 2008). Hence, organisations tend to introduce organisational forms and working 
methods that are perceived to have been successful elsewhere (Ter Bogt, 2008).
So, even though there is a suggestion (and a lot of rhetoric) that NPM is able to reform 
and strengthen the performance of governmental organisations, the evidence supporting 
this claim is typically weak. When asked for their perception of the overall effects of NPM, 
however, professionals in Dutch local government indicated that they were ‘slightly positive’, 
even though the effects achieved were not always what they had intended (Ter Bogt, 2008, p. 
221). This study offers another concrete example of this discrepancy between intended and 
actual results. The next section will elaborate on the concept of a shared service centre. It will 
describe the main reasons for establishing an SSC and the characteristics of the organisations 
that adopt this concept.
4 Integral management is a management concept introduced in Dutch government in the 1980s. The goal is to make 
management more accountable for the efficiency of their work processes and generate cost savings. Management, in 
this concept, is held accountable for the realisation of targets (output) and controls the amount of resources (personnel, 
financial, etc) needed to establish the goals (derived from: Buurma & Jacobs, 1999).
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2.3 Characteristics of a shared service centre
In definitions of shared service centres, it is often emphasised that the processes that are bundled 
in a shared service centre should not be part of what is considered to be the core business of 
the organisation. Support processes, such as HRM, IT, and Finance, are eligible candidates to 
be organised within a shared service centre (Bergeron, 2003; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Grant et 
al., 2007; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013). Key to these activities is that they can be standardised 
without loss of added value to the processes of the business unit. Their output should be described 
by certain measurable parameters, because this can form the basis of a contract between the 
shared service centre and the business units to which it delivers services (Strikwerda, 2010). 
Several characteristics are distinctive for a shared service organisation as compared to 
centralised staff departments or business units within an organisation (Schulz & Brenner, 
2010). A shared service organisation consolidates processes in order to reduce redundancies 
within the organisation. Delivering supportive processes is its core competency and its focus 
is on internal customers. It is a separate organisational entity and its main objective is to 
reduce costs. These elements are also present in the definition provided by Janssen and 
Joha (2006). They consider a shared service centre to be a “separate and accountable semi-
autonomous unit within an (inter)organisational entity, used to bundle activities and provide 
specific pre-defined services to the operational units within that (inter)organisational entity, on 
the basis of agreed conditions” (p. 102). This description of a shared service organisation will 
be used in this thesis.
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the main reason for introducing a shared 
service centre is that it promises to deliver a significant cost reduction for the organisation, 
plus greater efficiency and effectiveness (Bergeron, 2003; Strikwerda, 2010; Herbert & 
Seal, 2012; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Ulbrich). Shared service centres have been reported 
to lead to improved quality of services, because they stimulate the sharing of knowledge 
and experience (Schulman et al, 1999). Career opportunities improve because the 
shared service centre is a distinctive organisational unit and, as a result, a professional 
career path is more apparent. Career opportunities are limited if someone is part of, for 
example, a relatively small IT division within a business unit, whereas in an SSC he or she 
is part of a larger joint IT division. The size of the division allows for more specialisation 
in functions, because in smaller divisions tasks that involve multiple functions are often 
combined in one person. Because of the size and the opportunity for specialisation, 
different career possibilities emerge (Korsten et al., 2004). Herbert and Seal (2012) report 
the same development in the area of management accounting in a shared service centre. 
A different argument for introducing a shared service centre is that it improves the ability 
of other business units to focus on their core business. Because supportive processes are 
organised jointly in a shared service centre, management that is responsible for running 
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the core business can focus its attention fully on these activities (Bergeron, 2003). Within a 
municipality, the core activities are, for example, urban development, education, welfare, etc. 
One political argument why municipalities may favour establishing a shared service centre is 
the desire of particularly small (local) government organisations to maintain their own authority 
(Korsten et al., 2004). Collaboration with other (local) government organisations on non-
political activities and processes may enhance the scale of the operations and preserve local 
political autonomy at the same time. For example, several municipalities in the Netherlands 
have joined forces in a shared service centre on IT services. These municipalities are now 
able to invest in IT on a scale that would not have been possible if they had done it on 
their own. They can maintain provision of services because they share costs and necessary 
investments in IT (Korsten et al., 2004). Also, while IT supports the municipal organisation, 
political choices on the way in which IT is used can still be made at a local level.
However, as stated, shared services are also introduced as a result of coercive, mimetic 
forces and to enhance credibility (Herbert & Seal, 2012; Janssen & Joha, 2006). In these 
cases, shared service centres are introduced even though the motives for doing so may 
be abstract and potentially conflicting. Moreover, the impact of the introduction of a shared 
service organisation may be underestimated (Janssen & Joha, 2006). The introduction of a 
shared service organisation is often not straightforward in such cases. It is difficult in practice 
to reach all the objectives expected of a shared services organisation (Janssen, Joha & 
Zuurmond, 2009; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Herbert & Seal, 2012). Expectations then have to 
be adjusted or choices have to be made in order to make the shared service arrangement 
acceptable to the participants (Janssen, Joha & Zuurmond, 2009). If the participants in the 
shared service were to prefer a certain amount of customisation in the way they furnish their 
offices, for example, less standardisation would be possible and therefore less efficiency 
would be achieved.
2.4 Organisational arrangements related to a shared service centre.
Several organisational arrangements of shared service centres can be distinguished. Figure 
2 depicts the arrangements that are most commonly used in shared service organisations, 
including those in the public sector (Janssen & Joha, 2006).
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Figure 1: Positioning of Shared Service Centre (Source: Janssen & Joha, 2006, p. 103) 
 
Figure 2: Positioning of Shared Service Centre (Source: Janssen & Joha, 2006, p. 103)
In figure 2, a shared service centre is positioned in-between a centralised model of organisation 
and an organisation in which specific services are outsourced to an external company. A 
shared service centre could be outsourced (Janssen & Joha, 2006, Herbert & Seal, 2012). 
What is distinctive in this arrangement is that the shared service centre is distanced from 
the organisation to which it delivers its services. This is an arrangement that has been 
implemented by several organisations in the private sector. Large companies such as Albert 
Heijn and KPN in the Netherlands are examples of organisations that have outsourced shared 
service centres which provide administrative processes (Strikwerda, 2010).
In public organisations the shared service centre and organisational agencies are 
most commonly part of the same organisational entity (Janssen & Joha, 2006). As 
indicated in figure 2, two possible organisational arrangements are then possible. The 
shared service centre may be positioned within a single organisation (it may be an intra-
organisational unit), or it can be a collaboration between different organisations that share 
their supportive processes in a joint shared service centre (an inter-organisational unit) 
(Janssen & Joha, 2006; Amiruddin et al., 2013). Whatever choice is made with respect 
to the organisational arrangement, research indicates that the governance arrangement 
for the shared service centre is relevant if the centre is to be effective (Walsh et al., 
2008; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Grant et al., 2007). When a shared service centre is set up 
a separate, a (semi-) autonomous organisational unit is typically established with its own 
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In figure 2, a shared service centre is positioned in-between a centralised model of organisation 
and an organisation in which specific services are outsourced to an external company. A 
shared service centre could be outsourced (Janssen & Joha, 2006, Herbert & Seal, 2012). 
What is distinctive in this arrangement is that the shared service centre is distanced from 
the organisation to which it delivers its services. This is an arrangement that has been 
implemented by several organisations in the private sector. Large companies such as Albert 
Heijn and KPN in the Netherlands are examples of organisations that have outsourced shared 
service centres which provide administrative processes (Strikwerda, 2010).
In public organisations the shared service centre and organisational agencies are 
most commonly part of the same organisational entity (Janssen & Joha, 2006). As 
indicated in figure 2, two possible organisational arrangements are then possible. The 
shared service centre may be positioned within a single organisation (it may be an intra-
organisational unit), or it can be a collaboration between different organisations that share 
their supportive processes in a joint shared service centre (an inter-organisational unit) 
(Janssen & Joha, 2006; Amiruddin et al., 2013). Whatever choice is made with respect 
to the organisational arrangement, research indicates that the governance arrangement 
for the shared service centre is relevant if the centre is to be effective (Walsh et al., 
2008; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Grant et al., 2007). When a shared service centre is set up 
a separate, a (semi-) autonomous organisational unit is typically established with its own 
budget and staff, and alongside traditional vertical accountability relations, horizontal 
accountability relations are introduced (Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Kastberg, 2014). 
Vertical accountability exists within the hierarchy of the organisation. The management of the 
shared service centre will be held accountable, by those higher up the hierarchical ladder, 
for its contribution to the goals of the organisation. However, the shared service centre will 
also have to respond to the needs of the business units to which it delivers its services. The 
delivery of services provided by the shared service centre is often agreed upon in some sort 
of contract or service level agreement. In these contracts arrangements are made regarding 
the quantity, quality and price of the services provided by the shared service centre, and the 
shared service centre will be held accountable for its performance in relation to the delivery 
of services. When a shared service centre is set up, this introduces a relationship that is 
often compared to that of a supplier and a customer (Janssen & Joha, 2006; Grant et al., 
2007; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Herbert & Seal, 2012). This is referred to as horizontal 
accountability because there is no (vertical) hierarchical relation between the shared service 
centre and the business units. 
Hence, the introduction of a shared service centre within an organisation leads to a situation 
in which aspects of hierarchy and market co-exist within the organisation. A governance 
arrangement provides a way to manage the transactions within the boundaries of the 
organisation (Judge & Dooley, 2006). Such an arrangement addresses “the relationship 
between many clients and one internal vendor, both belonging to the same organisation” 
(Janssen & Joha, 2006, p. 103).  An effective governance arrangement is considered 
indispensable when a shared service centre is established (Walsh et al., 2008; Janssen & 
Joha, 2006; Grant et al., 2007). A governance structure should provide for clear decision 
rights, defined roles and responsibilities, and issue resolution processes (Grant et al., 2007). 
These are needed because traditional hierarchical management is interrupted. In addition, 
decision-making authority should be clear, especially when, for example, conflicts emerge 
between the shared service centre and business units. A poor internal governance structure, 
poor management of relationships or organisational change is bound to result in not achieving 
objectives or even to incur negative effects (Cooke, 2006). 
While a shared service centre requires a specific governance set-up in itself, certain 
characteristics of local government organisations cause additional considerations for effective 
governance (Schulz & Brenner, 2010). Political decision-making does not always lead to the 
most efficient solution when it comes to governance (Aalto, 2012). As a result, “the design 
of the SSC business model seems to be a compromise balancing the different interests and 
perceptions of the involved stakeholders” (Jansen & Joha, 2005, p. 114). Niehaves and Krause 
(2010) concluded that the behaviour of key actors within local government organisations 
and prior cooperation from stakeholders in local government organisations are necessary 
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conditions for an SSC to emerge. If key actors such as mayors or high-level executives within 
municipalities work together, it is likely that a fruitful collaboration will develop. When prior 
cooperation is perceived as successful and a structure for this cooperation is already present, 
this increases the chances that a shared service cooperation will emerge. The success of 
particular arrangements thus appears to vary, depending on the specific local circumstances. 
Other impediments that have been reported, but have not been further clarified, are the 
existence of too many decision makers, conflicting objectives, and difficulties in agreeing on 
what constitutes the ‘right’ approach (Dollery & Akimov, 2008).
In the previous section, we explored the characteristics of NPM, which introduces private-
sector management practices into the public sector. The shared service centre was the main 
topic of this section. The shared service centre can also be considered a private-sector 
initiative that is carried into the public sector. Just like NPM, it is a concept that is guided 
mainly by economic rationality. As such, it fits the tradition of NPM thinking that has developed 
in the public sector over the past decades. 
Introducing a shared service centre into a municipal organisation brings additional challenges, 
however. These challenges are caused by the specific characteristics of these types of 
organisations. Compared to a private-sector organisation, the most apparent difference is the 
relevance of political powers and interests within the municipal organisation. These powers 
influence decisions regarding the shared service centre (Janssen & Joha, 2005; Niehaves 
& Krause, 2010; Dollery & Akimov, 2008; Kastberg, 2014). The next section introduces the 
municipality in which this research was conducted, the municipality of The Hague in the 
Netherlands.
2.5 Introducing the municipality of The Hague
Dutch government has three main pillars: the national government, the government at the 
province (‘state’) level, and local government (municipalities). Each municipality has its own 
competences and can initiate “all sorts of policies that it considers important for the local 
community” (Budding, 2008, p. 23). The activities of municipalities cover a variety of policy 
fields such as social services, welfare, sanitation, economic development, education, and 
public housing transport. The freedom of choice of the municipalities is constrained, however, 
by requirements set at a higher level of government and by the power of national government 
to compel municipalities to comply with national laws (Koopmans, 2003). 
In the organisation of the municipal administration a distinction can be made between political 
bodies and the bureaucracy or civil service organisation (Budding, 2008). The political bodies 
consist of the city council and the board of the mayor and deputy mayors. Municipal elections 
are held every four years to elect representatives for the city council. They appoint the deputy 
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mayors on the basis of the number of representatives from each political party. The mayor is 
appointed, for a duration of six years, by the Crown (i.e., the Minister of Interior and Kingdom 
Relations) (Budding, 2008). The mayor and deputy mayors together form the board of the 
mayor and deputy mayors. They are responsible for the day-to-day management of the city. 
The civil service organisation can be organised in different ways, but most commonly the 
structure is based on the policy fields mentioned above (Budding, 2008; Aardema & Korsten, 
2009). This leads to departments with responsibility for areas such as urban development, 
urban maintenance, social welfare, or education. The municipal secretary is the top-level 
manager in the civil service organisation and serves as the link between the board of the 
mayor and deputy mayors and the bureaucracy. The municipal secretary, together with 
the managers of the divisions or departments, is the top management of the municipal 
organisation. Figure 3 depicts the typical structure of a Dutch municipality.
 
Figure 1: Structure of Dutch municipalities (based on: Budding, 2008, p. 24) 
 
Figure 3: Structu e of Dutch municipalities (based on: Budding, 2008, p. 24)
The municipality of The Hague is organised according to the structure set out in Figure 3. 
It is the third largest municipality in the Netherlands, with 510,000 citizens living within its 
boundaries. The organisation of the municipality has 6,500 civil servants who deliver services 
to the citizens, with a total budget of over 2 billion Euros per annum. The municipal council 
of The Hague consists of 35 members from 15 different political parties. They are the highest 
governing body of the municipality and determine municipal policy for the four years of their 
office. The board of the mayor and deputy mayor executes this policy and decides on the 
measures available to obtain the goals formulated in the municipal policy. The board of the mayor 
and deputy mayors in the municipality of The Hague consists of seven deputy mayors. One of 
them is responsible, and therefore also politically accountable, for the municipal organisation. 
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The municipal secretary is the first advisor of the board and chair of the general municipal 
management team (GMT).  
The general directors of the municipality’s main departments5 are all part of the GMT. In 
addition to their responsibility in the GMT the general directors have an integral accountability 
for the performance of their departments. They are held accountable by the deputy mayor 
responsible for their particular policy area. Departments are organised based on policy 
fields such as urban development, sanitation, education and welfare, social services, and 
public services. The department of municipal administration is concerned with business 
management policies and supporting the board of the mayor and deputy mayors. Figure 4 
depicts the organisation of the municipality of The Hague. As can be seen in this figure, the 
municipality structure is clearly organised around departments. Integral managers of these 
departments are responsible for the overall performance of their department. The municipality 
of The Hague uses accrual budgeting. Services delivered from one department to the other 
are chargeable and are often based on contractual agreements.
 
Figure 1: Organisation of the municipality of The Hague 
 
Figure 4: Organisation of the municipality of The Hague
5 The main departments are: DECW, DSAE, DPS, DUD, DCM and DMA (see figure 4 for an explanation of the 
abbreviations).
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This research mainly concerns the overhead and staff functions within the municipality, which 
are labelled ‘business management’: the management of the provision of support services. 
These services are partly organised within the Internal Service Centre (ISC). The ISC holds 
a special position in the municipality, because it is considered to be not a department but a 
company in the context of the municipality. This ought to emphasise the nature of the activities 
undertaken by the ISC: the provision of support services to the municipal departments. The ISC 
provides services for personnel and salary administration (called ‘Human Resource Services’; 
HRS), housing and facilities, and technical management of the IT infrastructure. Other support 
services such as Finance, Personnel and Organisation, and IT are part of the departments of 
the municipality. To manage and coordinate these services several committees exist in which 
representatives of the different departments are brought together. These committees are 
chaired by a director from the Department of Municipal Administration. For example, every 
department has a Finance division. This division is headed by the departmental management 
accountant. He or she sits on the committee of management accountants in which financial 
rules, procedures, and other issues are discussed. This committee is chaired by the municipal 
management accountant, also called the Finance Director or ‘Concern controller’, who is 
responsible for the financial planning and control of the municipality of The Hague.
2.6 Concluding remarks
NPM has led to the adoption of management practices in the public sector that were 
perceived as having been successful in the private sector, such as the shared service centre. 
Even though no hard evidence exists that this has led to more effective and more efficient 
government, the shared service centres are now commonplace in the public sector and their 
numbers are growing. The concept of shared services has been transferred from the private 
sector into the public sector based on the promise of cost reductions and improved quality of 
service delivery. 
This leads to the current situation in which the presence of shared service centres in the 
public sector is widespread. Governance is known to be important when shared services 
are introduced (Walsh et al., 2008; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Grant et al., 2007; Minnaar & 
Vosselman, 2013), but this is even more important in the specific context of a public service 
organisation such as a municipality (Schulz & Brenner, 2010; Dollery & Akimov, 2008; Aalto, 
2012; Niehaves & Krause, 2010).  Shared services are often introduced based on (economic) 
promises of significant cost saving while maintaining existing service levels (Herbert & Seal, 
2012; Janssen & Joha, 2006). However, municipalities are public organisations led by political 
representatives. The interests of different representatives do not always coincide, even though 
they head the same organisation. As a consequence, economic rationality is not the only 
rationality in these organisations (Ter Bogt, 2008; Lapsey & Pallot, 2003). Research on NPM 
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reforms indicates that this may lead to a decoupling of accounting and control instruments 
and decision-making (Van Hengel, Groot & Budding, 2008; Laspey & Pallot, 2003). These 
different aspects collide in the governance structure.
This research has been conducted while I was one of the managers within the process under 
scrutiny. A researcher should always investigate his or her own position, values and beliefs 
when conducting research (Johnson & Duberley, 2003; Calás & Smircich, 1999; Cunliffe, 
2004, 2011). However, this issue is probably even more relevant when my own position as 
a manager (who is also a researcher) is taken into account. In chapter 3 this subject will be 
elaborated upon.
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CHAPTER 3
Philosophical assumptions behind the study
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3.1 Introduction
Here I am preparing (again) for a debate with my fellow management accountants from the 
other departments. One year ago, in 2007, we had designed, with a select group, a new cost 
allocation method that was less complex than the one currently used. We had discussed 
the proposed method in the meeting of the council of management accountants, at which 
our proposal was accepted (at least that is what I thought had happened). Now, a year later, 
we are still discussing the implications of the new method. Every time we discuss this topic 
emotions are running high and issues that I thought we had decided upon are questioned 
again. In any case, the numbers I now present are deemed to be wrong, and are thought to 
be questionable. I know the outcomes will not suit everyone, but we knew that this course of 
action could arise when we decided upon this subject, didn’t we? What happened? Was the 
design wrong? Did we make other mistakes? Anyway, things did not work out the way we 
intended, at least from my perspective.
(Excerpt based on logbook entry of the author, early 2008)
This anecdote illustrates some of my experiences, or perhaps frustration, while dealing with 
(elements of) the governance structure that followed the introduction of a shared service 
centre (SSC) in the municipality of The Hague. I experienced a discrepancy between the 
intentions behind the design of the cost allocation method and the way it worked out or was 
used in practice. This was the main reason for me to start this research. I wanted to get an 
understanding of what was going on. Specifically, I wished to understand the choices that 
were made in the design of the governance structure, how the choices were perceived, and 
why the further processing of the governance structure turned out the way it did (in the eyes 
of some of the key players involved). During the research I was an ‘embedded’ researcher 
and a practitioner holding a management position in the organisation and directly involved 
in the processes under scrutiny. This position affected my research without a doubt, but is 
research not always affected by the one who is conducting it? This chapter elaborates on this 
question and other issues that relate to the philosophical assumptions that guide this research. 
Stated differently, this research is based on philosophical assumptions relating to (a) the 
nature of ‘reality’, that is, what is ‘out there or not’ (ontology); (b) what counts as knowledge, 
given what is (allegedly) being researched (epistemology); and (c) the research process and 
methods used, as well as the role of the researcher in this (methodology). The ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological assumptions determine the way the research can 
be interpreted and understood. Different possible choices regarding the assumptions are 
highlighted and the choices that were made in this research are outlined. The chapter ends 
with some concluding remarks.
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3.2 Philosophical assumptions in research
When a researcher starts a research project, he or she has certain assumptions about the 
way reality is perceived and/or constructed and about the roles of theory and researchers 
in understanding and probing this reality. These beliefs provide answers to questions 
such as: Is there a world ‘out there’ that is objectively observable? Or, can reality only 
be understood with the aid of people (or for that matter, non-human actors) living in the 
reality that is being studied? What role do the values and beliefs of these people play 
when they are the ‘lens’ through which reality is studied? How can perceptions of reality 
add to existing theoretical accounts? What methods of research can be applied? And, 
how are interpretations made that ultimately may or may not be labelled as ´knowledge´? 
These are questions of an ontological, epistemological, and methodological nature. 
Consistent constellations of ontology, epistemology, and methodology are basic beliefs 
regarding research, which are also called paradigms (Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Although several paradigms can be distinguished (for example, see Creswell, 2007; Guba, 
1990), this chapter is focused on the positivist and constructivist paradigm because these 
paradigms differ particularly from each other in ontological and epistemological philosophical 
assumptions. Exploration of these paradigms is helpful to display the position my research takes. 
Although the differences between the paradigms discussed here are perhaps obvious (as 
they are clear opposites), the differences are not always that evident and many other positions 
are possible in-between the two extreme positions set out below. The distinction between 
different paradigms therefore has a more “shifting and fluid nature” (Cunliffe, 2011, p. 653). 
3.2.1 An exploration of ontological and epistemological questions
The ontological question addresses both the assumptions that are made regarding the 
nature of reality and the vocabulary that is used to describe this reality (Calas & Smircich, 
1999; Cresswell, 2007; Cunliffe, 2011; Guba, 1990). The main question is whether reality is
independently observable (a realist ontology) or is constructed in the context in which it is
researched (a relative ontology).
From a realist point of view, one believes that reality is directly observable, independent of the 
researcher (Cunliffe, 2011). The picture that is perceived is the same for everyone and is not 
blurred by individual meanings, perspectives, and assumptions. In cases where the picture is 
blurred, research methods can be applied to alleviate the blur. Reality is therefore universal 
and exists outside of the individual; it is ‘out there’ waiting to be apprehended (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Guba, 1990). From this point of view, reality consists of ‘hard’, tangible, and 
observable structures and behavioural patterns. These patterns are governed by laws that 
are comparable to natural laws. This means that in every context and situation the same 
structures lead to the same behavioural patterns. The behaviour of people develops in line 
525761-L-bw-Jellema
Processed on: 30-11-2018 PDF page: 36
36
Philosophical assumptions behind the study
with their environment and the social context in which they are embedded (Creswell, 2007; 
Cunliffe, 2011; Hassard & Cox, 2013).
From a relative point of view, one believes that reality is only observable through the people who 
live in it (Cunliffe, 2011). Reality is not an observable, tangible structure but is an (intersubjective) 
interpretation by those who are part of the situation under scrutiny. Guided by their own beliefs 
and assumptions about what is happening in practice, people build their own interpretation 
(and possibly a joint interpretation) of what they think is reality. Consequently, reality is a 
constructed description, made by individuals or collectives of individuals (Cunliffe, 2011). This 
description differs in different contexts because the individuals (and their beliefs and opinions) 
are not the same, and as a result their interpretations differ (Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
From a relative perspective, human actions are determined not only by the context in which 
they live in, but also by a process of understanding and interpretation of an individual or a 
collective of individuals. People both constitute and are constituted by their surroundings. 
Based on the picture that is perceived and constructed, it is decided what type of action is taken. 
Variations on these answers to the ontological question are also possible – it is not an ‘either/
or’ question. For example, one could also claim that a directly observable reality can be 
perceived as being emergent, as a process of coming into being. It can be a reality that can 
be observed, but that also develops while being observed (Cunliffe, 2011). Hence, more 
ontological positions are possible than just the ones described above.
The epistemological question is about the relation of the researcher to that what is being 
researched, and what he/she believes may count as knowledge (Creswell, 2007; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). Two different approaches to answering this epistemological question are the 
objectivist and subjectivist approach (Guba, 1990).
Viewed from an objective epistemological perspective, the researcher is distanced from 
what he or she is studying. The values of the researcher are perceived as a source of bias 
that potentially influences the research and has therefore to be prevented or, if present, 
eliminated. Only if this potential source of bias is controlled, can the findings of the researcher 
be considered to be ‘true’ (Guba, 1990).
This epistemological assumption can easily be related to the ontological assumption that 
reality can be reconstructed in terms of structures, behavioural patterns, and laws. From 
this objective, realist perspective, research would be aimed at falsifying or confirming these 
natural laws. Hypotheses are formulated (based on natural laws) and tested against the world 
that is assumed to be ‘out there’. Key is the belief that there exists replicable knowledge, 
which is (re)built or (re)discovered by application in different situations and contexts. From 
this perspective, knowledge is developed from an outside or ‘etic’ perspective (Cunliffe, 2011). 
Knowledge is built by the researcher and the academic context he or she lives in. Based on 
the research accounts knowledge develops in this academic world, outside of the world that is 
being studied (Cunliffe, 2004). In this perspective, interaction between these different worlds 
does not exist.
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In a subjective epistemology, the researcher is entangled in the context under scrutiny. He 
or she influences the object of study. Even by just being there the researcher influences, for 
example, the behaviour of subjects who may feel compelled to show behaviour that is socially 
desirable instead of behaviour that they would show when no one was watching (Alvesson, 
2003; De Loo & Lowe, 2012). Also, it can be argued that the researcher actively helps in shaping 
reality because he or she plays a role in the process of understanding and interpreting what 
is happening in reality (e.g., by interviewing people). Moreover, because the researcher may 
be actively present when reality is ‘made’, he or she influences the course of action. Events 
might develop in another way than if the researcher had not been there. Researchers also 
may invoke their beliefs more actively as some are more strongly driven by their own values 
when conducting research. These researchers participate in research to engage in social 
debates on, for example, womens’ rights (Cunliffe, 2011; Guba, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
In a subjective epistemology there exists no universal knowledge that can be tested. Knowledge 
is built in the context in which the research is conducted by ‘embedded’ researchers who try to 
gain an understanding of daily practice from an emic or insider’s perspective (Cunliffe, 2011). 
“Knowledge can only be produced in ‘small stories’ or ‘modest narratives’ mindful of their 
locality in space and time…” (Calás & Smircich, 1999, p. 651).
As suggested above, assumptions about ontology and epistemology are not completely 
independent, but related. The assumption that there is an objective identifiable reality, for 
example, implies universal knowledge which is theorised by outside researchers (Cunliffe, 
2011). Thus, a realist ontology coincides naturally with an objective epistemology. When 
reality is considered to consist of observable structures and patterns in which behaviour is 
predictable, based on natural laws, there is no need for a researcher to become a part of this 
reality to gain an understanding of what is happening. The task of the researcher is to observe 
what he or she sees, and the belief is that what is observed are the facts. 
A relativist ontology indicates an epistemology that advocates dependence of the context of 
knowledge, the limitations of the understanding of the reality by the researcher, and the role 
of the researcher (Calas & Smircich, 1999; Cunliffe, 2011; Hassard & Cox, 2013). If reality is 
thought to be constructed by human actors, individually or collectively, there are no ‘absolute 
objective facts’ that can be observed in the external world. The challenge the researcher faces 
in this perspective is to build an understanding of how the people in the context under scrutiny 
experience what is going on. How do they perceive the events which they think are ‘facts’? 
What value do they attach to these experiences? How do they feel about and describe the 
events happening in the context they live in? Finding answers to these questions is necessary 
for the researcher to obtain a picture of how the situation of interest has been constructed 
by the human actor. The goal of the researcher is to gain a deeper understanding of the 
individual experiences, thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of the people in the situation that 
is being studied. Using research to predict or explain is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
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to do from this point of view. Based on a deeper understanding of the object of study, the 
researcher can add to existing knowledge and theory development.
However, the answer to the epistemological question is more complicated than suggested 
above. In addition to the perspectives highlighted above, one can take many other positions. 
For example, there could be a position in which the researcher is part of and shapes the 
context under scrutiny, but is also able to distance him- or herself from this context and thus 
to take an etic perspective (Modell & Luka, 2010). If reality is considered to be shaped in 
networks of human actors (or of human actors and non-human actors), the researcher is 
part of this reality once he or she enters the research site. Being part of this network the 
researcher performs actions in this network, such as making observations or conducting 
interviews. With these actions the researcher is part of the process of understanding what 
is happening and is actively involved in the shaping of the context under scrutiny. However, 
after leaving the research site the researcher will evaluate the ‘data’ that have been gathered 
and use this information to theorise and add to the knowledge in the world of academia. 
The next section explores the consequences of the ontological and epistemological positions 
for the methodological question. Whatever the position taken with respect to ontology and 
epistemology, this will influence the methodology that may be used to conduct the research 
(Cresswel, 2007; Cunliffe, 2011; Guba & Johnson, 1994). As we will see, several different 
positions can also be taken here.
3.2.2 An exploration of the methodological question
The methodological question considers the approach taken to the conduct of the research. 
This involves questions related to the research methods that are used to collect and analyse 
the ‘data’. It also involves questions about the role of the researcher(s) during these aspects 
of research. Moreover, attention is devoted to the way in which analyses are conducted 
and to the logic that is used to interpret the ‘data’. Another aspect of methodology is the 
design (or lack of it) of the research that is carried out (Creswell, 2007; Cunliffe, 2011). 
As stated, another aspect that should be considered is the role of the researcher him- or 
herself. Accordingly, some scholars have argued that reflexivity should be part of any type 
of research that is conducted, because we should “engage with ourselves through thinking 
about our own thinking” (Johnson & Duberly, 2003, p. 1279). In this view, the researcher who 
conducts research is considered to be part of two worlds: the world he or she studies and the 
world of him- or herself (the academic world) (Cunliffe, 2003).  Whether or not these worlds 
are related depends on the philosophical assumptions of the research. Three factors need to 
be considered when addressing the role of the researcher in these worlds: (1) the role of the 
researcher in the constitution of the object of study, (2) the impact on knowledge making of 
the interests in the different worlds, and (3) the impact of writings/ language on our definition 
of knowledge (Calás & Smircich, 1999). 
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A research project that is conducted within a realist ontology and an objective epistemology is 
typically based on a predefined research plan. For example, a plan that describes how the research 
will be conducted, what methods will be used to collect the data, what will be studied, and who 
will be interviewed. This approach to research presumes that reality is directly observable and 
predictable and hence that it is possible to determine upfront what will be a suitable research 
strategy to answer the research questions. The chosen methods, such as surveys, structured 
interviews, observations, or case studies, are in accordance with the assumptions that lie behind 
the research. The findings obtained are equivalent to facts in this approach (Cunliffe, 2011). 
The researcher is considered a distant observer and not part of the subject of the study. He 
or she interprets the observed facts with scientific methods such as statistical analysis. In this 
approach, reliability and validity are important criteria to assess the quality of the research 
(Yin, 2009). To assess the reliability of the study’s results over time, one needs to determine 
whether the same results and conclusions are obtained when the research is repeated 
using identical procedures at another point in time. For this, thorough documentation of the 
research procedures and methods is required to enable the research to be repeated. The aim 
of reliability is to minimise errors and bias in a study (Yin, 2009).
Validity refers to the extent to which empirical measures adequately reflect the reality that 
is being studied. Several aspects are relevant when evaluating validity. Are the operational 
measures, presumed to measure the topic of research interest, correct? Do they measure 
what the researcher genuinely wants to investigate? This criterion is often referred to as 
construct validity. Another aspect of validity involves the quality of the conclusions that are 
drawn from the research, taking into account the research design, study sample, and methods 
used. For example, it may be difficult to draw strong conclusions about relationships when 
the design is poor or the measurements are confounded by error. A final aspect that needs 
to be addressed, referred to as external validity, is the issue of whether or not the findings 
are generalisable beyond the specific situation and subject sample that have been studied. 
In this approach, a “thick wall of one-way glass” (Guba, 1999, p. 19) is believed to exist 
between the object of study and the researcher, so that his or her own beliefs and values 
are excluded from the research and measures can be taken to facilitate the validity and 
reliability of the research. For example, a broader evidence base can be provided by using 
multiple sources of evidence or by conducting the same study in a different context. These 
measures help to ensure the reliability and validity of the conclusions of a study (Yin, 2009). 
The language used in the written and oral report for this type of research is factual and 
definitive. The aim of this type of research is to explain and predict what is happening in 
practice (Cunliffe, 2011). This combination of philosophical assumptions – namely a realist 
ontology, an objective epistemology, and a methodology that is meant to explain – is referred 
to as a positivist paradigm. The picture that emerges when relating the assumptions of this 
paradigm to the three aspects of reflexivity mentioned by Calás and Smirchich (1999) is 
presented in table 2.
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Table 2. Philosophical assumptions of the positivist paradigm in relation to reflexivity
World that the researcher 
studies World of the researcher
Role of the researcher 
in the constitution of the 
subject of study
Researcher is a distant 
observer
Researcher analyses facts 
and infers causal relationships 
based on ‘natural law’.
Bias can be erased or 
prevented by taking appropriate 
measures.
Impact of interests on 
knowledge-making Not applicable Not applicable
Impact of writings/language 
on our definition of 
knowledge
Not applicable Not applicable
 
The assumptions of this paradigm imply that a carefully considered research design ensures 
research that is free from bias and influences relating to the context of the researcher or to 
the subject of study. Furthermore, because facts are studied, analysed, and reported, the 
interpretation of the research results presented is typically not a subject of debate among 
scholars.
In contrast, research that is based on a relativist ontology and a subjective epistemology does 
not involve a (fully) predefined plan (De Loo & Lowe, 2012). Because the researcher does not 
know in advance what will be encountered in the situation being studied and which behaviour 
he or she will display, there is much more room for ‘playfulness’ (Denzin, 1978). The specific 
questions asked, the situations observed, and the documents studied all emerge from what 
happens when the research is conducted in daily practice. As such, the research is partially a 
‘process of discovery’ (De Loo & Lowe, 2012). 
In this perspective, a researcher plays a distinctive role when conducting research. All the 
information gathered in this research is the result of interpretation and these interpretations 
are in turn interpreted by the researcher (interpretations of interpretation; cf. Alvesson 
& Skoldberg, 2009). The researcher interprets the findings on the basis of his or her own 
perspective, values, and beliefs, as well as on the basis of the theoretical lens that is being 
utilised  (Alvesson & Skolberg, 2009; Cunliffe, 2004). The view of the researcher on the 
‘empirical data’ is also influenced by the context in which the research takes place; the 
researcher is part of a constructed world and cannot take a neutral position in conducting 
research and constructing knowledge (Alvesson, 1996). Understanding is most important 
in this type of research, and this is gained by engaging in different types of discourse, 
including conversations, writing, and reading. Findings are not based on the interpretation 
of the researcher alone. If the researcher uses interviews, for example, the interviewees 
include their own subjectivity on the basis of their perspective (De Loo & Lowe, 2012). 
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To address these different types of subjectivity the researcher should investigate his or 
her own perspective (Alvesson, 1996; Cunlife, 2004). Insight into the perspective of the 
researcher can be derived from knowing about the process that the researcher has gone 
through during data collection and interpretation and what choices he or she has been made 
when producing written texts (Siti-Nahiba, 2009). The researcher has to be confronted with 
his or her personal thoughts, ideas, beliefs and values. This can be accomplished in several 
ways, such as making personal presumptions explicit. Also, in presenting the research, 
the researcher can choose a strategy of writing in the first person. This strategy makes it 
clear to the reader that the researcher him- or herself plays a role in the interpretation. The 
author could also invite the reader to consider alternative interpretations of the ‘data’ that 
are presented (De Loo & Lowe, 2012). For example, the researcher may present different 
perspectives by putting forward not only his or her own interpretation, but also the views of 
others (Alvesson et al., 2008). The researcher is faced with several challenges when invoking 
these theoretical reflections. One of the main challenges is the extent to which the researcher 
is aware when conducting the research of his or her own assumptions and preferences. 
Moreover, a researcher is challenged to resist the temptation to pay less attention to findings 
or interpretations that do not coincide with his or her own beliefs. In this process of including or 
excluding interpretations the researcher is “fixing signification” (Calás & Smircich, 1999, p. 664). 
Despite these challenges, the strength of this type of research is that it offers ‘convincin’ stories, 
and identifies uncertainties that exist in organisations and processes of interest (De Loo & 
Lowe, 2012). In-depth knowledge of the specific context enhances careful interpretations and 
diminishes the chance of misunderstandings (Alvesson, 1996). This type of research aims to 
produce persuasive texts – that is, stories that are considered by readers as ‘credible’ and 
‘truthful’ (Chua & Baxter, 2008). If the written account makes sense to the readers, they will 
consider the story to be more convincing (De Loo & Lowe, 2012). A text should also echo that 
the researcher ‘has been’ in the field. The descriptions in the study should be realistic and the 
events described should be plausible because, if not, the persuasiveness of the study will be 
compromised. In addition, the results presented should be recognizable to those who have 
been studied (De Loo & Lowe, 2012). The written research report is the source of information 
by which the reader to judges whether the account is credible.
Accordingly, the process of writing the final research report is an activity that should not 
be underestimated. As stated by Chua and Baxter (1998, p. 83): “It raises issues that go 
to the heart of fundamental debates about the scientific authority of field research.’’ The 
style of language that is used in a research report is shaped by the choices the researcher 
makes during the process of writing. Scholars reading the research report interpret 
the content of the text and the language used on the basis of their own perceptions. 
However, because they often lack the extensive contextual knowledge that the researcher 
has, the interpretations and, consequently, the inferences made by scholarly readers 
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may be different from those of the researchers. Even though the conclusions drawn 
by researchers may represent a valuable addition to knowledge, it is not certain how 
they will be interpreted by other academics (Cálas & Smircich, 1999; Cunliffe, 2003). 
The constellation of a relative ontology, a subjective epistemology, and a methodology that 
seeks to understand is referred to as a constructivist paradigm. Its characteristics in relation 
to reflexivity are shown in table 3.
Table 3. Philosophical assumptions of the constructivist paradigm in relation to reflexivity
World that the researcher 
studies World of the researcher
Role of the researcher in the 
constitution of the subject 
of study
Researcher is an active 
participant who shapes the 
practice under scrutiny
Researcher fixes signification
Impact of interests on 
knowledge-making
Study participants determine 
what is shown to/shared with 
the researcher
The dominant beliefs and 
assumptions within the 
academic network of the 
researcher affect the choices 
made by the researcher
Impact of writings/language 
on our definition of 
knowledge
Language guides our 
interpretation of reality
Sense-making is done through 
different types of discourse 
which are interpreted and built 
upon
The answers to the ontological and epistemological questions described earlier are clearly 
not black and white. Under the premise that the answers to these questions are consistent, 
this also applies to the methodological question and the choice of methods used. A vast 
array of methods is available to conduct the research and some of them are more suitable 
for one approach than another. For example, quantitative data obtained in carefully controlled 
experiments are very well suited to the application of statistical analysis and the inference 
of causal relationships. On the other hand, active participation by the researcher to gain 
an understanding of the context under scrutiny is rarely applied within a positivist research 
paradigm and fits better within a constructivist paradigm. The use of interviews is a method that 
is useful in both approaches to research. However, the way in which interviews are conducted 
differs between the approaches. From a positivist perspective, an interview is used to gather 
facts and data that can be analysed in a structured way. From a constructivist perspective, an 
interview is used to gain an understanding of how the interviewee perceives his or her reality 
(Alvesson, 2003; De Loo & Lowe, 2012). In this perspective, it can also be used to collectively 
interpret this reality and construct a more collective picture of what is perceived as a reality. 
These different theoretical and methodological choices also impact different aspects of 
reflexivity. In a more positivist approach language is typically factual, whereas in an approach 
related to constructivism it is more tentative because from this perspective facts do not exist.
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3.2.3 Concluding the exploration of the philosophical assumptions
This section summarizes the philosophical assumptions that commonly guide a research 
project. The possible answers that can be given to the ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological questions within the two contrasting paradigms are presented in table 4. 
Table 4. Philosophical assumptions of positivist and constructivist research paradigms 
Positivist Constructivist
Ontology
Realistic 
Reality is objectively observable 
and independent of time and 
place
Relative
Reality is dependent on the constructions 
made in a specific time and place
Human nature
Determinism 
Human actors act based on 
(economic) rationality
Reflexive 
Human actors act based on interpretations 
in process of making meaning
Epistemology
Objective 
The researcher is a distanced 
observer 
Knowledge is objective, universal 
and true
Subjective 
Knowledge is dependent of the context, time 
and place in which it is constructed
The researcher is implicated in the research 
process
Methodology Aims to explainLanguage is factual
Aims to understand 
Language is tentative
Source: Guba (1990) and Guba & Lincoln (1994) 
Traditionally the positivist paradigm predominates in research also in the social sciences and 
hence in management accounting research (Creswell, 2007; Cunliffe, 2011; Guba, 1990). 
However, different perspectives have been adopted in management accounting research 
(Scapens & Arnold, 1986; Lukka & Modell, 2010). 
In the next section the philosophical assumptions of this specific research project are 
described. The questions that are explored in the next section serve as a guide to highlight 
the position of this research.
3.3 The philosophical assumptions in this research
Initially, I would like to go back to the anecdote described at the start of this chapter, before 
addressing the philosophical assumptions underlying this research. This anecdote gives an 
impression of the process I went through when I worked at the municipality of The Hague. To 
understand where my own views come from, it is helpful to elaborate on my position within 
the municipality. 
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3.3.1 My position in the municipality of The Hague
From 2001 until 2016 I worked in various positions within several Finance Departments of 
the municipality of The Hague. During this period I had a number of interesting experiences 
where I saw how management accounting instruments affected daily practice within a finance 
department.
In one of the first departments I worked in, for example, the budgeting process and the numbers 
used seemed to provide management an important grip on what was happening. Management 
typically considered the financial reports to be an important instrument that supported the 
dialogue between managers on what to expect from each other in terms of how they were 
achieving their goals. This experience strengthened my belief that management accounting 
is important in determining the behaviour of those involved in using such an instrument. 
When I transferred to the Facility Department I noticed, however, that the budgeting cycle was 
thought to be the responsibility of the management accountant, rather than the department’s 
management. This experience differed completely from my previous experiences.
And, although I had to work hard to draw the attention of management to the subject of 
management accounting, my own belief remained that management accounting was an 
important determinant of people acting in a pre-defined way.
At the time I started this research I became the management accountant of the Internal Service 
Centre (ISC), the new shared service centre of the municipality of The Hague. The construction 
of a cost allocation model was one of the projects I was involved in. I started this process 
with a still rather instrumental perspective on management accounting in mind. I thought the 
design of cost allocation model would be quite straightforward, as would its implementation. 
As the process progressed, however, I learned that these assumptions needed to be revised. 
The design of the cost allocation model was supposed to take place in a project group of 
which I became the chair. This group consisted of management accountants from several 
departments within the municipality. Even in this rather homogeneous group there was much 
debate about the role and impact of the cost allocation model and how sophisticated it should 
be. Should we, for example, charge for photocopies provided to the departments, or not? And 
if we did, should black and white copies be charged at a different rate than colour copies? In 
these debates it became clear to me that, even within a group of management accountants, 
the value that is attached to a management accounting instrument differs depending on the 
views, beliefs and interests of an individual. 
3.3.2 My philosophical assumptions in this thesis
The ontological question. My experiences in the municipality shaped how I think about the 
role of management accounting in the daily practice of an organisation. These experiences 
have resulted in assumptions that have gradually shifted during the process of this research. I 
started off with a rather positivist view on research where I thought I could observe what was 
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happening in practice. However, once I got involved with the ISC I started thinking more and more 
that there is not one observable, objective reality that can be studied from a distance. Because 
people judge their experiences based on their own values and beliefs, their interpretation of 
these experiences differ. This was noticeable, for example, in the debates I had on the cost 
allocation system. The debates we had on the design of this system resulted from different 
ways of thinking about the performance of such a system. These different ways of thinking were 
fuelled by different experiences we had had with the same system that was used at that time 
within the municipality. These experiences led some of us to believe that it was necessary to 
charge for relatively small items, such as copying, and others to the belief that this was of no use. 
Although we interpreted the performance of the cost allocation system differently, I think the 
debates we had can also be perceived as a joint process of interpretation. In this process we 
tried collectively to reach a common understanding of what the cost allocation system was 
about and how it should perform. So, I think a picture of reality is constructed in a process in 
which intersubjective interpretations are developed and shared. This research, therefore, also 
adopts an intersubjective ontology (Cunliffe, 2011).
The epistemological question. An intersubjective ontology implies that knowledge is 
dependent on the time and place of the research project. A researcher is also part of the 
intersubjective development of interpretations. As such, the researcher is an active participant 
in the construction of this shared interpretation. The understanding that results from this 
process is not easily transferred to other situations. 
One important aspect that needs consideration here is the possibility that a management 
accounting instrument has an effect of its own. This means that such an instrument could 
guide, at least partly, the decisions people make, given the (financial) effects resulting 
from these decisions. Thus, the management accounting instrument becomes part of the 
context in which it operates. As depicted above, in my experience management accounting, 
such as management reports in which operational and financial results were reported, 
served as a means by which purportedly relevant issues could be discussed between 
managers and others within the organisation. I think that simply the fact that topics were 
selected and that had to be reported directed managerial attention to these topics. In this 
way the management accounting instrument was a mobiliser. During this process, however, 
the management accounting process itself also changes, in both content and shape. 
When we turn to the epistemological assumption in this research, this assumption also 
shifted when research was underway. The rational economic perspective that was applied to 
answer the first research question coincided with an objective epistemology. The researcher 
is considered to be a distanced observer and reality can be assessed based on universal 
truth. Also, I started this part of the research with the aim of assessing the choices made 
within the municipality based on the academic literature. Based on this assessment the 
municipality could make adjustments to the governance structure and/or I could add findings 
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to existing literature. However, during the research process I became more and more aware 
of the impact of my position and role in the process so I thought, and I realised that choices 
within the municipality could only be viable in the specific context in which they were taken. 
Gradually the epistemological assumption in this research shifted to a relational epistemology. 
This means that knowledge is built on the basis of the researcher’s in-depth involvement in 
the construction of an intersubjective understanding of what is perceived as reality. In this 
construction management accounting, as a non-human actor, is thought to act at the same 
level as human actors as it enables and constrains the actions of human actors. In chapter 5 
this issue is elaborated on extensively.
The methodological question. The ontological and epistemological assumptions which I 
have make reflexivity an important element of this research. As I will explain below I held a 
management position in the process under scrutiny while also being the researcher.
Figure 5. Position of researcher in the research project
Figure 5 shows the different positions that I had as a researcher and as a practitioner. In the 
world of the researcher, I used different theoretical lenses to look at the situation under scrutiny. 
When choosing these lenses I was (and still am) under the influence of the academic community 
which I was part of. Within this community I was influenced specifically by the research group 
that is headed by one of the professors supervising the construction of this thesis. This group 
has undertaken much research on governance and control of a shared service centre. These 
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studies were based primarily on the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 
1979; Covaleski, 2001; Speklé, 2001). This was also the perspective I used when starting 
my research. This perspective leans toward the positivist paradigm described earlier in this 
chapter, because transaction cost economics seeks to explain and predict what happens 
in practice. According to TCE, different types of transactions are likely to produce different 
governance structures. I used this perspective to evaluate the choices that were made in 
the governance structure of the municipality of The Hague. While performing this part of the 
study, I thought the TCE perspective was a way of looking at practice that would offer insights 
into why I had experienced frustrations, as illustrated by the anecdote at the beginning of this 
chapter. Although the observations that resulted from this part of the research led to some 
interesting insights, my experiences during this process (as the management accountant of 
the ISC) also led to a shift in my perspective on governance. The choices that were made in 
the municipality of The Hague did not seem to correspond with the considerations promoted 
by TCE. This is elaborated upon more extensively in chapter 4. I felt another perspective 
was needed to gain a better understanding of how a governance structure performed within 
the daily practice of an existing organisation such as a municipality. This perspective was 
consistent with more recent research by members of the research group at hand (see 
Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013). Through interactions in the world of the researcher a feeling 
emerged that this understanding could be enriched by using a lens inspired by ‘Callonistics’. 
The research group showed interest in taking such a perspective because they had not yet 
used this approach. After several debates I also became convinced that this perspective 
could be valuable for my research. This change of perspective entailed a paradigm shift: 
from a perspective that leant more toward positivism to one that was more related to the 
constructivist paradigm. The experiences in the earlier part of my research convinced me 
that assumptions within this paradigm matched more with what I had encountered in the 
municipality of The Hague. As depicted above, I started this research with the idea that a 
governance structure could be designed to determine the way people acted. However, as 
the governance structure developed I became increasingly convinced that it was not just one 
accounting instrument that determines the behaviour of people. I got the impression that their 
behaviour was determined by how significant a specific management accounting instrument 
might become in the particular context in which it was going to be used, and also by the value 
that people attached to it. The ‘Callonistics’ lens coincided with this perspective. However, a 
more precise positioning of the research was necessary at this point. 
I had various discussions with the members of the research group on how the different 
relevant concepts within this theoretical perspectives could be interpreted. Concepts such as 
‘framing’ and ‘overflowing’6 were debated as they are at the core of this research. Although 
this process can be considered a joint effort to gain a collective understanding of the relevant 
concepts, I interpreted these concepts based on my own beliefs and values and brought 
6 These and other concepts are elaborated upon in chapter 5.
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them into the world I was studying. I did that as a researcher, but even more directly as 
an actor in the process under scrutiny. As a participant in the process I actively used my 
theoretical insights to contribute to the process of collective interpretation. At a certain point, 
when my research was already making some headway, I became a member of a project 
group that was rethinking the governance structure of the ISC. I used some insights that are 
presented in chapter 4 of this thesis to stimulate this process within the municipality. These 
insights subsequently led to the organisation of several meetings in which we tried to reach 
a collective picture of what the new governance structure should look like. In these meetings 
the governance structure served both as a joint point of reference and as a mediator in the 
process of making meaning. The shared structure and meanings that resulted from these 
sessions were relevant input for the restructured governance within the municipality. 
Therefore, I had a substantial effect on the development of the governance structure because 
I was also a practitioner within the municipality. As such, I was an active participant in the 
process in which we reached a shared understanding of the governance structure, at least in 
the project groups I participated in.
I also used the perspectives as a frame of reference when I was writing my account of this 
research. This approach reduced the risk that I would favour interpretations that coincided 
with the theoretical perspectives used at the expense of those interpretations did not coincide. 
However, this risk is ever present and thus the reader of this thesis is invited to read my 
inferences critically and to challenge them when they are considered to be less convincing. 
3.4  Concluding remarks
This chapter describes the philosophical assumptions in this research and depicts the 
interaction between my different roles and the different worlds which I was part of while I was 
conducting the research. The chapter illustrates the way in which the ideas and beliefs in 
these worlds were part of this research and it depicts my role as a researcher and practitioner. 
This is relevant background when reading this study, because it gives insights into my 
philosophical assumptions, how they emerged, changed, and interacted in this study and 
thus inevitably had an impact on the interpretations, pictures, and inferences I present in this 
research, starting with chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4
Governance through the lens of a rational perspective
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the governance of the shared service centre (SSC) within the 
Municipality of The Hague through the lens of a rational economic perspective. This means 
that the concept of governance, as described in organisational economics theory (Williamson, 
1979; Covaleski, 2001; Speklé, 2001), is used as the frame of reference in the description 
of the practice within the Municipality of The Hague7. Questions asked are, for example, as 
to whether choices are consistent with what is expected from the theoretical framework or 
whether any deviations from the framework are observed. Similarly, if deviations are found, 
what are the reasons for these deviations? Should the governance structure be adjusted in 
the light of these findings? Do the findings add to the existing literature on this subject?
This chapter is structured as follows. In the first part the concept of governance is explored from 
a theoretical perspective, which enables us to identify choices on two different dimensions. 
The first dimension corresponds to the choices made in relation to the generic governance 
structure. The most important choice in this respect is what the generic governance 
structure should be: should it include aspects of the market, be hierarchical in nature, or 
have a hybrid structure? Choices on this dimension affect the vertical relations between the 
different parties involved. The second dimension concerns the roles and responsibilities of 
the different parties that are involved. The assumption is that these choices are relevant 
after the main choice regarding the generic governance structure has been made – that is, 
after the decision has been taken to adopt a market, a hierarchical, or a hybrid structure. 
As it turns out, viewing the governance from a rational perspective leads to recommendations 
that the governance structure should be adjusted in practice. Also, the findings derived 
from the present study add to the existing body of knowledge on governance in general 
and the governance of shared service centres in public organisations in particular. Moreover, 
the results of this research lead to the recommendation to assess the development of the 
governance structure from a different perspective, namely a perspective that considers the 
governance structure in relation to its context. This theoretical consideration is elaborated on 
in the next chapter.
4.2 An exploration of the concept of governance in organisational economics 
theory
The rational perspective adopted in this study is based principally on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) reasoning. Initially, TCE is applied to explore the concept of governance and 
to distinguish between several governance arrangements. Subsequently, the characteristics 
of these different governance arrangements are described. 
7 An introduction to the organisation of the Municipality of The Hague is found in Chapter 2.
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The concept of governance
The central aim of TCE is to explain why different organisational arrangements are used 
to carry out transactions. The assumption is that different kinds of transactions give rise to 
different contractual problems and that some organisational arrangements are more suitable 
than others for reducing these problems. Alignment between the organisational arrangement 
and the type of contractual problem should provide an efficient arrangement to govern the 
associated transactions (Speklé, 2001). 
From a TCE perspective, an exchange could be organised efficiently using a contract in 
which the mutual rights and obligations of the persons involved are safeguarded. However, 
humans are constrained by two ‘imperfections’ in their nature: (1) bounded rationality and (2) 
opportunism (Speklé, 2001; Williamson, 1981). Decisions taken by people in organisations 
(‘organisation man’) are not only based on economic rationality because …”organisation men 
… are endowed with less powerful analytical and data-processing apparatus’ than ‘economic 
men’” (Williamson, 1981, p. 553). Thus, from an economic perspective, bounded rationality 
leads to decisions that are suboptimal, even though humans try to behave rationally (Speklé, 
2001). A consequence of bounded rationality is that contracts are always incomplete and 
this leaves room for opportunism, that is, seeking to fulfil one’s own interests at the expense 
of another. TCE does not assume that humans act opportunistically all the time. Rather, 
opportunistic behaviour is seen as a possible mode of action because trustworthiness cannot 
be fully determined upfront. Because of this, additional organisational arrangements should 
be established to make sure that transactions are executed efficiently and effectively. 
The type of transaction that is performed determines the extent to which bounded rationality 
and opportunism lead to problems that can or cannot be solved with contracts, and the 
extent to which additional organisational arrangements are necessary. According to TCE, 
there are three critical dimensions that determine the characteristics of the transaction: 
(1) uncertainty, (2) frequency, and (3) asset specificity, that is, the specific investments 
that are needed to produce the goods. (Williamson, 1979, 1981). The predictability of the 
environment in which the contract is executed determines the uncertainty of the transaction. 
If the environment becomes less steady and less predictable, the transaction becomes more 
uncertain, as can often be seen when IT products are involved, for example. The frequency 
refers to the transactions that are carried out: is this often or occasionally? Finally, asset 
specificity refers to the investments that are specific to the type of product that is delivered. 
Significant investments are necessary to execute a transaction with high asset specificity. If 
this transaction is executed in a way other than has been agreed, there is a loss of (a part of) 
the investment. 
Differences along the three dimensions result in different types of transaction, which in turn, 
from the perspective of TCE, need different types of contracts and consequently different 
governance arrangements. A governance structure from this perspective is “an institutional 
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framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided” (Williamson, 1979, p. 235). 
The structure is a means by which order is established in a relationship in which conflict is 
conceivable. This conflict may emerge because contracts are incomplete, do not cover all 
eventualities and opportunistic behaviour threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realise 
mutual gains (Covaleski et al., 2003; Speklé, 2001; Williamson, 1998). 
Different generic governance structures
Governance structures are arrangements that are made to cope with problems that cannot 
be solved within a contract. These governance structures differ in the control measures that 
are employed to safeguard the execution of the contract (Speklé, 2001). As stated earlier, 
there are essentially two dimensions along which choices need to be made. The first is the 
choice on the generic governance structure. TCE distinguishes the market and hierarchy 
as being the two generic governance structures that are most different from one another. 
There are, however, also other governance structures that have aspects both of a market 
and a hierarchy, but that are neither completely one nor the other. These are called hybrid 
governance structures (Herbert & Seal, 2012; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Speklé , 2001; 
Williamson, 1979, 1981). In this form of governance, measures are present that moderate 
the free competition of the market or that extend the working of the hierarchy with market-
like instruments. For example, in a market situation, explicit long-term contracts combined 
with arrangements for settling disputes are known to reduce free competition within 
the market (Speklé, 2001). The autonomy of the different parties is thus maintained, but 
binding contracts are established by which the parties involved are obliged to carry out 
the defined transaction (Williamson, 1979). In this hybrid governance structure, complex 
contracts and strategic alliances govern the transactions (Judge & Dooley, 2006). 
In a hierarchy, market-like instruments such as contracting, cost recovery, and free buying 
and selling are sometimes introduced to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of activities 
within the organisation (Herbert & Seal, 2012; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013).  The transactions 
that take place within the organisation with a hierarchical governance structure are subject 
to a relationship of authority (Williamson, 1979). Disagreements and other matters are often 
solved internally without interference from a court (David & Han, 2004). In a hierarchical 
governance structure, the managers govern the transactions within the boundaries of the 
organisation (Judge & Dooley, 2006).
From the perspective of TCE, the choice for a generic governance structure is guided by 
the type of transactions involved. For example, non-specific transactions, regardless of 
whether they are recurrent, are thought to be organised most efficiently through the market. 
Within the market, buyers and sellers meet to buy standardised goods at a market price 
(Williamson, 1979). The identity of the buyers and sellers is not relevant (David & Han, 2004). 
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A single individual has no influence on the market price because the market price results 
from many separate decisions and contains all the information that actors need to make 
decisions (Vosselman, 1995). Accordingly, the market does not have rules and procedures 
that regulate behaviour. Structure and order is coming from free market competition. In 
the market, price is the only regulating mechanism (Vosselman, 1995). If asset specificity 
is low, the transaction should also take place within a market. Because there are no 
specific requirements for the product, the product is considered a commodity that can be 
produced and bought by many different parties (David & Han, 2004; Williamson, 1979). 
Furthermore, it is believed that as the uncertainty of the transaction increases, the transaction 
costs associated with the market also increase. Also, as uncertainty increases, the wish for 
predictability grows. This results in a need to draw up long-term contracts to ensure that 
transactions will take place as intended, which in turn raises the transaction costs. If asset 
specificity is increasing, the market can no longer function smoothly and a hybrid form or 
a hierarchy governance structure will be a better option (Covaleski et al., 2003; Speklé, 
2001). Where there is asset specificity, a high frequency of transactions is likely to shift the 
governance structure even farther from the market and more towards a hybrid or hierarchical 
structure. 
The main determinant of the choice of governance structure is the character of the transaction 
involved, yet this is not the only determinant. The choices related to the governance structure 
could also be affected by the wish or need for stability and security (Covaleski et al, 2003), or 
by the perception that outsourcing, for example, is an undesirable option. The decision not to 
outsource may be especially relevant when an organisation wants to preserve its access to 
a technology that is deemed of strategic interest to the organisation. Alternatively, an activity 
might be considered not yet mature enough to be outsourced; a decision to outsource this 
activity would be premature in this case (Speklé, 2001). Thus, decisions on the governance 
structure are also dependent on the context in which they are taken.
Transactions, governance structures and a shared service centre
The previous sections described the different governance structures that, from the perspective 
of TCE, are suited to govern effectively the different types of transaction. Governance 
structures have been studied quite extensively, both in interfirm and intrafirm relationships 
(e.g., Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, Van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000, 2006; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013). 
This section discusses the governance structure of an SSC and addresses the choices 
on the two dimensions of this structure: (1) the generic governance structure, and (2) the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities. It starts by describing these dimensions in relation to 
the governance structure of an SSC. Next, it considers the choices that can be made on these 
dimensions. The section ends with some concluding remarks.
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Dimensions of the governance structure of a shared service centre
Figure 6 visualises the situation that emerges when an SSC is introduced within an organisation. 
The circle in the middle represents the internal marketplace where the transactions occur. 
These transactions are the object of the governance arrangement.
 
 
Figure 1: Internal marketplace (based on Vosselman, 1995) 
 
Figure 6: Internal marketplace (based on Vosselman, 1995)
This hybrid governance structure contains features of both market and in-house management 
control. In this structure, the business units and the SSC need to find a balance between 
a professional customer–supplier relationship and a collegial working climate designed to 
benefit the organisation as a whole  (Herbert & Seal, 2012). As a consequence, a trilateral 
relationship arises between top management, the management of the SSC, and the managers 
of the business units (Vosselman, 1995). In this relationship, control and accountabilities 
should be shaped in such a way that the transactions will be executed effectively and conflict 
is prevented or quickly dissolved (Strikwerda, 2010). Therefore, clear lines of decision 
making, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, and issue resolution processes are needed. 
The governance structure depicts these control and accountability relationships (Grant et al., 
2007).
The term ‘governance’ conveys that there are multiple interests in the different relationships 
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in which a fruitful balance of interests and power needs to be achieved (Williamson, 1979). 
As such, governance is a wider concept than control (Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008), as suggested in the previous section. In the governance 
structure of an SSC, a balance should be found between the vertical management control 
systems of the hierarchy and the horizontal management control systems, which are in turn 
connected to the customer–supplier relationships between the SSC and the organisational 
units to which it delivers goods and services (Vosselman, 2002). 
The main choice within the generic governance structure is whether or not to include an ‘exit 
threat’, allowing customers to buy products and services of suppliers other than the SSC. 
From an economic perspective, the exit threat is considered a strong means of stimulating 
economic efficiency. The introduction of an exit threat seems particularly effective if market 
parties are available to which customers in the marketplace (in this case internal) can turn 
(Vosselman, 1995). This choice is affected, at least in part, by the type of transactions 
that will take place between the SSC and its customers. Minnaar and Vosselman (2013) 
describe several possible choices with respect to the governance structure of an SSC. 
An SSC with free buying or selling (and exit threat) would be the expected choice if transactions 
are standardised or non-specific. In contrast, an SSC with captive buying and selling might 
be expected if services are customised. In this case, external market transactions may not 
be efficient, because the vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour by other market parties 
grows as the level of customisation or specificity increases. The most efficient option here 
is for the SSC itself to supply the goods or services. In the context of a vertical management 
control system, agreements are made about the products and services that are delivered 
and about the way that performance is monitored and costs are settled. These agreements 
can be incorporated in the contract that is supposed to govern the transactions. Finally, if the 
transactions become even more specific for the organisation and more specialised in their 
delivery, the arrangement that might be expected is deconcentration. This means that the 
product or service is provided by the business units themselves. 
The object of this study concerns an SSC with captive buying and selling. As indicated, 
this means that the transactions take place within the hierarchy of the organisation. Here, 
decisions on roles and responsibilities are made by management within the organisation. The 
next section elaborates on the choices regarding this type of SSC.
Choices in the management control structure of a shared service centre with captive 
buying and selling
For top management, several roles and responsibilities can be distinguished (Vosselman, 
1995). With regard to the internal market, the top management serves as a regulator, taking 
important decisions on how parties can enter or exit the internal market, on the pricing strategy 
of the SSC and the terms of delivery and on how disputes are handled.
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After taking the decision to rely on captive buying and selling, the SSC still has the option of 
charging internal customers for the services that are delivered to them. That is, in the case 
of captive buying and selling, top management can make decisions on the cost recovery 
system. Two main methods of funding the SSC are (1) using a cost recovery system, and (2) 
funding by means of a centralised budget (Kearney, 2004). A cost recovery system is thought 
to be the most important aspect of a real internal marketplace and is sometimes believed 
to be essential in the functioning of an SSC (Strikwerda, 2010). It is claimed that prices 
can be easily compared to those of providers of the same services on the market and that 
monitoring efficiency is thus relatively straightforward (Vosselman, 1995). In addition, others 
claim there should be a form of customer-inclusive governance (Kearney, 2004) in which a 
dialogue between customers and the SSC takes place about expectations on performance 
targets and on how they will be managed and delivered. It has also been argued that the use 
of a cost recovery system discourages the cooperation that is needed between the different 
parties involved. 
Additionally, the costs of sharing of information is reduced and information about the 
performance of the SSC is easily accessible. This allows for performance to be discussed on 
the basis of performance information, rather than building in incentives by using cost recovery 
systems (Grant et al., 2007; Strikwerda, 2010).
Related to costs of sharing of information, the concept of benchmarking is often applied in the 
governance of an SSC (Borman, 2010). It is feasible to compare the functioning of one SSC 
to another by measuring their performance in terms of input (e.g., budget, personnel) and 
output (products and services delivered). This is a useful source of information for enhancing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the centres that are being benchmarked.  
Given the choices described, top management is assumed to be able to determine the 
(market) position of the SSC. As such, the decisions of top management can have profound 
consequences. This is especially the case if top management also decides on the issue of 
whether there should be free or captive buying and selling and whether or not the SSC should 
compete on service delivery with other parties.
Also, in its role as owner of the SSC, top management has the power to decide how 
potential profits should be allocated. It is also supposed to ensure the stability of the 
operations of the SSC. This task is especially relevant if there is captive buying and 
selling and the SSC is the sole provider of services and goods. In this situation, the 
SSC can be put under pressure by its clients to lower prices, to increase quality, or both. 
In addition, top management can be a provider of financial capital as it can define the 
conditions under which the SSC will be given funding. Furthermore, it may be entitled to 
authorise decisions and/or investment budgets if the sums requested exceed a certain 
amount. Top management can regulate the performance of quality audits to enforce a certain 
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level of quality. With these tasks top management can be considered to be exercising the 
role of a supervisor. By leading from a distance, the top management can impose targets and 
performance evaluation systems. Thus, the decisions that top management take shape the 
position and governance structure of the internal marketplace.
Grant et al. (2007) examine the governance structure of shared service centres (SSCs) 
in terms of “the hierarchy of committees, boards, bodies, or forums that execute the 
management of, and oversee the delivery of, the products and/or services of the SSO8.” 
(Grant et al., 2007, p. 523). In this type of governance structure, decision making authority on 
subjects such as business cases and costing and pricing mechanisms of the SSO should be 
clearly identified. Several layers of governance are distinguishable within this structure (De 
Haes & Grembergen, 2009; Grant, 2006). At a minimum, two layers are assumed to exist, 
one at the level of the enterprise and one at the operational level. On these levels, different 
bodies and committees operate with different responsibilities and accountabilities (Grant et 
al., 2007). The enterprise level of the governance structure needs to focus on the strategic 
and organisational alignment of the SSO. The focus at this level is on the contribution of 
the SSO to the organisation at large. However, other strategic concerns are also important 
because developing an SSC is a structural change (Herbert & Seal, 2012). It is relevant, for 
example, whether the organisation changes gradually to the SSC or whether this occurs 
in one big change. Also, where should the SSC be located? If the organisation chooses a 
separate location, this strengthens the message that the SSC is independent. However, this 
may increase the geographical distance between the SSC and those whom it serve. (Grant et 
al., 2007). At the enterprise level, a board is needed that is authorised to discuss the issues at 
hand. This board – which may be termed, for example, the ‘governance board’ or ‘governing 
board’ – should be staffed with the senior officers of the organisation and the Director of the 
SSC (Grant et al., 2007).
The operational level is concerned with evaluating how the SSC performs on a daily basis. 
The performance of the SSC is evaluated in relation to the agreements made in the service 
level agreement. Also, problems that could not be resolved in the daily service interaction 
that exist between the SSC and the business units and that need structural solutions are 
dealt with at this level, typically by a board that is called either a ‘User Board’, a ‘Management 
and Advisory board’, or a ‘Partnership Group’. This board consists of senior management of 
business units and the Director of the SSC (Grant et al., 2007; Strikwerda, 2010).
The service level agreement discussed in these boards can take multiple forms. Arrangements 
can be made in differing levels of detail, which in turn determine the size and shape of 
the service level agreement. Choices made here are dependent on customs within the 
organisation and, potentially, on the level of trust in the SSC’s performance (Minnaar, 2010; 
Strikwerda, 2010).
8 Grant et al. (2007) use the term Shared Service Organisation (SSO) where in this thesis Shared Service Centre 
(SSC) is used.
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In the model presented by Grant et al. (2007), three aspects are distinguished in the design 
of the governance of public service organisations: (1) the structure itself, with its roles and 
responsibilities; (2) the necessary processes such as goal setting, strategic alignment, risk 
management and performance management; and (3) cultural aspects. Grant et al. also 
emphasize the need for participative collaboration of key stakeholders in the governance 
structure and its processes. They argue that a cultural analysis is required to staff the key 
positions in the governance structure with the right people while the SSC is being established. 
According to these authors, the type of leadership and staffing needed should be reconsidered 
periodically during the different stages of building an SSC. The main reason is that the SSC 
requires different knowledge and competences from employees. Grant et al. (2007) explicitly 
raise these cultural aspects as one of the important governance topics that need to be 
addressed by the boards in the governance structure.  
Concluding remarks concerning the exploration of the concept of governance in theory
In this section a rational perspective has been used to explore the two dimensions of the 
governance structure, specifically of an SSC. The choices most relevant to the governance 
structure of an SSC concern the amount of hybridity and the attribution of the roles and 
responsibilities of the different parties involved.
The governance accompanying an SSC is considered a hybrid because it contains both
elements of the hierarchy and the market. The question is to what extent the market-like
instruments will be employed within the hierarchy of the organisation. The main issue 
involved is whether or not an exit threat is introduced and other parties than the SSC are 
allowed to deliver services.
To govern the transactions, the different roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined. 
The contribution of the top management is particularly relevant because the management will 
play different, sometimes conflicting, roles. 
This research focuses on an SSC with captive buying and selling. An exit threat is not present 
in such a situation, although market-like mechanisms are introduced to stimulate economic 
rationality. An internal marketplace exists in which contracts between the SSC and the 
business units of the organisation should ensure transparency about the goods and services 
to be delivered and the costs to be charged. The cost recovery system, often combined with 
benchmarking, encourages efficiency.
The governance structure should include a hierarchy of committees that evaluates the 
performance of the marketplace and the SSC. This chapter focuses on two levels of decision-
making. At the enterprise level, the top management decides on issues such as the pricing 
strategy of the SSC and how potential profits are allocated, and it also controls the financial 
stability of the SSC. The contract or service level agreement is authorised at this level, and this 
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level is the last resort in the settlement of disputes in the marketplace. At the operational level, 
the senior management evaluates the performance of the SSC in relation to the agreements 
that have been made in the service level agreement. Senior management resolves issues 
relating to the daily service delivery between the SSC and business units.
The next section explores the choices made in the municipality of The Hague, organised 
along the main choices presented in this chapter. The way these choices were made in the 
original plans and how they developed in practice will be described. The exploration in the 
next section leads to some interesting findings that are discussed at the end of the chapter. 
The method that is used to collect data is described in 5.4 and is not elaborated upon in this 
chapter.
4.3 The exploration of the concept of governance in practice
This section explores the development of the governance structure of the SSC in the Municipality 
of The Hague. This exploration is guided by choices on the two main dimensions indicated in the 
previous section. Attention is devoted to the choices about the generic governance structure, 
the use of market-like instruments, such as contracts and cost settlement, and the presence or 
absence of captive buying and selling (the degree of hybridity). Also, the choices made in relation 
to the attribution of roles and responsibilities within the governance structure are considered. 
This research is guided by the description of the governance structure and proposals for 
alterations in several formal documents. An important document is the ‘blueprint’. After this 
‘blueprint’ has been addressed, the development of the governance structure is described and 
the reasons for the adaptations of the structure are explored. At the end of this chapter, the 
developments of the governance structure are examined using the theoretical lens provided 
in the previous section. This results in several interpretations that may add to the theoretical 
considerations presented in this chapter and that may be useful for further research. Finally, 
some practical implications are discussed.
The blueprint of the governance structure: the main principles
The blueprint provides a rather straightforward description of the main principles of the SSC 
and its governance. It is a document that resulted from a design process that was carried out 
under substantial time pressure. This time pressure was due to the decision by the general 
management team in February 2007 to establish the SSC in January 2008. It marked the 
beginning of a process in which plans had to be made and decided upon in an organisation 
with many different stakeholders. Even though the process could be perceived as a success, 
the results also left room for different interpretations of some of the major governance issues. 
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Several statements in the text of the blueprint indicate the kind of context intended for the 
SSC.  There is a strong emphasis on the collaboration that is necessary between the SSC 
and the policy departments of the municipality. It is believed that one key element in this 
collaboration is that the SSC and the department should have shared responsibility for the 
results achieved by the municipality as a whole. 
“We choose collaboration as colleagues, instead of a customer–supplier relationship: as 
colleagues we are jointly responsible for the results achieved” (Blueprint, p. 9)
In this collaboration, the SSC delivers support services, whereas the departments focus on 
their services to the citizens of The Hague and, given that focus, on what is needed from the 
SSC.
According to the blueprint, the SSC is supposed not only to focus on collaboration, but also 
to be a customer-oriented organisation and a reliable partner to the municipal organisation. 
Reliability is thought of as a solid basis on which to build a collaboration and this should 
therefore be one of the leading values within the SSC. Customer orientation is supposed to 
emphasise the supportive nature of the services provided by the SSC. These services are 
provided to ensure the service delivery of the municipality at large. According to the blueprint, 
employees within the SSC need to be aware of their supportive role and the needs of the 
departments. Reliability and transparency are thought to be key elements. The employees 
should also be aware of the costs of their activities.
Captive buying and selling
One of the main decisions presented in the blueprint is the decision to opt for captive buying 
and selling for the service delivery of the SSC. This proposition is supplemented by proposals 
on several management accounting instruments that should stimulate efficiency in everyday 
activities.
The blueprint devotes substantial attention to performance management. The SSC is 
expected to report on its performance on the basis of several key performance indicators 
(KPIs). Different sets of indicators are defined and related to different stakeholders of the 
SSC. The indicators concern the price, quality, and volume of services and products. Also, 
there are indicators that aim to measure the efficiency of the organisation.
These indicators of efficiency relate to the level of standardisation of processes within 
the SSC, the productivity of the workers, and the financial performance of the SSC. 
Benchmarking should be useful to evaluate the performance of the SSC. The benchmark 
should indicate how the centre is doing compared to other shared service centres in (local) 
government organisations.
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A cost recovery system was already in place in the Municipality of The Hague before 
the SSC was introduced. Although it was adjusted after the introduction of the SSC, 
this system of cost recovery itself has not been questioned as it is perceived to be an 
instrument that leads to price transparency.  Using this instrument, comparisons to other 
suppliers can be easily made and, as a result, the SSC is triggered to perform efficiently. 
Also, even though the cost recovery system itself is not in dispute and a joint proposal has 
been constructed, the subject still provoked major discussions within the working group 
preparing the proposal on the new cost settlement system. 
“The subject of internal cost settlement leads to debate within the municipality. On the one 
side, there are those who emphasise the relevance of internal cost settlement because it is 
thought to affect the use of products. On the other side, there is the recognition that in the 
present situation the cost settlement has gone too far and the efficiency of this system cannot 
be demonstrated.” (Final report of the working group on Service Delivery and Internal Cost 
Settlement, September 8th, 2007)
Service level agreements
The blueprint distinguishes three types of service level agreements (SLAs), which describe 
the different goods and services provided by the SSC and the conditions under which they are 
delivered. The first type of SLA is the so-called ‘SLA basic’. This is an agreement that should 
run for one year and that should be signed by the departmental managers and the Director 
of the SSC, This type of SLA is obligatory for all departments. The services are supposed 
to be provided only by the Internal Service Centre (ISC) (which uses captive buying). This 
agreement specifies the needs of customers as a collective, as opposed to the needs of 
individual customers. The second type of SLA is a so-called ‘plus SLA’ for departments and 
relates specifically to the primary processes of a specific department. In this agreement, the 
individual needs of the department are taken into account. The third type of SLA is a plus 
SLA for the Department of Municipal Administration. This SLA documents how services will 
be provided specifically to the City Council and the municipal clerk’s office. It is thought that 
these services will differ from those delivered to the civil servant organisation, because the 
City Council and the clerk’s office are political functions.
Choices on roles and responsibilities
The roles and responsibilities of parties involved in the governance are described extensively 
in the blueprint and subsequent proposals. Many of these issues relate to the contracts and 
how the monitoring of these contracts will be undertaken. Figure 7 depicts what became 
known as a ‘governance triangle’ of the SSC. This triangle describes the different layers 
of governance that were distinguished, the role of the SLA and the different organisational 
actors that operate in the governance of the SSC.
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Figure 1. Initial design of the governance triangle of the Shared Service Centre within the 
Municipality of The Hague.  
IDC = Intern Dienstencentrum in Dutch; in English, Internal Service Centre (ISC) 
Figure 7. Initial design of the governance triangle of the Shared Service Centre within the 
Municipality of The Hague. 
IDC = Intern Dienstencentrum in Dutch; in English, Internal Service Centre (ISC) 
In the governance layer at the top of the triangle (Municipal Secretary, heads of departments, 
and Director of the SSC), the SLA is drawn up, the execution of the contract is monitored, 
and possible conflicts are resolved. In the second layer, the ‘Mandatees’9 and the middle 
management of the SSC prepare decision-making for their part of the service delivery, as 
well as monitoring the execution. This layer also serves as a first resort for possible conflict 
resolution. If issues cannot be resolved here, those in the top layer will have to decide. 
In the top layer, the Municipal Secretary is responsible for the establishment of service level 
agreements that serve as contracts. This person is supposed to report on the performance 
of the SSC to the Deputy Mayor. The Deputy Mayor does not seem to participate directly in 
the governance of the SSC (as he/she is not represented in the picture). Nevertheless, he/
she is authorised to set boundaries for the scope, quality, and prices of the service delivery 
by the SSC. The budget available for shared services is assigned by the City Council, and 
the Deputy Mayor is held politically accountable by the City Council regarding this budget. 
The Municipal Secretary has the authority to provide the parties involved with directives 
because of his responsibility to the Mayor and Deputy Mayor. By approving the SLA he 
mandates the Director of the SSC to provide the services as described in the document. Ex 
post, the Director of the SSC, being responsible for proper preparation and execution of the 
SLAs, reports to the Municipal Secretary on the execution of the SLA. More specifically, he 
reports on progress on standardising products, services, and processes. 
9 The service delivery of the SSC is divided into several components: housing and facilities, automation, and personnel 
and salary administration. This division is reflected in the organisation of the SSC by clusters on the same subjects. The 
departments have representatives, called ‘mandatees’, who are authorised to speak on behalf of the departments on 
these various subjects.
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Departmental managers are collectively responsible for the decisions made on the basic SLA. 
In the management philosophy of the municipality, departmental managers are responsible 
for all the resources they use to achieve their departmental goals. This is called the ‘integral 
accountability’ of departmental managers. Through basic SLAs, the responsibility for use 
of resources in the SSC becomes a shared responsibility, shared between departmental 
managers and the Director of the SSC. The departmental managers are required to sign the 
agreement to indicate that they consent to it. 
The Director of the SSC is responsible (and is held accountable by the Municipal Secretary 
and the departments) for the execution of the SLAs. He is also responsible for ensuring the 
SLAs are prepared appropriately. The Director is supposed to accomplish this particular task 
in collaboration with the managers of the different business units (‘clusters’), who discuss the 
quality and terms of service delivery for their part of the service delivery. Also, the Director is 
responsible for the operational management of the SSC.
The Municipal Secretary is authorised to decide on problematic issues that may arise during 
the execution of agreements and that cannot be resolved by the departmental managers 
and/or the Director of the IDC. In the original blueprint, however, the role of the general 
management team, consisting of the heads of the five main or ‘core’ departments, has not 
been made clear. 
In the second layer of governance, the business unit managers of the SSC and the 
mandatees are required to prepare the parts of the SLA that apply to their fields of expertise 
(HR, Automation, and Facilities and Housing). They should also discuss issues that arise 
in relation to the service delivery that they are concerned with. Additionally, their task is to 
advise the departmental heads and Director of the SSC about matters of concern in the 
daily service delivery. These tasks are performed in so-called cluster meetings that act as a 
‘customer council’ for the different fields of service delivery of the SSC. In these meetings the 
mandatees represent the different departments.
The various aspects of the different structures within the overall governance structure are 
summarised in table 5.
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Table 5: Choices proposed in the governance structure of the shared service centre (SSC)
Choices on 
the generic 
governance 
structure
Captive buying and 
selling
Choices on 
the allocation 
of roles and 
responsibilities 
Municipal secretary reports to the 
deputy mayor on the performance 
of the SSC.
Performance is 
measured using critical 
performance indicators.
Committee of department heads 
are jointly responsible for the 
service level agreement on the 
basic service delivery.
Cost recovery should 
provide an incentive to 
perform efficiently.
In cluster meetings preparation 
of decision-making on the service 
level agreement takes place.
Benchmarking is 
supposed to allow the 
SSC’s performance 
to be compared to 
other shared service 
organisations.
Service level agreements:
One basic service delivery for 
every department
‘Plus services’ for specific needs
Services for the City Council
The table shows that the governance structure of the SSC is hybrid in nature. Several 
market-like instruments (performance measurement, cost recovery, benchmarking) are 
introduced, with the aim of enhancing efficiency as can be derived from the blueprint.
The SSC is a shared service organisation with captive buying and selling. However, the 
decision to use captive buying is not based on the characteristics of the transaction alone, 
as might be expected from the perspective of TCE. Instead, the main argument in favour of 
captive buying and selling is that it is believed to be necessary in order to make the shared 
service concept work within the Municipality of The Hague. That is, the key objective is to 
avoid suboptimality. If free buying and selling were an option, internal departments might 
decide to buy externally, which might then lead to excess capacity and thus inefficiency.
Several roles and responsibilities are identified and assigned to the different parties. 
Contracts are drafted which set out the terms by which the transactions are to be executed.
Cost settlement and benchmarking should offer transparency and should encourage 
efficiency within the SSC. As a consequence, an internal marketplace is presumed 
to arise within the municipality. Values such as partnership and joint responsibility 
describe the basis on which the governance should work.
Towards the end of 2007 the blueprint was converted into decisions by the general 
management team and the Board of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors. It was decided that the 
ISC and its governance structure should become part of the administrative structure of the 
Municipality of The Hague. The question is how this structure functions in daily practice. 
This issue is highly pertinent because the description in the official documents seems fairly 
straightforward, but in practice the level of approval was not as high as might be deduced 
from these documents. The working council of the Facility Department expressed this in a 
letter to the Director while the ISC was being prepared:
525761-L-bw-Jellema
Processed on: 30-11-2018 PDF page: 65
65
Governance through the lens of a rational perspective
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 4
“Internal consultation has been suboptimal and the pace of the process is fast. Changes to 
provide the ISC with a good starting position are at risk of being lost.”(Letter from the Working 
Council of the Facility Department, October 29th, 2007)
Also, the members of the Committee of Management Accountants, which the author, as a 
manager, was part of, did not fully endorse the proposals. However, because of the intense 
(time) pressure of the project, ‘no’ was not an option and the project moved on.
The development of the governance structure
In 2008 the governance structure was expected to perform effectively in daily practice while 
the SSC became operational. This performance, however, proved not to be in line with what 
was assumed when the blueprint was accepted. Accordingly, the blueprint was adjusted 
several times.
The governance structure in practice: alignment with existing structures
The blueprint included descriptions of the products and services that were to be delivered 
by the SSC. An important product was called the ‘basic service delivery’. The basic service 
delivery consisted of several elements, such as computers, desks, chairs, coffee, housing, 
and salary administration. This new system brought with it a new cost settlement system 
that was considerably simpler than the one in use up till that point. The service delivery 
was to be governed by a contract, a service level agreement. However, when the centre 
started its operations, formal contracts were not yet prepared. Parties simply had to rely on 
the descriptions of products, costs, and key performance indicators (KPIs) in the blueprint. 
In the first year during which the SSC was active there was much discussion about the effects 
of the new cost settlement system and the quality of the service delivery, particularly of the 
salary administration (called Human Resource Services or HRS). The relative costs charged 
to the different departments changed after the introduction of basic service delivery. Some 
departments had to pay more, some less. The intention was to adjust the budgets of the 
departments in accordance with the new costs. It was intended to be a ‘zero-sum game’; overall, 
the services delivered by the SSC would not cost more than the previous services had done. 
However, in practice, debates on cost allocation were not easily resolved and they continued 
for quite some time. The discussions concerned the accuracy of the calculations of the financial 
effects for the different departments. Moreover, the debate was infused with the different 
interests of the management accountants and the departments they represented. A key concern 
to all was that they would be paying for another department if the budgets were reallocated. In 
the discussion, the participants also addressed the definitions of the products involved and how 
accurate these were. Another topic discussed was the question of who was actually authorised 
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to decide on the issues that were raised, particularly budgetary issues. These debates took 
place in the Council of Management Accountants which, according to the description of the 
governance structure in the blueprint, could be asked for advice by the Municipal Secretary. This 
consultation, however, was not described as being compulsory. The management accountants 
had difficulty accepting this; they thought they should have a formal say in these issues. 
Based on the experiences of the first year of operation and on his own views, the Director 
of the ISC decided to deviate from the formal governance structure. He did not initiate the 
proposed cluster meetings, but used existing councils such as the Council of Management 
Accountants to prepare and organise decision-making. For decision-making he did not use 
the collective of departmental heads, as was described in the blueprint, but addressed the 
general management team directly. According to him, it was legitimate to act in this way 
because he was already a long-serving management executive within the municipality who 
knew how to ‘play the game’ in order to accomplish things within the municipality. These 
informal deviations from the governance structure are depicted in Table 6 and are related to 
the formal aspects of the structure as described in the blueprint.
Table 6: Deviations from the governance structure in practice
Formal aspects of the governance structure 
(blueprint)
Informal deviations from the governance 
structure (in practice)
Municipal Secretary reports to the deputy mayor on 
the performance of the SSC.
No deviations
Committee of departmental heads is responsible 
for the service level agreement on the basic service 
delivery.
General management team decides on the 
service delivery.
In cluster meetings, the service level agreement 
should be prepared for decision-making
Existing councils and committees put 
forward issues to be decided upon by the 
general management team.
Service level agreements:
On basic service delivery for every department
‘Plus services’ for specific needs
Services for the City Council
No deviations
With these adjustments the Director of the ISC was clearly responding to a broader perceived 
need. However, not all parties involved agreed that the informal adjustments produce a 
governance that is effective. As a consequence, several initiatives were started by different 
parties to propose additional adjustments to the existing governance structure.
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Proposals to enhance collaboration
In the autumn of 2009 the Council of Management Accountants decided to set up a 
project group with the assignment to “define the service delivery of the ISC products: 
housing, other products and the management of the IT infrastructure in terms of service 
level agreements, delivery time, key performance indicators and standard values” 
(Project group on ISC service delivery, October 2009). This assignment was the result 
of a year filled with debate and widespread discontent within the committee. The results 
from the project group were meant to be used as input for preparation of the 2010 SLA. 
In the short run, this project group resolved some issues regarding the definitions of the 
service delivery. The main conclusion of the project group, however, focused on the formal 
governance structure in a broad sense. The project group thought that the demands (in terms 
of both quality and volume) placed in the SSC were patchy. As a consequence, it was not 
clear what could be expected in terms of service delivery. According to the project group, this 
was a concern not only in the management of the IT infrastructure, but also in the other areas 
of service delivery. The project group therefore advised the SSC to prepare a proposal to 
improve the design of the governance structure on this point.
The SSC also started a project entitled Governance, with the intention of preparing proposals 
to improve the design of the governance structure. This project group developed a new 
governance structure that would fit the Municipality of The Hague better and would solve 
some notable problems. The new structure clarified the roles of the different actors within the 
governance structure. New roles were introduced to cover areas such as demand management 
and account management. These roles were proposed to manage the demand from different 
departments for the services of the SSC. Moreover, the project group recommended 
establishing a Governance Board and an Integral Customer Council to facilitate collective 
decision-making. Figure 8 depicts the adjusted governance triangle that was proposed.
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Figure 1. The adjusted governance triangle of the Municipality of The Hague 
 
Figure 8. The adjusted governance triangle of the Municipality of The Hague
The design of the adjusted governance triangle, just like the initial design, is divided into two 
layers. The adjusted governance triangle delineates three important roles: the owner (at the 
top of the triangle), the customer (on the right side), and the supplier (on the left side).
The role of the owner is assigned to the Deputy Municipal Secretary. Mandated by the 
Municipal Secretary, this deputy is responsible for the overall performance of the support 
and overhead functions within the Municipality of The Hague. As owner of the SSC he/she is 
expected to safeguard the SSC’s contribution to the municipality at large and to ensure that 
there is alignment between the policies and standards of the municipality and the products and 
processes of the SSC. And, he/she is required to monitor the operational management of the 
SSC. The owner is expected to report on the performance of the Internal Service Department 
to the Deputy Mayor, who is in turn accountable to the City Council for the performance of the 
municipal organisation as a whole.
The responsibilities of the SSC as a supplier and of the departments as customers do not 
essentially change. However, the management of the relationship between these two parties 
has been adjusted. In the adjusted governance triangle, account managers and demand 
managers are introduced (Figure 8). These managers have a responsibility to coordinate 
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the supply from the SSC with the demand from the departments (collective and individual). 
Furthermore, the proposal extends the governance triangle to include a governance board 
at the strategic level (Figure 8). In the governance structure up till 2011, meetings on the 
services of the SSC were organised by subject: finance, personnel, IT, and facilities and 
housing. However, this organisation by subject gave a rather fragmented picture of the 
services the ISC delivered. As a consequence, a complete overview of demand and supply 
was lacking, as was clear and coherent governance of the SSC. The proposed governance 
board consisted of the general management team, the owner, and the Director of the SSC. 
The establishment of this board was proposed as a way of enhancing collective ownership of 
the SSC. This was thought to be necessary because collaboration was not a key value in the 
culture of the Municipality of The Hague.
The governance board was expected to decide on the contents of the service level 
agreements and to serve as a last resort if disputes could not be resolved at lower management
levels. 
To support the collective action of the governance board, an Integral Customer Council 
was suggested (Figure 8). This council consisted of the heads of the staff subunits of the 
departments (including the head of the staff units of the SSC) and the deputy Director of the 
SSC. The council would be established to enhance collective action by customers, which 
should result in well-defined expectations of the service delivery of the SSC. The Integral 
Customer Council should put forward issues to be decided upon by the governance board. The 
Integral Customer Council discussed the scope of the service delivery, the quality and volume 
of the services (service level agreements, periodical reports), and financial issues (prices 
and benchmarks). The proposal was also intended to eliminate all existing customer councils 
in order to establish a less complicated decision-making structure for demand and supply. 
These recommendations all involved formal change in the governance structure. However, 
developments took place that were not part of this (intentional) decision-making, but that led 
to informal adjustments. In the original structure, the City Council and the municipal clerk’s 
office were singled out and the services provided to them were regulated by a specific service 
level agreement. This agreement was expected to be valid for five years. In practice, specific 
arrangements were indeed made because of the specific needs of this organisational unit, but 
the agreements were confirmed in a service level agreement for ‘plus services’, similar to other 
agreements with the different departments of the municipality. In short, a specific service level 
agreement proved to be not necessary after the proposed structure was put into practice. 
With regard to the captive buying and selling, external buying (that existed before the start of 
the SSC) remained common practice. 
For example, the design and printing of brochures was a service that was bought not only from 
the SSC, but also from external suppliers. The main arguments given in favour of using external 
suppliers were the higher prices and lack of quality of the services provided by the SSC. This 
issue, however, remained unresolved as opinions differed within the general management 
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team. Additionally, the project leader of the ISC considered it not important enough to act upon it. 
Before the concept of the SSC was introduced, there was a strong belief within the Municipality of 
The Hague that competition was essential to improve the effectiveness of the organisation. This 
belief was related to the New Public Management paradigm that had reached the Municipality 
of The Hague. In the design of the governance structure, the idea of competition was replaced 
by the idea of performance management and benchmarking in the context of captive buying 
and selling. That is, the general management team opted to move towards greater hierarchy, 
or more specifically, to more unified (hybrid) governance. The reason why external buying 
continued to exist was was that heads of departments did not give priority to problem-solving. 
Furthermore, it turned out that the Director of the SSC was not in a position to change this 
situation, possibly also because the general management team did not agree unanimously. 
Table 7 shows the adjustments that were proposed.
Table 7. Proposed adjustments to the governance structure
Dimension Existing aspects of the governance structure
Proposed new aspects of the 
governance structure
Generic governance 
structure
Service level agreements:
 on basic service delivery
‘plus services’
Services for the City Council
Service level agreements:
 on basic service delivery
‘plus services’
Roles and 
responsibilities
General management team 
decides on the service delivery 
Existing councils and 
committees put forward issues 
to be decided upon by the 
general management team.
Municipal Secretary, 
departments, and shared 
service centre
Mandatees vs cluster 
management
Governance board strategically 
decides on service level agreements, 
costs, and quality 
Integral customer council prepares 
decision making in the governance 
board
Owner, supplier and customers
Account management and demand 
management
The proposals for the new governance structure were decided upon by the general 
management team in February 2012. 
Ambiguity remains
The adjusted governance structure was meant to clarify roles and responsibilities and to 
stimulate collective action. However, in practice ambiguity remained. For example, it remained 
unclear who was required to decide upon the targets for the SSC. Should these be set by the 
governance board, the Integral Customer Council, or the owner?
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The SSC also had potentially conflicting goals: it should contribute both to reducing costs 
(improving efficiency) and to increasing quality and customer satisfaction. Different views 
existed on who decides on issues arising from this potential friction. The chair of the Integral 
Customer Council thought that the governance board should decide which goal ought to 
prevail. The Director of the SSC considered this to be the role of the owner. The management 
accountant thought the SSC should make most of the decisions itself. 
Another perceived ambiguity involved the issue of reporting. According to the governance 
structure, the Director of the SSC’s performance in the operational management of the 
centre should be reported to the owner. The owner could utilise this information to safeguard 
the existence of the SSC. Furthermore, the Director of the SSC thought that the report on 
his operational performance was part of his reports to the governance board, in which the 
owner participated. The owner also believed that the reporting mechanisms for the SSC were 
complex. The SSC had to report to its customers on performance in relation to the agreed 
service delivery. The SSC should also report to the owner on their operational management 
(although this does not happen in practice). Additionally, the SSC reported on its financial 
performances to the Board of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors.
In addition to these differences in interpretation, the Chair of the Integral Customer Council 
expressed a shortcoming in the system. The department of municipal administration was 
responsible for developing company policy and standards regarding the SSC’s service 
delivery. However, the Chair did not see this happening (enough) in practice, which led, in 
his opinion, to debates that could have been avoided. In this context the deputy municipal 
secretary also emphasised that the complex organisation of the municipality also played a 
role in this. He argued that policy setting needed to be done in dialogue with the departments 
in order to be effective. 
In practice, different views also seem to have existed on the character of the relationship 
between the SSC and its customers. The Chair of the Integral Customer Council thought that 
the customers and the SSC should develop a strong collegial relationship, because “…in the 
end we are one and the same organisation and we have to work together.”, The Director of 
the SSC, on the other hand, posited that the relationship should develop into a professional 
customer–supplier relationship. He thought that the relationship is too collegial in nature, 
resulting in agreements that are not clear enough and that end up in disputes. The program 
manager added that the only option for the SSC at that point had been to maintain a collegial 
relationship because activities were not yet well organised. He thought that more business-
like behaviour and objectivity would be valuable. The owner was of the view that more trust 
and better cooperation were needed in the relationships.
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It is important to mention that, within the Integral Customer Council, a process was taking 
place that encouraged more collective action. The council was rethinking the process and 
content of the service level agreement for basic service delivery. This was being done in 
cooperation with the SSC and representatives from the various departments, under the 
customer council’s supervision. The chair of this council stressed the importance of having 
an open conversation, because she felt that not all issues were being discussed openly. 
Several key players considered the customer council to be the platform where these issues 
should be discussed. The management accountant of the SSC, who participated as deputy 
Director of the Integral Customer Council, stated that the collaboration and debate were very 
constructive.
In sum, from the rational perspective it is assumed that decision-making is based on 
economic rationality, particularly in relation to the configuration of the governance structure. 
As illustrated in the previous sections, elements of this economic reasoning are recognisable 
in the formal documents describing the original design of the governance structure. 
Instruments such as cost recovery systems, benchmarking, and contracts are introduced. 
In addition it seems that decisions have been made are not fully guided by reasoning 
related to transactions cost economics. For example, the decision to use captive 
buying and selling is based mainly on the belief that the concept of an SSC can only be 
applied effectively if captive buying and selling is the norm. Economies of scale were 
thought to be achievable only if every department was obliged to participate in the SSC. 
Furthermore, we can make a distinction between theory and practice. The main thrust of 
this study is that, although a formal governance structure has been described in formal 
documents, in practice the different key players have their own interpretation of what is meant 
in the documents and their own opinion about what is or is not desirable. 
Service level agreements and cost recovery minimised
In 2012 a project was initiated by the Deputy Mayor responsible for the internal organisation 
of the Municipality of The Hague. This project sought to expand the SSC of the municipality, 
with consultative and support processes still remaining within the departments. For example, 
Human Resource Management, IT, and Finance were activities that were executed within 
the different the departments of the municipality. These tasks had to be restructured 
to enhance collaboration between these departments and save up to 9 million euros. 
The general management team used this political assignment to address several problems 
that had emerged when the governance structure was brought in. The first problem that 
had to be resolved involved the role of the consultative units. A strong feeling existed in the 
general management team that the municipality, and especially the SSC, was governed by the 
consultative units instead of by the managers who ran the core business of the municipality. 
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The work of the managers had a direct impact on the city and the citizens of The Hague. 
Moreover, they were supported by the consultative and supportive units within the departments 
and by the SSC, so it made more sense that the management of the core business should be 
in charge of the services provided by the SSC. In the redesigned governance structure, these 
managers should have a prominent position, giving them the power and authority to decide 
what support would be delivered.
Also, the general management addressed the problem that the cost recovery system used 
caused too much bureaucracy and dispute. It was felt that the decision to use this system 
was based more on nurturing opposing positions rather than supporting a conversation based 
on transparency and economic facts. The general management team expressed the wish 
therefore for this system to be abandoned.
The structure thought to resolve the described problems is depicted in Figure 9.
 
Figure 1. Final proposed governance structure 
 
Figure 9. Final proposed governance structure
In this structure, the organisation of the consultative and supportive processes consists of two 
entities.  The consultants and experts are combined into one unit that undertakes consultative 
activities, whereas the Internal Service Centre (ISC) looks after operational and transactional 
processes and activities. 
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The general management team brought forward several arguments for this distinction. 
The first was that the shared consultative processes needed a different kind of operational 
management than the transactional processes in the ISC. It was felt that these could not 
be combined within one organisational unit. The second reason was that one of the largest 
departments within the municipality would be created if the two types of process were 
combined in a single entity’. The fear was that this restructuring would result in even more 
bureaucracy. A third argument was that it takes time to stabilise a new organisational entity. 
This was a lesson learned from the ISC, where several years were needed to achieve a 
steady operational process. Having a distinct organisational unit for the consultative services 
would allow these processes to be developed without disturbing the daily operation of the 
ISC. The proposed governance structure was meant to govern all support services in both 
organisational units.
In the adjusted governance structure, there was no longer any distinction between the Integral 
Customer Council and the governance board. The general management team considered 
this distinction to be artificial and of little value in practice. The new proposed council was 
supposed to be staffed with high-level executives from the departments, because they were 
authorised to take decisions. 
Another aspect that needs to be emphasised is that the proposed governance structure 
illustrated in Figure 9 is described in terms of departments and the consultative and 
supportive processes, instead of using the language of customer and supplier. This was a 
conscious choice by the general management team as they felt strongly that particular issues 
and processes should be handled differently to how they had been handled in the SSC. 
The perception was that the governance did not function effectively, due also to the use of 
instruments, such as service level agreements and cost recovery. There was a general feeling 
that the service level agreement and cost recovery system frustrated a collective approach. 
The sense was also that too much time and energy was wasted on debates about the 
agreement and the KPIs and on disputes over bills. The plan was to design these instruments 
differently when the governance was restructured. Moreover, the key values were proposed 
to be ‘partnership’ and ‘trust’ and the focus should be on collaboration and on the work of the 
municipality as a whole’.
In addition, ‘account management’ and ‘demand management’ were felt to stimulate 
bureaucracy and increase differences instead of focusing on what departments had in 
common. The new governance structure should stimulate an open conversation between the 
different parties. The belief was that this goal was unlikely to be achieved by using a wide 
variety of committees and councils. Therefore, a minimal structure for the governance structure 
was proposed, which included only the joint integral customer council and the governance 
board. In addition, service level agreements should be reduced to the most essential aspects 
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and cost recovery should be reduced to a minimum. The governance structure should give 
room for the various parties to explore together how the principles of trust and partnership 
could best be put into practice.
These new proposals had an impact on all dimensions of the governance structure, as shown 
in table 8.
Table 8. Aspects of the proposed governance structure
Dimension Existing aspects of the 
governance structure
Proposed aspects of the 
governance structure
Generic governance 
structure
Service level agreements:
 on basic service delivery
‘plus services’
Services for the City Council
Cost settlement
Use of SLA’s is minimised
Cost settlement minimised
Roles and 
responsibilities
Governance board decides on 
a strategic level on service level 
agreements, costs and service 
quality 
Integral customer council put 
forward issues to be decided upon 
by the general management team.
Owner, supplier and customer
Account management and 
demand management
Integrated governance board and 
customer council. Staffed with high-
level management
Owner, overhead and support 
processes and departments
Account management and demand 
management are abolished
It is interesting to note that the key values proposed in relation to the revised governance 
structure resemble those of the initial design. However, it seems that the accounting instruments 
introduced alongside this initial design did not stimulate the development of these values. 
Accordingly, these instruments need to be used in another way in an effort to accomplish this. 
Moreover, the role of the cost recovery system should be reduced as much as possible. The 
governance structure has been simplified compared to the structures described in the earlier 
documents. The view is that a minimal structure gives room for a process in which the best 
way of governing the Municipality of The Hague can be explored together.
4.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter the hybrid governance structure of an SSC has been explored, both in 
theory and in practice. From a rational perspective, this exploration focused on two relevant 
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dimensions. The first dimension concerns the generic governance structure. The question 
is to what extent market should be introduced into a hierarchical organisation, or how hybrid 
the governance structure ought to be. The most relevant question in this context is whether 
or not an exit threat will exist for the SSC. The issue also arises of whether or not the SSC 
should employ market-like instruments, such as contracts, cost recovery systems, and 
benchmarking. The second dimension concerns organisational arrangements, including roles 
and responsibilities: which responsibilities will be assigned to whom and who will be held 
accountable for what?
The governance structure for an SSC in the Municipality of The Hague can be considered 
to be hybrid in nature, because market-like instruments such as contracts, benchmarking, 
and cost settlements have been introduced within the generic structure of a hierarchy 
(the Municipality of The Hague). However, the choice was made to rely on captive buying 
and selling. There was no exit threat. As a consequence, the market-like instruments 
were brought into the hierarchy of the organisation without opening up the external 
market (Herbert & Seal, 2012; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Speklé, 2001; Williamson, 
1979, 1981). It was expected that using these instruments would improve the efficiency 
of the SSC. This efficiency was needed to realise the cutbacks that were being imposed. 
With regard to roles and responsibilities, several parties with different responsibilities were 
distinguished, including the top management, the SSC as a supplier, and the departments 
as customers (Vosselman, 1995). Different layers of governance were also established: 
(1) at the strategic level, a governance board that decides on the contract, and (2) at the 
operational level, an Integral Customer Council that evaluates the performance of the SSC. 
These different roles and responsibilities correspond the literature (De Haes & Grembergen, 
2009; Grant et al., 2007).
However, the decisions over the governance structure do not seem to be guided by the 
type of transactions being executed (Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013). The decision to rely on 
captive buying and selling was driven by the desire to achieve economies of scale and the 
necessary collaborative behaviour associated with it. It was assumed that participation in 
the SSC should be obligatory for all departments in order to achieve the efficiency sought. If 
participation was not obligatory, it was expected that the departments would buy from external 
suppliers because that would be more cost-effective from their point of view. It would be less 
so, however, when viewed from the perspective of the collective: the municipality as a whole. 
The general management team opted for a governance structure within the authority of the 
hierarchy to prevent opportunistic behaviour, that is, to prevent people from looking after their 
interests, at the expense of the interests of the collective. This decision can be interpreted 
as seeking a good balance between the management control systems of the hierarchy and 
the horizontal management control systems used in customer–supplier relationships. The 
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management control structure of a hierarchy provides scope for strong internal co-operation. 
The considerations of the general management team led to choices that weakened the 
relevance of market-like instruments, such as contracts and transfer pricing, favouring instead 
the existing governance structure. From the perspective of TCE one might argue that these 
choices attached too much importance to the governance structure at the expense of the 
transaction. The transaction is the key element in TCE, and the strength of the governance 
structure is derived from the nature of the transaction. However, the decisions within the 
Municipality of The Hague were also guided by other considerations concerning the municipal 
organisation at large. Although these considerations might be understandable, they can lead 
to choices being made that deviate from what might be expected from the perspective of TCE.
The search to find a means to encourage collective action continued to this day. In the original 
design of the governance structure, the departmental heads were framed as a collective 
of customers of the SSC. However, this collectivity did not seem to develop sufficiently in 
practice, given the multiple adjustments in the structure designed to increase collective action. 
The introduction of the Governance Board and the Integral Customer Council are examples of 
these adjustments. The Integral Customer Council started to work collectively on improving 
the content of the existing service level agreement. In the final proposal, the Governance 
Board and Integral Customer Council were combined to further enhance collectivity. 
Additionally, the general management team expressed the wish to abolish the use of 
contracts and cost settlement as much as possible. The impression was that the use of these 
instruments led to much consultation and dispute. Put differently, the transaction costs were 
perceived to be too high. The general management team posited that the transaction costs 
would diminish and that the interests of the collective would be served better if a minimal 
governance structure was developed. In this structure, market-like instruments served the 
dialogue on the different interests and the collective of the municipality. Thus, the goal was to 
develop more customer-inclusive governance (Kearney, 2004) in which choices were based 
more on the interests of the collective than on the characteristics of the transaction. While 
the design of the governance structure was consistent with the current literature on SSCs 
(De Haes & Grembergen, 2009; Grant et al., 2006), the choices that were made about this 
structure partially deviated from the expectations that might be derived from TCE.
Thus, within the Municipality of The Hague, the decisions on the governance structure were 
guided by the collective interests of the municipality. This conclusion may also be derived 
from the values that were supposed to guide the functioning of the governance structure. 
These values reflected the need for collective action: ‘trust’, ‘collaboration’, and ‘partnership’. 
These values were emphasized when the governance structure was introduced and were 
reconfirmed in the last iteration of the governance structure. Moreover, the decision to 
impose captive buying and selling could be considered an attempt to induce collective action. 
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Over time the use of market-like instruments such as contracting, cost settlement, and 
benchmarking proved not to contribute to an atmosphere of cooperation. One reason was 
that the different roles, responsibilities, and instruments were insufficiently defined in the 
proposals. The complaint was that there was a lack of clarity over who was responsible for 
what. Also, there was much debate on the definition of products, the service level agreements, 
and how costs and prices were calculated. More fundamentally, collaboration between the 
different departments was not a distinctive feature of the culture within the Municipality of The 
Hague. The owner even stated that a ´fight culture´ existed and that opposition was more 
common than collaboration. The egocentric attitude of the departments was partly caused 
by the different political interests of the deputy mayors. Political factors more generally may 
be a specific characteristic of local government organisations where it is difficult to reach an 
agreement because of the involvement of many stakeholders with different interests (Dollery 
& Akimov, 2008; Schulz & Brenner, 2010).
In the specific context of a local government organisation, several additional elements 
should be included within a hybrid governance structure. Elements Vosselman (1995) did not 
incorporate in his presentation of the internal market. This is illustrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Governance structure of shared service centre with captive buying and selling
 
The role of top management originally focused only on the SSC and transactions in the internal 
marketplace. However, it can be argued that decisions of the top management also directly 
affected the business units – for example, the decision to impose captive buying and selling. 
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In addition, several adjustments within the Municipality of The Hague are made to stimulate 
collective action. A governance board and an Integral Customer Council were introduced as 
a means to serve the interests of the collective, i.e., the municipality at large. 
The various changes and events described in this chapter also have practical implications. 
First, it is shown that a governance structure needs constant care. The structure is introduced 
and a certain effect is intended, at least by those who decided upon the introduction. The 
design of a governance structure alone does not seem to be the end of this process, 
however, but rather the beginning. Continuous management attention is needed to ensure 
that the structure and the defined roles and responsibilities will actually turn out as intended. 
In this case the management turned its attention to other things and ambiguity remained. 
Second, the actual effect of the governance structure should be of concern to management. 
This chapter shows that the effect can be different to what was intended. Service level 
agreements and cost recovery were introduced to provide a basis for collaboration. This 
collaboration was guided by values such as trust and partnership. However, in daily practice, 
it was felt that the cost settlement system in particular encouraged bureaucracy and conflict 
instead of collaboration. Accordingly, the role of cost recovery was minimised in the redesign 
of the governance structure. Also, other aspects of the internal marketplace, such as account 
management, demand management, and service level agreements, received less attention 
and there was a growing realisation that a more minimal governance structure allowed more 
room for a ‘process of discovery’. In that process, departments and support services should 
find out collectively how the governance needed to develop in order to support collective 
action.
A governance structure may serve as a means to govern relationships within an organisation 
when an SSC is introduced. However, constant management attention is needed to monitor 
the functioning of the structure and to compare its effects in practice to its intended effects as 
specified in the original design.
Another issue that needs consideration is that that the governance structure was introduced 
in an established organisation with existing arrangements which already had its own way 
of doing things. Because of this, the introduction of the governance structure was not as 
straightforward as its initiators might have thought. This effect was not examined in this 
chapter, however, because the focus was on the choices that were made with regard to the 
governance structure. Notwithstanding that, this chapter shows that installing a governance 
structure is not a fixed process but a dynamic one.  Therefore, taking a more process-oriented 
view might give a deeper understanding of the governance structure as it is introduced and 
develops over time. A relational perspective could offer this type of view. Therefore, in the 
next chapter the governance structure is explored from a relational perspective. 
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10 This chapter has been submitted to Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal in an adjusted form, under the 
title: ‘The development of a management control structure as process of economization’. Authors of the submitted 
paper were: P. J. Jellema MSc, Prof. dr. I. de Loo, and Prof. dr. E. G. J. Vosselman.
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5.1 Abstract
As indicated in the previous chapter, we now conceptualise the management control structure 
of a shared service centre as an actor that acts and is acted upon in a network of associations. 
Consequently, the development of this structure is considered a complex interactive process 
that is continuously in a state of flux. We show specifically how the emergence and development 
of the structure in a municipality are part of a process of economisation in which framing and 
overflowing are essential phenomena. Framing and overflowing are mediated by networks of 
associations between multiple actors, both human and non-human, of which the developing 
management control structure is one. The developing management control structure turned 
out to have socialising rather than individualising consequences; co-operation is prioritised 
over competition. 
Since one of the authors of this chapter held a management accountant position and later a 
management position in the organisation under study, an explicit insider’s perspective on the 
process of economisation is offered. 
5.2 Introduction
Management control structures in both interfirm and intrafirm relationships can be regarded 
as relatively stable solutions to control problems (cf. Caglio & Ditillo, 2008) in specific 
relationships – for example, between multiple departments of an organisation and a shared 
service centre (SSC). In this context, management control structures are typically treated 
as relatively straightforward consequences of rational design and managerial negotiations 
and decision-making – that is, as instruments in the hands of often distant and relatively 
isolated managers (Anderson et al., 2014; Dekker, 2004; Minnaar et al., 2017; Vosselman 
and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009). However, management control structures may not be 
the straightforward result of design and managerial decision-making and negotiation at all. 
Moreover, they may not achieve what their originators intended. To paraphrase Hopwood 
(1987), management control structures have the tendency to become what they were/are 
not. Decisions and designs tend to develop and mediate in the constitution of organisational 
relationships. They can be seen as a promise of what might happen with these relationships, 
but they cannot offer any guarantees about them, as organisational life is far too complex to 
provide such certainty (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). 
This study views a management control structure as an important actor and mediator in 
processes of economisation, acknowledging that management control structures can be both 
a consequence and a cause of largely unpredictable network effects. We focus on a Dutch 
municipality that has recently set up an SSC, in which one of the authors held a management 
accountant position and, more recently, a managerial position. Hence, we adopt an insider’s 
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view to studying the emergence and development of this centre. 
Particularly, we adopt an insider’s perspective on processes of economisation. In a process 
of economisation, the economic rationality of a management control structure of an SSC is 
construed as a network effect. Through complex interactions between multiple actors, both 
human and other-than-human, a management control structure develops and carries the 
multiple interests of a continuously shifting group of actors. Complex interactions result in 
‘framing’ and ‘overflowing’ (Callon, 1998a, 1998b). Framing is an attempt to control centrally 
the development of a management control structure and to produce order among actors, 
whereas overflowing produces drift and disorder among actors. Actors may not accept the 
invitations that are embedded in a centrally produced frame such as a management control 
structure, because they do not perceive it to be in their interests. Depending on the power 
of the actors involved, the resulting overflows can lead to efforts to reframe. It is through 
such iterative cycles of framing and overflowing, of producing order and disorder, that a 
management control structure is translated. Thereby such translation, associations are forged 
between actors, that is, their identities are transformed, and their possibilities of interaction 
and the limits of manoeuvre are delimited (Callon, 1986). 
This study focuses on how a management control structure is assembled and held together 
in a network of associations, which is in itself a direct effect of complex interactions (see also 
Ahrens & Chapman, 2006; Mahama et al., 2016). Similar to human actors, the developing 
management control structure has, as a non-human actor, relational agency: the capacity 
to act and generate effects interactively (Latour, 2005; Mahama et al., 2016). Such agency 
does not stem from the cognitive capabilities or intentions of the actor itself, but from the 
actor’s position in a network of associations (Mahama et al., 2016). Through interactions, the 
structure itself, and the way it is perceived and used by other actors, changes.
The study adds to the management accounting and control literature in several ways. First, 
it relates to theoretical and empirical work that considers management accounting and 
control change to involve relational drifting with unpredictable outcomes, rather than being 
a centrally controlled and/or predictable affair (Andon et al., 2007; Quattrone & Hopper, 
2001). We contribute to this work by demonstrating how the emergence and development of 
a management control structure for an SSC is the result of iterative cycles of both centrally 
controlled activity and drifting. Second, the study builds on work on accounting and control 
in the context of shared service centres (Kastberg, 2015; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013) by 
demonstrating how the emergence and development of a management control structure is 
a process of economisation. That is, rather than being the direct and unproblematic result of 
rational individual decision-making and negotiation, the management control structure of an 
SSC may be interpreted as a result from the relational agency of multiple actors in a network 
of associations. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, the theoretical framework used 
to analyse the emergence and development of the management control structure at hand is 
introduced. The research methods are then discussed. Then, the municipality of The Hague 
is introduced. Given the involvement of one of the authors in the municipality at the time of 
the study, the ‘epiphany’ concept (Denzin, 2014) was chosen to identify specific processes 
of framing and overflowing that the author-as-researcher believed to be relevant for further 
study. The chapter ends with a conclusion and a discussion in which the main contributions to 
the management accounting literature are described.
5.3 A sensitising framework of translation
This study conceptualises the management control structure of an SSC as an actor in a 
network of associations. Accordingly, we follow a relational epistemology in examining the 
development and functioning of the management control structure. It should be acknowledged 
that in research which adopts such an approach, it is not tenable to make a distinction between 
‘neutral observation’ and ‘intervention’, or between ‘representation’ and ‘intervention’ (Callon 
et. al, 2011; Hassard & Cox, 2013; see also Pickering, 1995). In this approach, a researcher 
is considered to be an active participant (cf. De Loo & Lowe, 2012; see also Denzin, 1989), 
and he or she has therefore a position that is symmetrical to that of other actors in ‘the field’ 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). The researcher cannot rise above this position and is unable to 
study a network as a (seemingly) objective outsider, presenting overarching views (Walsham, 
1995). What a researcher can do, however, is to present interpretations by relevant human 
actors/stakeholders involved. These translations are inferred from interactions between 
human actors and non-human actors (e.g., software packages and written reports). 
From a relational perspective, theories on networks of associations (theories from 
organisational economics, for example) may be regarded as relevant non-human actors in 
such networks. In this perspective, theories become performative in the development and 
operation of a management control structure, rather than serving as an explanation for a 
management control structure that is ‘out there’. Theories, then, are in the networks, in the 
sense that they may interact with other actors and then become performative. They may 
interact with other actors and then become performative. They are not ‘lenses’ through which 
what is (believed to be) ‘out there’ is studied (DiMaggio, 1995), but they are actors in the 
development and functioning of a management control structure. Theories may be used, for 
example, by a knowledgeable researcher who acts from the position of an inside manager 
– as is the case in this study. Callon (2007) argues that the performativity of economic 
theories is an essential ingredient in processes of economisation. Instead of explaining and/
or predicting a reality that exists prior to and is independent of economic theory, economic 
theory interactively formats, performs, and transforms organisational reality (Callon, 2007; 
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see also Vosselman, 2014). To different degrees, economic theories are successful in that 
they materialise their core (behavioural) assumptions.
5.3.1 Economisation
Çaliskan and Callon’s (2010) notion of economisation refers to processes which concern 
the assembly and qualification of actions, devices, and analytical/practical descriptions as 
‘economic’. Such processes require and involve specific ingredients. Examples include “… 
rules and conventions; technical devices; metrological systems; logistical infrastructures; 
texts, discourses and narratives” (ibid., p. 3). Callon (1998) believes that it is possible to 
uncover how a given constitution has become framed as being or not being economically 
viable and/or sound, and how various forms of inclusion and exclusion (of actors and their 
interests and beliefs) have played a crucial role in underscoring the success or failure of 
a frame. Processes of economisation result in (temporary) ‘achievements’, which can be 
identified and critically discussed. An SSC and its management control structure can be seen 
as such an achievement. Achievements naturally involve ‘battles’ and negotiations between 
different actors with their own beliefs and interests. Accordingly, to produce a frame that 
needs to be sustained by many, if not all, of the actors involved, some actors, beliefs, and 
interests have to be given priority over others. 
5.3.2 Translation
We aim to reveal the processes of economisation through which a management control 
structure develops by drawing on the notions of (re)framing, overflowing and, in a more 
general sense, translation. Callon et al. (2011) use the term “translation” to describe processes 
through which a ‘macrocosm’ is taken from one state to another. A macrocosm is an existing 
organisation or part of an organisation. In this study, the municipality of The Hague, or parts 
of it, can be regarded as such. 
Translation processes start with the emergence of “matters of concern”. These are a 
platform for problematisation, and form a stage on which novel phenomena can be made 
perceptible (Callon et al., 2011). Problematisation leads to secluded, shielded analyses and 
framing in a (deliberately created) microcosm, which comprises a limited number of actors. 
According to Callon et al., a microcosm can take the form of a calculative centre in which 
manipulation takes place. From the macrocosm, reality is transformed and transported to the 
microcosm by using references to that macrocosm. The references to the macrocosm are 
treated as inscriptions (see also Qu and Cooper, 2011): signs that translate the macrocosm 
in its absence. Thus, the first translation is the creation and transportation of inscriptions 
in and from the macrocosm. Then, in a second translation that takes place in a calculative 
centre, inscriptions are produced or reproduced and transformed by a distinct group of actors 
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that intend to reconfigure the macrocosm from a distance. The macrocosm is transformed 
to a “purified and simplified world” (Callon et al., 2011, p. 59). This is a world that can be 
manipulated. Specific actors study and manipulate the inscriptions in order to frame a new 
desired reality, which can be transported back into the macrocosm. In the calculative centre, 
inscriptions carrying the interests of the actors involved are again produced and reproduced, 
discussed, and interpreted. Finally, a third translation is the process of bringing the results of 
the second translation back from the calculative centre into the macrocosm. Here, the support 
needs to be acquired form ‘allies’; relevant actors who also take an interest in bringing the 
result of the second translation into life. This process of forming alliances is referred to by 
Callon as ‘interessement’. Some alliances have already been forged in the first translation, 
but their solidity and viability are tested at this stage. The different stages in the translation 
process described by Callon et al. (2011) are summarised in table 9.
Table 9: Different stages in the process of translation (Callon et al., 2011)
Where? What? What happens? Who is involved?
Macrocosm Problematising A novel phenomenon is made perceptible
Limited number of 
actors
Macrocosm -> 
microcosm Translation 1
Transportation and transformation 
to a purified and simplified world Alliances of actors 
Microcosm Translation 2 Translating the macrocosm in its absence Secluded group 
Microcosm -> 
macrocosm Translation 3 Interessement Alliances of actors 
5.3.3 Framing and overflowing
We suggest that in a microcosm, through inscriptions, a management control structure is 
infused with the intentions of several actors and then brought into a macrocosm (in this 
case, the municipality of The Hague) with the intention of framing specific interactions in 
the macrocosm. A management control structure provides cognitive boundaries for these 
interactions, but at the same time these boundaries are challenged in the macrocosm (Callon, 
1998a). The question that becomes relevant is whether the management control structure is 
capable of creating a ‘world’ in which it can function. As a frame (and an actor), a management 
control structure can stabilise the conditions of interactions, as well as making it possible for 
other actors to calculate and thereby oversee the outcome of these interactions (Kastberg, 
2015). In the framing process that takes place in the calculative centre (the microcosm), actors 
construct and translate the management control structure so that it fits their own assumptions, 
views, interests, and aims. They then unroll the frame of the management control structure 
into the macrocosm to meet their own interests and (hopefully) strengthen their influence.
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Framing processes are never complete (Kastberg, 2015). The reason for this is that frames 
are typically used to make selective inclusions and exclusions of interests and actors (Callon 
et al., 2011). Because it is incomplete, a frame will produce overflows in the macrocosm. 
Overflows are variations of the frame, or variations outside the frame, that are perceived 
and/or created by actors but that were not intended or foreseen. Overflows are the norm, 
rather than the exception. Through overflows, the limitations of the frame become visible. 
This can in turn inspire debate and result in reframing efforts via the translation process 
described in Table 9. In the present case, we assume that framing processes initiated by 
the municipality’s general management – which were further developed and discussed by a 
Steering Committee (a central team), and several working groups – were aimed at ensuring 
the management control structure for the SSC would be implemented smoothly within the 
municipality. However, conflicts of interest arose between actors (see also D’Adderio, 2008), 
illustrating the incompleteness of this frame; this led to iterative cycles of overflowing and 
attempts to reframe. 
5.4 Method
Although access to information and key players is often a challenge when conducting field 
research (Baxter & Chua, 1998), this was not the case in the present study, given the position 
that one of the authors held in the municipality. However, this position also brought certain 
challenges. First, it was not practically possible to separate the role that this author played 
as a management accountant (and later a manager) from his role as a researcher. He did 
engage in reflexive processes to get a better understanding of the role he played in the 
research process. This process included thinking about how that role could affect what he 
deemed to be interesting insights, and about how he would report them (Calás & Smircich, 
1999; see also Dambrin & Lambert, 2012; Nadin, 2006). However, reflexive thinking cannot 
guarantee that he truly realised everything he had done or assumed when drawing inferences 
(Quattrone, 2006). Therefore, presenting intersubjectively shared interpretations of framing 
and overflowing processes that occurred in the municipality (according to some of the key 
actors, including the authors of this chapter) is as far as this research can go (De Loo & Lowe, 
2012; Denzin, 1989). 
Second, since we were adopting a relational approach, the research started from a network 
relation in the microcosm in which this author was an actor. Third, in addition to a specific 
network relation in a microcosm, we needed to choose a useful starting point for our research. 
This was considered to be a disturbance in or disruption of a relation that was caused by the 
engagement of the management control structure – that is, a disruption that led to tensions in 
the microcosm in which the author-practitioner acted. Denzin’s (2014) notion of ‘epiphanies’ 
was particularly helpful to elucidate possible disturbances and disruptions. Epiphanies are 
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retrospectively created ‘stories of enlightenment’: narratives that describe when and how a 
person concluded that previously held views about relationships that involve oneself and/
or others were inadequate and that changes were needed to cope with the new situation. 
Note that an epiphany occurs at the individual level: an individual experiences something 
as disturbing or surprising while he or she is interacting with other human and other-than-
human actors. Adaptations (of views, assumptions, thoughts, or ideas about other actors) are 
required to make sense of what has happened, and to move ahead. We suggest that such 
adaptations are at the heart of what individual human actors do when they are involved in, 
or reacting to, framing and overflowing efforts in micro- and macrocosms. The adaptations 
describe changes in position of individuals, which may or may not be in line with the framing 
and overflowing efforts that are occurring. More specifically, this study started by examining 
a specific epiphany from the viewpoint of a single actor, namely the author who held a 
management accountant position. Through this epiphany, we tried to access the relevant 
network of associations involved. By moving back and forward in time across this (shifting) 
network, we were able to elucidate the dynamics of specific processes of economisation in 
the municipality. 
Interviews were conducted at different stages of the research process with employees from 
the municipality (see Table 10 for a summary). The content of these interviews was mainly 
based on signals of framing and overflowing processes that a previous interviewee had 
described. All the interview reports were presented to the interviewees for feedback (Denzin, 
1989). Additionally, we conducted ex-post interviews with key players in the framing and 
enactment of the management control structure of the SSC. These ex-post interviews were 
scheduled at the end of the empirical research and were intended as a means by which to 
thoroughly reflect upon the interpretations made by the researchers. The key players involved 
were the Deputy Municipal Secretary, the Chair of the Integral Customer Council, the project 
leader in charge of the development of the SSC, multiple directors within the SSC, and the 
advisor to the General Director of the SSC (who was also strongly involved in developing the 
centre). The advisor to the General Director of the SSC also read parts of the case description 
presented in this chapter, because he was part of the process as well. His comments have 
been included in the analysis. Finally, the co-authors of this chapter interviewed their fellow 
author-practitioner, who had been the management accountant of the SSC, about his 
experiences and reflections on the shared service centre ‘project’.
In addition, notes of official and unofficial meetings were studied, as well as the logbook that 
one of the co-authors had kept during the research project. Because formal documents often 
include relevant inscriptions (Qu & Cooper, 2011), successive drafts of formal documents 
proved to be also essential sources of information in the present research. Table 10 shows 
who was interviewed and when the interviews were held.
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Table 10: Interviews conducted in this research
Interview with Interview type Date Duration Assisted by 
Controller of the shared 
service centre Unstructured 05-04-2013 1 hour LKR
Controller of shared 
service centre Semi-structured 25-06-2013 40 minutes LKR
Deputy Municipal 
Secretary/ Owner of the 
shared service centre 
and concern director 
business management
Semi-structured 25-06-2013 1 hour and 25 minutes LKR
Chairwomen of the 
Integral Customer 
Council and Director of 
Business Management 
of the Departmen of 
Social Affairs and 
employee projects
Semi-structured 25-06-2013 35 minutes LKR
Director of the shared 
service centre Semi-structured 25-06-2013 1 hour LKR
Programme manager 
for the improvement of 
business management
Semi-structured 12-07-2013 1 hour LKR
Deputy Municipal 
Secretary/ owner of the 
shared service centre 
and concern director 
business management
Semi-structured 09-05-2014 45 minutes JCN
Member of the Integral 
Customer Council. 
Director of Business 
Management for the 
Department of Urban 
Development, interim 
cluster manager 
Automation of the IDC
Semi-structured 09-05-2014 20 minutes JCN
Director of the shared 
service centre Semi-structured 09-05-2014 50 minutes JCN
Former director 
of Personnel and 
Organisation of the 
municipality of The 
Hague. Former project 
leader of the IDC
Semi-structured 23-01-2015 1 hour PJA
Former director of the 
IDC Semi-structured 06-02-2016 1 hour PJA
Advisor to the director of 
the IDC Semi-structured 17-02-2016 1 hour PJA
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5.5 The field study
Introduction to the municipality of The Hague and its SSC
In chapter 2 the organisation of the municipality of The Hague and the position of its SSC 
are introduced. Each of the departments (including the ‘company’ ISC) has a management 
accounting function. Management accountants get together in the Committee of Management 
Accountants, which discusses, on a weekly basis, financial issues concerning the municipality. 
At the time of study, one of the authors was the management accountant for the ISC (he later 
held a managerial position) and, as such, sat on this committee.
Ideas about establishing an SSC in the municipality gradually developed in 2004. At that time, 
several “experimental projects” had been conducted, some of which focused on how to ‘build’ 
an SSC. The purpose of these projects, as expressed in a memo that accompanied the start11, 
was to learn from hands-on experience with shared services and their governance. Working/
experimenting with an SSC is considered as a serious “matter of concern” (Callon et al., 2011) 
for the municipality of The Hague. The aforementioned memo can be regarded as a (bundle 
of) inscription(s) carrying general management’s interests related to an SSC. The inscriptions 
were used by the participants in the experimental projects to provide recommendations on 
how an SSC might be established, what it could look like, and how it might be governed. In 
2006, the newly elected Board of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors decided to impose financial 
cuts on all departments, as it wanted the municipality to become more effective and efficient12. 
Based on the insights from the experimental projects, the general management team decided 
to formally establish an SSC (as a separate ‘company’) in January 2008. This confirmed that 
it was a “matter of concern”: creating an SSC was ostensibly important. A special project was 
set up to guide the implementation process, and the Director of Personnel and Organisation 
was tasked to lead it.
According to this director, the generally held belief in the municipality at the time was that 
cost reductions and more efficiency could be realised by clustering the provision of support 
services. In addition, it was thought that these services would become less vulnerable (i.e., 
dependent on just one or two people per department), as was typically the case for most of 
the services offered. Thus, the municipality’s efficiency, financial state, and ways of working 
were problematised, and the concept of the SSC was presented as a solution. 
A ‘blueprint’ for the design of the SSC was produced in December 2007. In November that 
year, the Board of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors decided that the SSC, which now was called 
the ISC, would have to be in place by January 1st, 2008. Because of the tight schedule and 
supposedly high impact of the project, a Steering Committee was formed, and staffed with 
11 “Meer voor minder: startdocument shared services” (“More with less: starting memo shared services”), dated 
September 2004.
12 In line with prevailing ideas about New Public Management (NPM) (Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; Pollitt, 2007).
525761-L-bw-Jellema
Processed on: 30-11-2018 PDF page: 91
91
The development of a management control structure as a process of economisation
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 5
high-level executives. A central team was also formed, chaired by the project leader and 
staffed with the chairs of the various working groups. Working groups were made up of civil 
servants from multiple departments. These teams, groups, and committees, which can be 
seen as microcosms, would perform the preparation work necessary to establish the SSC by 
the start of 2008. 
The author-practitioner of this chapter, as the designated management accountant for the 
ISC, participated in several working groups. One of these working groups had to prepare a 
proposal for the scope and content of the services and the cost allocation system, as well 
as providing some initial reflections on how the introduction of the SSC might affect the 
departments’ annual budgets.
5.5.1 Epiphany
The entry point from which we studied multiple framing and overflowing processes is a major 
epiphany experienced several months after the ‘go live’ date of the ISC in January 2008. The 
epiphany is reflected in the logbook entry presented at the start of chapter 3. We interpret this 
entry as a record of and reflection on manipulation attempts in the Committee of Management 
Accountants, which in our research context is in the macrocosm of the municipality.
A specific agreement on the allocation of costs for the ISC was required at some point 
in early 2008, so that the costs incurred by the ISC would be covered. In his role as the 
ISC’s management accountant, the author-practitioner had an informal conversation with 
all the management accountants of the different departments. They all indicated that they 
understood his problem and offered their help. However, they also claimed that the effects of 
the new cost allocation system for the ISC would be unacceptable for their own department. 
They provided two reasons. The first was a financial one: they claimed not to have sufficient 
budget to pay for the services of the ISC. The second related to discontent with the ISC’s 
service delivery. The provision of personnel and salary administration services had started 
off badly, because the IT system that was supposed to support these operations did not 
function properly. On top of this, some of the management accountants were dissatisfied with 
the role of the Standing Committee in the development of the management control structure 
for the SSC. Financial issues had been until then the exclusive territory of the Committee of 
Management Accountants. In the new structure, with the ISC, they felt that the committee was 
losing this (powerful) role in the municipality. So-called customer councils now had to decide 
on the products, quality, and prices of the services delivered by the ISC. Hence, management 
accountants would be stripped of some of the prestige they had previously enjoyed (see also 
Ezzamel & Burns, 2005; Lambert & Pezet, 2011).
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The author-practitioner felt that the cost allocation problem would probably not be addressed if 
the dissatisfaction was not dealt with. He thought that the turbulence he faced would continue 
if the position of the Committee of Management Accountants remained the same. He was 
therefore rather uncertain how to proceed.
What caused the problems that the author-practitioner thought were important and needed 
to be tackled? 
5.5.2 Values loaded into the microcosms
As described above, within the macrocosm of the municipality, several different groups, or 
microcosms, were created to guide the implementation process of the ISC. These microcosms 
included the Steering Committee, the central team, and several working groups. The working 
group that had to prepare the new cost allocation system for the SSC was called the Working 
Group on the Service Package IDC. Among other things, this group had to propose viable 
solutions for how to settle cost issues with other departments, and how to handle budgetary 
consequences once the ISC was established. According to its final report, the working group 
proposed to adhere to the values of collaboration and mutual respect, which had been 
previously articulated by the municipality’s general management, as the initiator of the SSC 
project. These values apparently reflected the atmosphere in the general management team 
at the time.
The values implied feelings of camaraderie, which were derived from ‘lessons learned’ in 
other organisations. One important example was the municipality of Tilburg, a front runner 
in the development of SSCs in Dutch governmental organisations. Several delegates from 
The Hague visited the municipality of Tilburg to learn from their experiences. They were 
told that collegial co-operation had been a major contributor to the perceived success of the 
SSC. Therefore, the decision was made to load values such as partnership, co-operation and 
mutual trust into the management control structure of the ISC: 
“We were convinced that values such as partnership, co-operation and mutual trust were 
necessary to make the concept of shared services work.” (Project leader, ISC).
These values were expressed in the mission statement of the ISC, which served as a frame 
of reference for the working group. The group concluded that the ISC’s basic service delivery 
package had to contain as many services as the ISC could viably provide. The provision of 
these services should be guided by simple agreements and few formal rules. After all, mutual 
trust was one of the guiding principles in the municipality. Moreover, the new cost allocation 
system should provide incentives because the departments of the municipality had to be 
made more aware of the costs they were incurring for services. Also, the ISC had to strive 
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for an efficient and effective delivery of each service. It was thought that this could ultimately 
allow the SSC to arrive at a competitive price that would serve both purposes: cost awareness 
within the departments and efficiency within ISC. 
5.5.3 Framing in a microcosm
How did the working group (consisting of the management accountants of several departments) 
frame the service package and the prices? The management accountant from the Department 
of Urban Sanitation was asked to chair the group. This was based on his reputation:
“…. he was beyond doubt. He had an impeccable reputation and we knew that when he gave 
advice it would be readily accepted.’ Of course, he had to consult the other management 
accountants first.” (Project leader, ISC).
To a large extent, consultation with the other management accountants happened within the 
Working Group on the Service Package IDC. However, as stated, not all the management 
accountants were part of in this group. If the management accountants of all the departments 
had been part of it, it would have consisted of 14 members. In accordance with an agreement 
made in the general management team, only specific departmental management accountants 
were invited to participate, namely only those who worked in ‘major’ departments (in terms of 
their yearly budget). This led to the selection of five management accountants from different 
departments and a single participant from the Management Accounting Department at 
the level of the organisation as a whole. They operated on behalf of the general municipal 
management team and the group headed by the management accountant of one of the 
departments. The members of the working group were supposed to take the interests of the 
remaining departments into account, following the prevailing ideas of partnership and co-
operation.
After much discussion, in September 2007 the working group presented a draft proposal, 
containing an outline of the contents of the basic service package of the ISC. The package 
included printing services, salary administration, and the provision of catering services. The 
total value of these services was expected to be € 54.1 million per annum. These services 
were to be charged for annually, using 12 invoices, one for each department. The content of 
each invoice would be based on the parameters used to construct a department’s budget for 
the services: the total office space a department took up in m2, the number of offices involved, 
and the number of employees (in FTE), measured at a specific date in the year. Differences 
arising after this date would have to be charged in the following year. The nature of the 
products and services in the basic service package would be the same for all departments, 
and the ISC was supposed to be the sole provider of these services. In other words, it was 
proposed to introduce full captive buying and selling. 
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In addition to the services offered via the basic service package, a set of more specialised 
products and services could be provided according to specific demands. Examples included 
insurance, specialised accommodations for the library and the sanitation department, services 
for meetings of the City Council, and transportation services for the Mayor and Deputy Mayors. 
The total value of these services was expected to be € 23.4 million per annum. These costs 
were to be allocated on an ad hoc basis using individualised invoices. It was not known how 
many invoices would have to be sent, but the initial estimate was that there would be more 
than 4,000 invoices.
The draft proposal led to several debates in the working group. Several management 
accountants believed that only a more detailed cost allocation system would lead to greater 
financial awareness and efficiency in the municipality. They claimed, for example, that it was 
necessary to charge the costs of making photocopies and coffee to managers of organisational 
units. A more detailed cost allocation system would make the departmental manager (and 
those within the department) aware of the costs that resulted from their efforts. Moreover, this 
would offer the manager the possibility of controlling departmental costs. These management 
accountants argued that if a manager was about to exceed the budget, he or she could 
decide to cut back on photocopying and drinking coffee. However, several other management 
accountants argued that sophisticated cost allocation systems would involve a lot of work, 
and would thus incur transaction costs without providing important additional insights, as 
assumptions about the drivers of cost still had to be made. Moreover, they indicated that 
departmental managers would never cut back on issues such as photocopying or coffee 
drinking because they would consider these to be important in helping staff to do their job 
effectively. Also, some of the accountants argued that the cost of these activities would 
be relatively small compared to the total budget of an organisational unit. They therefore 
promoted a relatively simple system. These management accountants outnumbered the 
accountants who were in favour of a more sophisticated system of cost allocation. The 
chairman of the Working Group on the Service Package IDC also argued that a simpler cost 
allocation system would generate sufficient incentives to achieve the efficiency level desired 
by the general management. The Committee of Management Accountants then discussed 
the simpler scheme, without further amendments, in which just one invoice would cover a 
wide variety of products and services. This proposal was finally accepted by all members of 
the working group – or at least nobody objected that future decisions would be in line with 
the proposal. A possible reason for this apparent consensus could be that the draft proposal 
‘met’ the inscriptions that had been transported into the microcosm of the working group. A 
simplified cost allocation model was consistent with the values proclaimed by the general 
management team: co-operation, partnership, and mutual trust. Thus, the proposal not only 
reflected the insights and interests of most management accountants in the working group 
(microcosm), but also inscribed the values that were proclaimed by the general management 
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team. Accordingly, the Working Group on the Service Package IDC did not expect there to 
be much debate and resistance in the Standing Committee of Management Accountants 
(macrocosm). However, this expectation turned out to be completely wrong. 
5.5.4 Extending the microcosm
The draft proposal was presented to the Standing Committee of Management Accountants in 
the autumn of 2007. In the working group, discussions had focused mainly on the principles 
of the cost allocation system. The potential (budgetary) effects of the proposed system 
were not really addressed. These effects, however, became a big issue in the Committee 
of Management Accountants. Here, in an extended microcosm, the ‘smaller’ departments 
also took part in the debate. For these departments, the effects of the new cost allocation 
system appeared to be dramatic. Their interests had not been genuinely considered by the 
working group, despite requests from general management. The management accountants 
of the smaller departments felt that the flexibility of their budgets and their autonomy would 
be reduced. For the public library, for example, the total budget was originally about € 25 
million per annum. The management accountant from this department had a great deal of 
freedom in how to spend the budget, because all the services and products were traced and 
had to be paid specifically by the departments. In this way, he argued, the public library could 
control its costs. In the future, there would be only one invoice, comprising almost 20% of 
the department’s yearly budget at once (given the cost allocation parameters that were to be 
used). The department perceived this as a strong reduction in its freedom and in its ability to 
control costs. 
The general reply to these arguments by those advocating the principles of the draft 
proposal was that freedom of choice was already very limited. For example, services such as 
housing and catering could only be obtained from the Facility Department. Furthermore, the 
management accountants argued that it was much more important for managers to control 
the resources for their core business, such as urban development, than to control the costs of 
support services such as housing. 
Another consequence of the revised cost allocation system was that budgets had to be 
redistributed between departments. In the working group, it was suggested that departmental 
budgets would need to be adjusted according to the new, actual costs that would be charged 
after the implementation of the ISC. Any department whose charges had been reduced under 
the new system would have to transfer its excess budget to departments whose charges had 
increased. After all, this was what ‘co-operation’ in the municipality should amount to. 
Time also became an issue. Because the debates in the Committee of Management 
Accountants took place in the autumn of 2007, and the ISC was due to start in January 
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2008, pressure from the Steering Committee was rising. Since the negotiation processes 
in the Working Group on the Service Package IDC had already been strenuous, making 
further adjustments to the proposal based on the current discussions in the Committee of 
Management Accountants would inevitably lead to renewed discussions in the microcosm 
(i.e., the working group). Therefore, the chairman of the group insisted on continuing with 
the original proposal. He emphasized, both formally and informally – in various e-mails and 
discussions with other members of the Steering Committee – the most important advantages of 
the proposal. The proposal stressed the importance of transparency in the costs of the products 
and services the ISC was expected to deliver. The ISC was suppose to provide details of how 
the costs had been calculated and to demonstrate its efficiency via benchmarking with shared 
service centres in government organisations that were comparable to the municipality of The 
Hague. Also, the relatively simple allocation of costs in the proposal was an improvement on 
the existing situation. The chairman tried to convince the multiple management accountants 
by pointing out that this simple allocation of costs allowed the departments to control a large 
part of their budget and costs. An unchanged proposal was subsequently discussed by the 
Steering Committee and the general management team. Apparently, the resistance of some 
of the management accountants was not that extensive to lead to a reframing of the original 
frame. 
However, contrary to the proposal of the working group, the general management decided 
that the implementation of the cost allocation system was to happen in two phases. Because 
the budget for 2008 had already been set, major adjustments to current procedures for 
calculating and allocating costs and budgets were not found desirable. In the first phase, the 
calculation of the costs of some services had to be simplified. The costs of personnel and 
salary administration (one of the services contained in the basic service package of the ISC) 
had to be calculated in advance, because this was a new organisational unit. In the second 
phase, which was due to start in January 2009, the costs of the basic service package would 
have to be allocated as originally proposed in the draft proposal. This decision established 
that the management control structure between the ISC and the departments was to be 
framed from January 2008 onwards.
In the frame of the management control structure, the products and services that the ISC 
would deliver in the basic service package were treated at first as transactions between the 
ISC and the collective of departments. The basic service package would be the same for 
every department and the allocation of costs was to be relatively simple. In this way, the 
municipality economised on transaction costs, controlling as much as possible the costs of 
searching for partners, of negotiating between the ISC and the multiple departments, and 
of invoicing and conflict resolution. The different parties in the municipality did not meet in a 
marketplace, but in a co-operative space. Customer–supplier relations were framed, in which 
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most services involved transactions between the ISC and the collective of departments. For 
example, IT systems used by the Department of Public Services for issuing driving licences 
and passports differed from the systems used by the Department of Public Sanitation for 
making maps of the city. Specific transactions between the ISC and individual departments 
were framed only for a small number of client-specific services. The principal values in the 
spaces where the various parties met were co-operation, partnership, and mutual trust, but 
not competition. 
5.6.5 Remaining overflows
In the microcosm of the Working Group on the Service Package IDC, the values of co-
operation, trust, and partnership were inscribed in the frame for the management control 
structure. Debates over the cost allocation system were fierce. An agreement was reached, 
but not because the small group of management accountants who participated in the 
working group and who favoured a more sophisticated allocation system were convinced 
by arguments. It was rather that they acknowledged that the forces in support of a more 
simplified system were stronger. This process repeated itself in the macrocosm when the 
proposal of the IDC was discussed in the Standing Committee of Management Accountants. 
The process of framing that took place in the microcosm led to a coalition that was strong 
enough to constitute a frame that could be brought back into the macrocosm. 
But was the frame able to realise itself in the macrocosm? It turned out that several overflows 
emerged during the further unrolling of the frame. 
After the launch of the ISC in January 2008, the adjusted cost allocation system was supposed 
come into effect. However, this did not happen as planned:
“At each meeting of the management accountants, we had discussion about the budgetary 
implications of the services of the SSC. Because of the introduction of the basic service 
package, we had to redistribute the budgets to ensure that every department had sufficient 
budget to pay the SSC. But somehow there were always negative budgetary effects. We 
hardly ever heard about positive budgetary effects that could be used to compensate for the 
negative ones. That was difficult to believe, because we were not spending more than we did 
before” (Management accountant of the ISC).
Moreover, continuing debates took place in the Standing Committee of Management 
Accountants on the effects of the frame produced by the Working Group on the Service 
Package IDC. There was growing dissatisfaction about the quality of the personnel and 
salary administration services. Some management accountants argued that the costs of 
these services were dramatically increasing and that the budget cuts desired by general 
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management could therefore not be achieved. In addition, it was extremely difficult to reach an 
agreement about the cost calculation and allocation of data and telecom services – services 
that still had to be added to the basic service delivery package of the ISC. Another element 
fuelling the debate was the general discontent among management accountants about their 
new position within the management control structure of the ISC. 
As for the quality of the personnel and salary administration services, these services were 
originally (before January 2008) provided by the personnel and salary administration units, 
which served all departments. Due to time constraints, these units were put together in the 
ISC in their current form, meaning that working processes were not synchronised before the 
ISC went operational. Consequently, there was a great variety of working processes.  At the 
same time, a new IT system (the basis for personnel and salary administration services) 
was introduced, which was supposed to deliver concise management information. General 
expectations of this system were low, however. In December 2007, a ‘go/no go’ decision 
had to be made in a hastily organised joint meeting of the management accountants, IT 
managers, and HR managers of the different departments. In this meeting, everyone felt that 
that the system should not be implemented because it was not yet well developed. However, 
a ‘no go’ decision was not perceived to be a real option, because some weeks later the ISC 
had to be launched – no matter what. Therefore, a decision to ‘go’ was made. This decision 
did not of course diminish debate about the IT system. 
The provision and quality of personnel and salary administration services were challenged from 
day one. There was no adequate management information on personnel and administration 
costs and service delivery, because the new IT system could not produce relevant output 
reports. Apart from the problems with the new IT system, one of the main sources of discontent 
was that municipality officials were not allowed to make direct contact with their colleagues 
in the ISC. To contact the ISC, there was only one telephone number and one email account 
available. This led to frustration both inside and outside the ISC. Subsequently, trust in the 
management team of the ISC decreased. The general management team therefore decided 
to set up a taskforce to address the main issues relating to the operation of personnel and 
salary administration. This task force was chaired by one of the members of the general 
management team. The growing frustrations and the creation of the task force intensified the 
debate about the costs of service delivery. The willingness of the management accountants to 
contribute to the development of the ISC faded, and the interests of the individual departments 
were prioritised above the overall interests of the municipality.
Against this background, the author-practitioner had to reach an agreement about the cost 
volume and cost allocation of personnel and salary administration services provided by the 
ISC. The costs were estimated to be € 3 million when the Working Group on the Service 
Package IDC drafted its original proposal. However, during the first months of 2008 it became 
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clear that the actual costs would amount to almost € 6 million. This increase in costs was 
caused mainly by the costs of the new IT system, which at that time was not functioning 
properly. 
In September 2008, the management accountant of the ISC presented a proposal to the 
Standing Committee of Management Accountants to settle these costs (as 2009, with a 
different allocation system, was approaching). Needless to say, this proposal did not meet 
with much approval. The report of the meeting in which the proposal was discussed reveals 
very little of the actual discussion:
“Short discussion, no decisions. To be continued.” (Committee of Management Accountants 
minutes, September 17th, 2008).
To summarise the discussion that did take place, no department was prepared to pay the 
additional costs of € 3 million. The author-practitioner was urged to gain more support from 
the management accountants. He argued that the additional costs were mainly the result of 
decisions taken in the past, such as in the ‘go/no go’-meeting referred to earlier. He therefore 
prepared a detailed memo for the next meeting in which he listed the decisions taken 
previously, together with an estimate of the additional costs they had caused. Committee 
members then seemed to realise that there was no way out, and grudgingly accepted the cost 
allocation frame he had proposed earlier in September. 
The discussion about the cost calculation and allocation of data and telecom services 
(services that were added to the basic service delivery package of the ISC in January 2008) 
had started about nine months before in another microcosm, another working group of which 
the author-practitioner was also a member. The debate in this group focused on the total sum 
of money the municipality had spent on the data services that were to be shared. It turned out 
that the costs were difficult to calculate. Subsequently, the Municipal Audit Department was 
asked to analyse the cost data of the different departments. They concluded that it was not 
possible to determine the precise costs that had been incurred. The departments involved did 
not register costs in the same way, and it was therefore uncertain whether a reliable estimate 
of the total cost could be computed. It was suggested that the total costs could be somewhere 
between € 24 and € 27 million. However, when a budget was calculated which incorporated 
all the costs relating to data and telecom services within the ISC, it came to a total of € 31 
million – which suggested a sharp increase in costs. 
When the estimates of this working group were presented in the Standing Committee of 
Management Accountants, a heated debate ensued. Essentially, the debate revolved around 
the following issues:
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“How is it possible that costs are rising while we are sharing services? This is not what we 
intended. This cannot be right! It should be cheaper!” 
The calculations and estimates from this working group were challenged. The management 
accountant of the ISC replied that no data on total costs per department had been available 
before, so that the conclusion that costs were rising was premature. There was no benchmark 
to compare them against. The report from the Municipal Audit Department confirmed that 
costs had not necessarily risen.
Nevertheless, the author-practitioner was put under pressure by his fellow management 
accountants to adjust the budget so that it was more in line with the total amount the Municipal 
Audit Department had suggested. He ultimately believed he had no other option than to revise 
the budget. However, he warned his colleagues that:
“…there will be no budgetary consequences in 2008 ... but the estimated costs in 2009 will be 
higher.” (Committee of Management Accountants minutes, May 20th, 2008).
Some adjustments were therefore made to the budget. For example, personnel costs were 
reduced. In late 2008, there were several vacancies, but the budget reserved to fill these 
vacancies was removed. The budget for hiring temporary personnel was also reduced. In due 
course, the ISC was supposed to act as a spur to innovation in IT services, but the budget 
that was reserved to support these innovations was reduced to zero. The final outcome was 
a budget of data and telecommunication services of € 28 million per annum, which was much 
more in line with the expectations of the departments. These numbers would probably also 
be acceptable to the municipal general management team. In two further sessions of the 
Standing Committee of Management Accountants, it was agreed that this was to be the ISC 
budget for the remainder of 2008. Consequently, there was no way for the ISC to revise the 
budget again. Nevertheless, ‘funding’ the ISC through cost allocation remained an issue for 
debate.
The analysis above indicates that several aspects of the frame of the cost allocation system 
had to struggle to perform in practice. Tensions were caused by multiple actors, who had 
different interests regarding the new cost allocation system. These interests originated from 
the networks that the actors participated in, as well as from their personal preferences. 
The interests stemming from personal preferences concerned the sophistication of the 
allocation method. The debate between management accountants was driven mainly by 
personal beliefs about the value of such a system. These beliefs differed in terms of the 
extent to which the process of cost allocation might support a process of ‘marketisation’. 
Those in favour of a sophisticated allocation model had a vision that departmental and 
ISC-representatives would meet at an internal marketplace where internal client–supplier 
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relationships would be established. The ISC would supply services for which individual 
departments would be charged. To these management accountants, the process of 
economisation implied the further development of a market-like management control 
structure for the ISC. By contrast, those in favour of a simpler cost allocation model were 
not comfortable with the idea of a long trajectory towards an internal market. They argued 
that specific transactions between the ISC and individual departments should be kept to a 
minimum because such transactions would increase transaction costs. They advocated a 
view that was closer to ‘unified governance’, arguing that a simple cost allocation system might 
be sufficient to realise the values of co-operation, partnership, and mutual trust propounded 
by the municipality’s general management. To them, economisation should be associated 
not with marketisation, but with economies of scale and more unified control. Cost allocation 
should support co-operation, and should not be an incentive for managers to act as economic 
men in an internal marketplace. 
However, the interests relating to the network positions of the management accountants 
turned out to be particularly strong. Many arguments were about the interests of the individual 
departments in which the management accountants were positioned. When the budgetary 
effects of the new cost allocation method became clear, the accuracy of the cost calculations 
for products and the budgetary implications for the different departments were challenged. The 
management accountants seemed to realize that politics were in the calculations. Moreover, 
as outlined below, they realised that the power of their profession within the municipality of 
The Hague was being challenged by the frames for the new management control structure. 
5.6.6 Overflows result in reframing efforts
The first year in which the ISC was fully operational was 2009. The costs of the service 
delivery were to be calculated and allocated in the way the general management team had 
envisioned in late 2007. The cost allocation was to be accompanied by a SLA: a contract that 
described (a) the products and services to be delivered to specific departments, (b) the prices 
to be paid by these departments, and (c) the precise governance of the transactions between 
the departments and the ISC.
A proposal for the SLA and the cost allocation was (again) drafted in the ISC’s Control 
Department, another microcosm. This proposal was presented to the Standing Committee 
of Management Accountants in January 2009. The basic service package proposed by the 
Control Department consisted of services for facilities and housing, data and telecommunication 
services, personnel and salary administration, and other products and services. It covered 
63% of the yearly budget of the ISC. Its total costs were estimated to be € 66.3 million. Table 
11 shows the breakdown of costs for the suggested basic service package.
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Table 11: Content of the proposed basic service package13
Subject Amount in basic service package Total costs of ISC
Housing € 42.5 million € 60 million
Data and telecommunication services € 14.7 million € 30.2 million
Other products and services14 € 7.0 million € 8.8 million
Personnel and salary administration € 6.0 million € 6.0 million
Total € 66.3 million € 105 million
Again, the costs became a source of debate. However, this time the debate involved other 
issues as well. Discontent was growing within the Standing Committee of Management 
Accountants. There was a general feeling (and discourse) that the management control 
structure for the ISC was ineffective. Several management accountants suggested that there 
were too many stakeholders involved in the decisions that had to be taken. The majority 
of management accountants in the committee indicated that a Committee of Management 
Accountants was needed, with authorisation to assess the total costs and quality of the ISC’s 
service delivery. Even though they were not asked to comment on this, the minutes of one 
meeting say: 
“The Committee of Management Accountants prefers the establishment of one governance 
board that decides on the SLA and accompanying costs. Preferably, this should be the 
Committee of Management Accountants itself.” (Committee of Management Accountants 
minutes, January 21st, 2009).
Possibly, this attempt to regain the Committee’s original position in the municipality was 
reflected in a more broadly felt ambiguity about the roles and responsibilities in the governance 
and management control of the ISC. The General Manager of ISC felt there were problems: 
“I felt I needed a management control structure that was more aligned with the daily practices 
and existing bodies and committees within the municipality of The Hague. Otherwise, I was 
convinced, it would not work.” (General Manager of ISC). 
With respect to the statement from the Committee of Management Accountants that its 
position should be strengthened, he replied: 
13 Memo pricing ISC prepared for the meeting of management accountants January 21st, 2009
14 The ‘other products and services’ category included the provision of coffee. This was paid for by employees them-
selves. This led to the widespread use of ‘representation cards’ with which coffee could be obtained for free. The costs 
were charged to the department that owned the card. This ultimately led to a substantial process of internal invoicing. 
It was suggested that the overall costs of this process to the municipality were expected to be high, but this was not 
analysed by the working group. 
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“The Committee of Management Accountants claimed a position that was not right. They 
wanted to be the principal of the ISC, but that would be the wrong management level.” 
(General Manager ISC).
He thought the highest management level within the municipality should be the principal, 
namely the general management team. At the same time, the debate about financial issues 
continued. The management accountants from various departments claimed that they 
did not have the budget required to pay for the costs of the ISC. As a consequence, the 
management accountant of the ISC continued “walking circles in the city hall”, talking to 
individual management accountants in the departments involved in an attempt to answer their 
questions and resolve their issues. This turned out to be a futile exercise, though. Every time 
a proposal was presented in the Committee of Management Accountants, more questions 
were raised and new disputes between departments arose. Not only were the numbers 
produced by the ISC treated with suspicion, but there was also not much trust between the 
management accountants of the different departments. An underlying ‘fight culture’ came to 
the surface.  The General Manager of the ISC added:
“Decisions in the municipality were mostly made on the basis of ‘what’s in it for me’. In the 
existing committees, the most important thing was to represent the interests of one’s own 
department.” (General Manager of ISC).
The author-as-practitioner became increasingly worried as to whether any agreement would 
be reached. As he recalled in a subsequent interview, he expressed his concerns to the 
Committee of Management Accountants at a meeting in June 2009. Therefore, in June 2009 
he stated in the Committee of Management Accountants:
“I don’t know how we can come to an agreement. Each proposal I prepare is put into doubt, 
and questions keep on coming. Questions I am not able to answer, because you don’t seem 
to have enough faith in the calculations we make. But also, because your questions often 
move beyond the issues at hand. I think it is hard to reach an agreement on cost allocation 
issues when there is also discontent about service delivery … Therefore, I am not going 
to prepare another proposal in this way, because it is not going to take us any closer to a 
solution.” (Interview with the management accountant of the ISC, June 26th, 2013).
In the aftermath of the June 2009 meeting, the author-practitioner talked to the management 
accountant of the Department of Education and Culture, who suggested creating a working 
group which could resolve all the debates in the Committee of Management Accountants 
at once. Its remit should move beyond cost allocation issues. This second management 
accountant was willing to chair this group. The two management accountants took their 
proposal to the Committee of Management Accountants, which supported the initiative. 
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An assignment was then drafted for the new working group, which included management 
accountants and IT managers. This group was supposed to define more clearly the products 
and services which the ISC could viably deliver and also to indicate more clearly the delivery 
time involved. The new group was also asked to develop KPIs for the quality of service 
delivery. The generally held belief in the Committee of Management Accountants was that if 
more clarity could be provided, questions about cost allocation would be easier to resolve. 
This new working group came up with revised definitions of the products and services 
delivered by the ISC. However, their main conclusion was that the roles and responsibilities 
of those involved in the management control structure of the ISC should be clarified. For 
example, in a workshop organised by the group in the autumn of 2009, it became clear that all 
departments had different and sometimes conflicting demands regarding the IT services they 
expected from the ISC. Therefore, the working group proposed the creation of a joint demand 
management, which would enable requests for services and products to be conveyed more 
clearly to the ISC. The ISC would then be able to develop its service level without being 
confused by different and conflicting demands. 
5.5.7 Further reframing efforts
With this conclusion from the working group, discussions about the cost allocation system 
seemed to come to an end. However, while this working group was being set up, the ISC 
decided to set up a working group of its own: the Working Group on Governance. This working 
group also had to address the ambiguities in the management control structure of the ISC. 
In the autumn of 2009, the general management team appointed a new General Manager 
of the ISC. The new manager had to develop the ISC further, so that it would become a 
‘proper’ SSC. He started a process to improve the performance of the organisation. One 
of the topics he addressed was the governance structure of the municipality as a whole, 
referring in particular to the process of constructing the SLA: 
“There is not an unambiguous control model for the SSC. There are many different committees 
and customer councils, and their roles are related to one another. Their relationship with 
the owner15 and policymakers is not clear either. The process of creating a service level 
agreement for the basic service delivery is not well defined and seems – according to its long 
production time – not to be efficient.” (“Midrange Planning for SSC” document, February 1st, 
2010).
The members of the Working Group on Governance were not only employed by the ISC, but 
also held positions elsewhere in the municipality. Some thought of themselves as experts in 
governance issues. People from the Department of Municipal Administration also participated 
15 The owner was the Deputy Municipal Secretary. He expected, among other things, to supervise the operational 
management of the ISC.
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in the Working Group on Governance. They typically assisted in developing company policies 
and standards. By establishing a working group consisting of these members, the ISC 
believed that a further ‘interessement16’ of municipal departments in the functioning of the 
ISC could be achieved. 
The Working Group on Governance did not immediately function well, though. One problematic 
issue was that the people from the Department of Municipal Administration believed that 
they were the ones who ought to be dealing with governance issues in the municipality. The 
individuals from this department felt that they were now part of a process directed by the 
ISC. However, in their opinion it should have been them leading this process. This feeling 
was reflected in the minutes of the meetings of the working group, for example, when a 
representative of the Department of Municipal Administration explained that he had given a 
presentation to the general management team:
“… in which he has spoken about the consequences of a shared service organisation and 
the way in which it should be managed (governance). A follow-up is planned ... after which 
decisions can be made by us [the Department of Municipal Administration] about the steps to 
be taken next.” (Working Group on Governance minutes, October 18th, 2010).
In the same meeting, it was decided to consult the General Manager of the ISC about issues 
relating to different roles and responsibilities of municipality officials in the management 
control of the ISC. In the following months, the membership of the Working Group on 
Governance changed. The General Manager of the ISC and the manager of the Personnel 
and Organisation Department were added. In the meeting after these two managers joined the 
group, a plan was announced to develop a joint proposal for the management control structure 
of the municipality as a whole, the ISC, and the Department of Municipal Administration.
Thus, the reframing that emerged focused on two elements: (1) clarification of the roles of 
the multiple actors involved in the governance of the ISC, and (2) the establishment of a 
new board and council (the Governance Board and the Integral Customer Council) to take 
charge of the governance and management control of the ISC. The current Customer Council 
was dismissed. The reframed management control structure was translated back into the 
macrocosm of the municipality of The Hague in 2012. This did not mean that development 
of this structure was finished. The struggle for position and power continued. Overflows 
kept appearing as the debate continued – for example, over the role of the owner. He was 
considered to be responsible for developing company standards and policy on the services 
provided by the ISC. In practice, several key players felt that the owner fell short in meeting 
this responsibility. Consequently, another reframing process took place. In this context, 
16 The process of interessement refers to the organisation of alliances of actors who are able to contribute to the 
process of translation (Callon et al., 2011).
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an important development worth mentioning is that the proposal to introduce an Integral 
Customer Council was accepted. 
Participants in the Integral Customer Council tried to act in accordance with the formulated 
values of the municipality, and to collaborate to improve the performance of the management 
control frame.
5.5.8 Another reframing effort starts …
After a municipal election in 2014, a new Board of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors was 
established in the municipality. This board presented its general plan for the years 2014–2018 
in June 2014. An important ambition was formulated concerning the management of the 
municipality:
“The collaboration between the different parts of the organisation will be enhanced. Working 
in silos will end. We will centralise all support processes in business management. Personnel 
and Organisation, Finance, Purchase, IT, Communication and Legal Affairs will be jointly 
organised, in one spot, and controlled by the Department of Municipal Administration. The 
effectiveness and service of the ISC will be evaluated.” (”Trust in Strength of The Hague” 
Policy Programme, June 2014, p. 28).
Shortly after the presentation of the Policy Programme, the new general management team 
claimed that they were the ‘collective owner’ of business management in the municipality, 
and that they had to guide and direct the process of establishing a new form of business 
management, as expressed in the Policy Programme. Thus, the general management 
team explicitly took the lead, and set a new reframing process for the management control 
structure of the ISC in train. This process will not be elaborated upon for reasons of space. 
However, relevant to this study is that the general management team indicated that the 
values of partnership and mutual trust would be more sustainable if the use of management 
control instruments such as contracts and cost allocation systems was reduced. The team 
believed that these instruments did not encourage economic efficiency. Instead, the new 
general management team thought that the instruments caused much dispute (on cost 
allocation issues) and bureaucracy (different kinds of contracts, multiple working groups and 
committees), which did not contribute to co-operative action. 
All the tensions in the macrocosm put the frame of the cost allocation method to the test. 
However, not only was the cost allocation method challenged, but so too were other elements 
of the management control structure such as SLAs. In fact, SLAs were largely abandoned 
in the new reframing process. The general management team decided that cost allocation 
should be abandoned where possible and that SLAs should be limited to a few agreements 
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that were deemed necessary in order to work together. Councils and committees should be 
abolished whenever possible. Councils and committees that were believed to be necessary 
should be organised as much as possible in accordance with the existing governance structure 
within the municipality. These inscriptions were believed to enhance the performance of 
the reframed management control structure in the macrocosm of the municipality. It seems 
therefore that in the municipality the process of economisation regarding shared services was 
not a process of marketisation. Rather, it was both a move towards economies of scale by 
concentrating the provision of services in one department and a travel towards more trust and 
partnership. This move was towards unified governance rather than market-like governance. 
5.6 Discussion
This field study provides, from an insider’s perspective, an illustration of the development 
of a governance structure as a process of economisation. In a process of economisation, 
goods and spaces are framed and the governance structure is an achievement, rather 
than an instrument. The process described in this study shows that the establishment of a 
governance structure is not a straightforward process. It is not an unproblematic consequence 
of rational choice made by distanced managers. This study also shows that, even though the 
development of the governance frame is a process of economisation, the extent to which 
economisation occurs is limited. In other words, the performativity of economics of the frame 
is limited. Alternatively, a process of collaboration emerges. These aspects are elaborated 
further in this section.
This chapter shows that the process of economisation can be considered as a process of 
translation. The process for the municipality of The Hague is illustrated in figure 11. 
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Figure 1. Visualisation of the translation process within the municipality of The Hague  
 
Figure 11. Visualisation of the translation process within the municipality of The Hague 
The proces  of translation started from shared matters of concern within the general 
management team. These matters of concern were the consequence of budget cuts imposed 
by the Board of the Mayor and Deputy Mayors. The establishment of an SSC was a known 
response to budget cuts within municipalities in the Netherlands at that time. Accordingly, the 
general management team decided to introduce an SSC within the municipality of The Hague. 
They wanted to inscribe values that enhanced collective action, such as ‘co-operation’ and 
‘mutual respect’. This was the first translation in which inscriptions were transported from the 
macrocosm to a microcosm. 
In the municipality, several microcosms were created when various working groups were 
set up. One of the working groups was assigned to construct a cost allocation method for 
the products and services that the SSC would deliver. In this microcosm, there were the first 
signs of the struggle that the cost allocation method would evoke when it was transported 
back into the macrocosm. Fierce debate was part of the framing process in the microcosm. 
The cost allocation model was a frame because it was intended to provide actors within the 
municipality with a cognitive frame of reference, so that it would guide their actions. 
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The frame that resulted from these first two stages in the translation process was transported 
back into the macrocosm. A strong alliance was needed to succeed in this third stage of 
the translation process. In this study, the strength of the alliance was determined mainly by 
the level of support from the general management team. Those who favour other proposals 
(the ‘not-so-strong-believers’) knew that their alliance was not strong enough, because 
their preferences did not coincide with the inscriptions of the general management team. 
Consequently, the proposal of the working group that was brought back into the macrocosm 
was supported, but also had its opponents. This study showed that power and politics are 
important factors in these three stages of translation.
The general management team expected that once the frame was introduced into the 
macrocosm, it would perform as intended. However, immediately after its introduction, 
significant debate arose over several aspects of the cost allocation method. The calculation 
of product and service costs and the content of the SLA were questioned. The effect of 
the new cost allocation model on their existing budgets was perceived by the departments 
within the municipality to be unacceptable. The performance of the governance structure was 
thought to be inadequate by several of the parties involved. The debates arising from these 
‘attacks’ on the frame resulted in an alliance that was strong enough to propose adjustments 
to this frame. This was also possible because the interest of the general management team 
in the SSC had faded. Although reframing efforts were inevitable (Callon, 2009, 2010), this 
study clearly illustrated the important role of power and politics in this reframing process. 
Moreover, it showed that the management control structure is in this process, and is not a 
distant describer or even prescriber of practices of governance. Because the management 
control structure had the position of a frame, the structure was an invitation to other actors 
in the network in which it performed. As such, the management control structure was itself 
an actor. The extent to which the management control structure could perform effectively, or 
rather the extent to which it is performative, depended on the value that other actors attach 
to its performance.
Regarding performativity, this study showed that, even though the governance structure 
succeeded in obtaining a relevant position within the hierarchy of the municipality of The 
Hague, this was not performativity of economics to its full extent. The framing process was 
guided by economic rationality as stipulated in chapter 4. Initially, the reason for introducing 
the SSC and its governance structure was cost reduction, by organising processes within 
an SSC to increase efficiency. Economic technical instruments such as contracts, transfer 
prices, and benchmarking were introduced to enhance decision-making based on economic 
rationality. Rules and conventions were shaped in the framing of goods and services and 
in the spaces in which the calculative actors were supposed to meet. Thinking based on 
economic rationality thus played a leading role in shaping the governance frame.
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However, once introduced into the macrocosm, economic rationality did not develop to its 
fullest extent. The differing interests of the departments proved to limit the achievement of 
economic rationality for the municipality as a whole. Although the actions of the departments 
may be perceived as economically rational from the perspective of the department concerned, 
they are opportunistic when seen from the perspective of the municipal organisation at large, 
and lead to suboptimal behaviour/functioning for the organisation as a whole. Adjustments 
in the frame emphasised the need for collective action in the interests of the municipality 
at large. The introduction of the Integral Customer Council, for example, was aimed at 
making departments and SSC jointly responsible for fine-tuning supply and demand. The 
development of this frame, in the macrocosm, seemed to have had socialising consequences 
instead of individualising or disciplining consequences (Roberts, 2001; Zahir-ul-Hassan et 
al., 2016). In the reframing process, starting at the final stage of this research, the socialising 
elements seem to be even more powerful than the elements of economic rationality, given 
that the general municipal management team have recently expressed the wish to reduce the 
relevance of contracts and cost settlement. Therefore, the development of performativity of 
economics in the macrocosm is only partial.
5.7 Conclusion
This field study illustrates the development of the governance structure of an SSC as a process 
of economisation. The establishment of the structure is an achievement that is determined 
by the power of the structure and the invitation it entails. The governance structure is not an 
instrument that prescribes actions of other actors. Instead it is a mediator in a network where 
it itself performs as an actor among other actors. The different positions of power held by 
these actors and the different interests of these actors lead to a constant struggle to obtain a 
position of authority, that is, a position from which power can be exerted in the network. This 
study illustrates this process using the perspective of a process of translation. The results also 
show that iterative cycles of framing and reframing emerge from constant power struggles, a 
process that seems to offer periods of stability and disorder in which new alliances can be built. 
Moreover, when this relational perspective on economisation is used, the results show 
that economic rationality developed only to a limited extent. The spaces developed seem 
to develop collaboration and collective action, rather than economic rationality. Why this 
occurs is not exactly clear. One factor that could be relevant to these results is that this study 
describes a hybrid governance structure within the boundaries of a hierarchy. The results 
could also have been affected by the political character of the organisation. Further research 
in other (public and private) organisations should be helpful to gain a deeper understanding of 
whether the development of governance structures varies according the type of organisation. 
CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and suggestions for further research
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6.1 Introduction
This thesis has explored the choices that were made in the process of the development of a 
governance structure for a shared service centre (SSC) within the municipality of The Hague. 
The aim was to contribute to the scientific discipline of management accounting and control 
by focussing on the overarching question of why and how the governance structure for the 
shared service centre came into shape. The ambition was to contribute to the knowledge 
production in the scientific discipline by theorizing on the governance and control structure 
on the basis of a case study concerning a shared service centre within a public organisation, 
the municipality of The Hague. The first research question, aimed at gaining a deeper 
understanding of the choices that were made, is as follows:  
How can the choices made by a municipality on the design of a governance structure 
for an SSC be understood from a rational economic perspective?
The second research question addresses specifically the process of development of the 
governance structure in the municipality of The Hague: 
How does a governance structure and, more specifically, a cost allocation method 
develop in practice?
The answers to the two research questions are explored in chapters 4 and 5. This chapter 
reflects upon the main findings and conclusions that are described in these chapters. 
How does this research contribute to extant knowledge? Does it offer any help for 
practitioners? And, what can be said about the methods that were used in the research? 
This chapter starts with a section that reflects upon the answers to the research questions, 
the methods used while searching for these answers, and the practical relevance of these 
answers. The subsequent section reflects upon the research at large. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the limitations of this research and with suggestions for further research.
6.2 A rational economic perspective on the governance of a shared service 
centre
In chapter 4, a rational economic perspective is used in an effort to understand the choices 
that were made in the municipality of The Hague on the design of the governance structure. 
Elements of transaction cost economics (TCE) (Covaleski, 2001; Spekle, 2001; Williamson, 
1979, 1989) and models of hybrid governance structures regarding SSCs were used as a 
theoretical framework to address the first research question. The results described in chapter 
4 reveal that the choices made differ, to some extent, from what can be expected from a 
rational economic perspective. That is, it is demonstrated that decisions taken within the 
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hierarchy of an organisation are not based solely on rationality as proclaimed by many 
microeconomic theories. 
According to TCE, the character of the transaction essentially determines the type of 
governance structure that is most suitable. Two generic governance structures are 
distinguished: the market (with horizontal accountability) and the hierarchy (with vertical 
accountability). However, governance structures also exist that have aspects of both, but 
are neither completely one nor the other. These are called hybrid governance structures 
(Herbert & Seal, 2012; Minnaar & Vosselman, 2013; Spekle, 2001; Williamson, 1979). 
For example, a market is typically most suitable for non-specific transactions with low asset 
specificity, in which standardised goods are traded. On the other hand, a hierarchy is often 
the most suitable governance structure for transactions with high asset specificity. However, 
there are also situations in which the choice of either a market or a hierarchy is not so 
straightforward. In these situations, a hybrid governance structure can be the most suitable 
one. For example, when market transactions are executed in an uncertain context, as is the 
case in the IT market, there is a greater need to create stability. Strategic alliances and long-
term contracts may provide this stability. Consequently, free competition is reduced and a 
hybrid governance structure is established.
Minnaar and Vosselman (2013) undertook a case study on the governance and management 
control of an SSC in a private publishing company. Their results show that considerations 
of economies of scale prevail over considerations of ‘economies of governance’. 
Moreover, it seems that the character of the transaction is not the only determinant of 
decisions on a governance structure. Covaleski et al. (2003) stated that decisions on 
governance structures are also related to the wish or need to have stability and security. 
These considerations turned out to be also prevalent in the municipality of The Hague. 
The present study highlights that in the municipality of The Hague the decision to use a hybrid 
governance structure was not solely based on considerations relating to the characteristics 
of transactions. Rather, decisions on the governance structure seemed to be based on 
arguments relating to economies of scale, the need for collaborative action, and the fear of 
opportunistic behaviour. The general management team decided, based on these arguments, 
to incorporate captive buying and selling for all transactions of the SSC, even though not all 
transactions had the same characteristics. For example, from a TCE perspective it could 
be argued that personnel and salary administration services ought to be standardised and 
could thus be executed efficiently in a market structure. However, it was decided that the 
transactions had to be executed within a hierarchy, extended with market-like instruments 
such as contracts, transfer pricing, and benchmarking. The (alleged) reason to opt for captive 
buying and selling was the belief that the budget cuts that were needed at that time would be 
compromised by opportunistic behaviour from the heads of the departments involved. The 
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general management was concerned that the departments would buy products more cheaply 
from the market rather than buying from the SSC. In that situation, the SSC would have 
excess capacity and the municipality would still have to bear the fixed costs. Thus, general 
management focused on production costs (‘economies of scale’) rather than on transaction 
costs (‘economies of governance’). Emphasis was placed on the need for collective action 
coupled with captive buying and selling.
Several studies have addressed the trilateral relationship between the top management, 
the management of an SSC, and the managers of the business units that arises once a 
hybrid governance structure has been chosen (Grant et al., 2007; Herbert & Seal, 2012; 
Vosselman, 1995). Top management plays a distinctive role in this relationship because 
it has the power to take decisions that determine the (market) position of the SSC. The 
most important decision is whether or not to incorporate an exit threat, that is, whether 
or not business units should be allowed to buy from a supplier other than the SSC. 
Moreover, the top management decides on the extent to which market-like instruments 
such as benchmarking are to be used within the authority structure of a hierarchy. 
Typically, the governance structure is organised in two layers. One layer is that of the 
enterprise and is concerned with ‘goal setting’ and ‘strategic alignment’. At this level, the 
governance board should be staffed with senior managers from the organisation and SSC. The 
second is the operational level, and this is concerned with the daily performance of the SSC 
(Grant et al., 2007).
In the situation under scrutiny, an owner was supposed to set the ‘rules of the game’ and to 
look after the operational management of the SSC. The departments of the municipality were 
considered to be customers who had to define their needs collectively so that the SSC could 
offer the services and products that would fulfil those needs. The SSC was thus a supplier. 
These different key players met at different layers of governance in a governance board and 
user boards. Also, choices were made over the use of a cost allocation model, contracts (or 
rather service level agreements), and benchmarking. These instruments were supposed to 
enhance the efficiency of the SSC’s operation and to lead to a higher quality of service delivery. 
In practice, however, the efficiency and the quality of service delivery of the SSC were 
questioned. It turned out that the development of the governance structure was strongly 
affected by struggles, and this had a negative impact on the desired collective action of the 
departments and SSC, as envisioned by the the municipality’s management. The struggles 
produced a continuous shift in the balance between horizontal and vertical accountability 
arrangements within the governance structure. Ultimately, this resulted in a situation in 
which the use of market-like instruments was diminished and more emphasis was placed on 
the accountability structure which involved committees and councils. These organisational 
arrangements may fit better with the authority structure in an organisation that promotes 
unified governance. 
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These issues of struggle and power, however, could not be accounted for by the TCE 
perspective on the governance structure of an SSC. For example, the management 
accountants believed that the existing (powerful) position of the Committee of Management 
Accountants would be devalued in the new governance structure. The accountants attempted 
to maintain their powerful position by opposing proposals, highlighting the consequences 
of the governance structure, and referring to the different interests of the departments. The 
present study was therefore also partially aimed at providing a better understanding of these 
issues (power and interests) by adopting a relational approach to studying the development 
of the governance structure.
The results of the first study build upon the findings by Minnaar and Vosselman (2013) 
in that they show that the choices that led to the governance structure for the SSC in the 
municipality of The Hague were guided by considerations of economies of scale rather than by 
considerations of economies of governance. Furthermore, the results add to the frameworks 
of Vosselman (1995), Grant et al. (2007), and De Haes and Grembergen (2008) by illustrating 
the need for governance arrangements that enhance collective action. The results also reveal 
that the decision to choose a hybrid governance structure within a hierarchy was based 
on a balance between economic values, such as efficiency and effectiveness, and social 
values, such as collaboration and mutual respect. Such a balance requires careful ongoing 
management attention. 
Moreover, the results show that a rational economic perspective does not take into account 
issues such as the power and interests of the different actors involved, which seem to play 
an important role in the development of a governance structure. It became clear that the 
introduction of a new governance structure in an existing organisation interfered with the 
existing structure of authority, involving existing powers, interests, and beliefs of multiple 
actors. To prevent such interference, a newly introduced governance structure should take 
into account these aspects of an existing organisation. In contrast to a rational economic 
perspective, a relational approach does provide an understanding of the development of the 
governance structure in its context, being an actor among other actors. 
It should be realised that the methods used to conduct this research have affected the 
observations and interpretations presented here given the position of the researcher in the 
research activities. 
6.2.1 Limitations of using a transaction cost economics perspective
In the first study, the choices made by those within the municipality were examined through 
the ‘lens’ of transaction cost economics. The researcher tried to take a distanced position: an 
etic perspective (Cunliffe, 2011). Consistent with a positivistic view on research, observations 
and interviews were aligned to gain an understanding of what is believed to be reality. 
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The interviews with key players, such as the owner, internal customers, and the director of 
the SSC, were conducted at different stages during the research process. Other key players, 
such as the project leader of the ISC and the initial director of the SSC, who had already 
left the municipality of The Hague for various reasons, were also asked to reflect on their 
experiences of developing the governance structure. In this context, however, it should be 
noted that the management of the municipality had only limited involvement in the research. 
It would have been interesting to delve deeper into the thoughts and feelings of the directors 
of the municipal management team about the performance of the governance structure and 
the choices made – or, for that matter, to get the view of the Municipal Secretary. But, at the 
time the study was conducted this did not seem to add to the research, form the viewpoint of 
the researcher at least. With hindsight however, the lack of information from these (important) 
key players might be a limitation of this study. This also applies to some extent to the 
information from the management accountants collected in this research. Their view and 
opinions were derived from collective meetings and business talks with the researcher as a 
fellow management accountant. However, official interviews were not conducted. Information 
acquired from interviews with these individuals could have added to the level of understanding. 
In addition, the interviews with the project leader and the initial director of the SSC were 
conducted quite some time after the relevant events had taken place. Indeed, these 
interviewees indicated in the interviews that their memories of the events, although vivid, 
were not as fresh as they were when the events had just happened. With hindsight, these 
interviews with the initiators of the SSC could have been even more valuable if conducted 
earlier in the research process. The need to conduct these interviews grew throughout 
the process, however. It became particularly relevant to gain an understanding of their 
views when the introduction of the governance structure turned out to be not a simple 
straightforward process as initially expected by the researcher, in his role of management 
accountant. Thus, the relatively long time that elapsed between the events discussed in these 
interviews and the interviews with key players might also be seen as a limitation of this study. 
In this field study, the researcher, as a management accountant of the SSC, was also part of 
the process under scrutiny. As such, as an actor in this process he was influenced by his own 
interests. In this position, adopting an etic perspective is probably more difficult than it would 
be for a researcher from outside the organisation. As a researcher, he was also connected to 
the academic world, which offered him a more distanced view on the process under scrutiny. 
At the same time however, the positivist assumptions underpinning this part of the research 
were seriously challenged during the research. A relational perspective was therefore also 
employed to address the second research question. This perspective is that of an ‘embedded 
researcher’ who conducts research from an ‘emic’ perspective.
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6.2.2 The practical value of the transaction cost economics perspective
The theoretical concept of a hybrid governance structure provided a frame of reference to 
assess the choices that were made with regard to the governance structure. This 
frame of reference corresponds to a rational economic perspective. However, this 
perspective was not fully compatible with the decisions that were made in practice. 
For example, a comprehensive evaluation of the governance of the transactions that 
would emerge between the departments and the SSC was not undertaken, because 
the dominant view in the general management team was that captive buying and 
selling would be the most effective way of making the governance structure work. 
The researcher learned that an etic economics perspective allowed for an ‘outside’ reflection 
on the choices in the governance structure in the municipality of The Hague. It also became 
clear to him that such reflection enabled existing problems to be revisited. In several 
meetings, in his role as practitioner he used various insights developed during the research. 
For example, when the municipality was rethinking the governance frame the researcher 
used earlier versions of the additions made to the Vosselman (1995) model, as outlined in 
chapter 4. The model offered a useful shared frame of reference to discuss the problems that 
different actors perceived, such as problems resulting from the expectations of the different 
roles and responsibilities that were described. Because the model has a solid empirical 
and theoretical basis, it became a kind of impartial mediator and thus without a preference 
for the views of all the actors involved. Consequently, a more open discussion emerged. 
An organisational economics perspective thus proved to have merit in practice. Such a 
perspective or model can serve as a shared frame of reference to address questions. The 
model presented in chapter 4 can be used to serve this purpose.
6.3 The development of the governance structure as a process of economisation
The second research question has been addressed in chapter 5. In that chapter, a relational 
perspective was taken to gain a better understanding of the development of the governance 
structure in the existing organisational architecture of the municipality of The Hague. In the 
chapter, the development of the governance of an SSC is portrayed as an essential part in a 
process of economisation. This is a process in which the governance structure represents an 
achievement rather than an instrument. In this process, the governance structure acts as a 
mediator between other actors (human and non-human), rather than to describe or prescribe 
the action of others. Power and politics are central to this process, because all the actors 
involved are governed mainly by their own interests. 
In the process of economisation the governance structure develops as a consequence of 
translations (Callon et al, 2012). The interests of actors such as the general management 
team are inscribed in a frame that is constituted in a secluded working group (a microcosm). 
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This frame is supposed to provide cognitive boundaries for the actors in the macrocosm in 
which the frame has to perform. However, overflows are inevitable because of the inherent 
incompleteness of the frame (Callon, 1998). The governance frame becomes part of power 
and politics, and this seems to increase even more the chances of overflows emerging. 
Overflows may be ‘hot’ or ‘cold’. Hot overflows may be successfully incorporated in an 
adjusted frame. The present field study shows that overflows can be favourable to some 
actors because the parties involved have different interests. For example, not all management 
accountants in the Working Group on the Service Package for the IDC agreed fully with the 
proposed cost allocation method. They agreed because they knew their position was not 
strong enough to enforce a decision that would be more in line with their preferences. When 
the introduction of the cost allocation method in the macrocosm led to debate and overflows, 
an opportunity arose to re-address certain issues that had been discussed in the microcosm. 
Additionally, the performance of the governance frame did not meet the expectations of the 
general management team. So, for them, and those who supported them, overflows offered 
an opportunity to inscribe their interests more firmly. In the subsequent process, different 
interests caused tensions, which in turn facilitated the development of new overflows; this led 
to iterative cycles of framing and overflowing and repeating processes of translation. 
Çaliskan and Callon (2010) describe marketisation as being central to processes of 
economisation. In this field study, however, collaboration and mutual respect were considered, 
at least by the general management team, to be leading values in the performance of the 
governance structure. In practice, these values did not appear to be consistent with the 
economic rationality that was facilitated by market-like instruments such as contracts, transfer 
pricing, and benchmarking. In the municipality of The Hague, adjustments to the frame of the 
governance structure were proposed to enhance more collective action in the interests of the 
municipality at large. For example, an Integral Customer Council was set up to evaluate the 
existing service level agreements and transfer prices. In the space between the SSC and the 
other departments, a process of collaboration, rather than marketisation, seemed to develop. 
Although adjustments were made to the service level agreements, it became apparent that 
these kind of arrangements could lead to much bureaucracy and dispute and thus to relatively 
high transaction costs. Following the municipal elections, a new Board of the Mayor and 
Deputy Mayors was established. This board proposed to develop the SSC further within the 
municipality of The Hague, providing an opportunity to fundamentally reassess the existing 
governance frame. The general management intended to inscribe the shared values aimed at 
collaboration more firmly than before. To achieve this, it emphasized the framing of collaborative 
spaces where collectives of managers from the departments and the SSC would have extensive 
decision-making authority. The framing of goods in terms of contracts, transfer prices, and 
benchmarking was thought to be necessary only if it facilitated collective decision-making. 
The process of economisation may better be characterised here as a process of collaboration 
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rather than one of marketisation. Emphasis was given to the framing of collaborative spaces 
at the expense of the framing of economic goods and services to be transacted in an (internal) 
marketplace. This collaboration was intended to emerge after the governance structure had 
been introduced. However, when it did appear, the collaboration happened in designated 
spaces and was not realised at all levels. Also, the emphasis on collaboration led to a 
reduction in the significance attached to economic instruments in the internal marketplace. 
Thus, this outcome differs markedly from the consequences associated with a process of 
economisation as discussed by Çaliskan and Callon (2009, 2010). This difference may be 
perhaps be explained by the hybrid character of this particular governance frame, which is 
situated within a single organisation. The interests of the organisation at large may interfere 
with the interests of the individual departments. This situation potentially leads to a greater 
need for collective action than in a situation in which goods and services are transacted in 
a marketplace. With marketplace transactions, there is more need for individual needs to be 
optimised.
Tensions emerge in the governance frame as for example, when the Committee of 
Management Accountants discussed the effects of the cost allocation model on the budgets 
of the departments. The tensions led several actors to form alliances and instigate alterations 
to the governance frame. These effects, which arose following the introduction of the 
governance frame in practice, illustrate that the development of the frame is not a 
straightforward process. Instead, it is a dynamic and complex process involving relational 
drifting with unpredictable outcomes (Anton et al., 2007; Quattrone & Hopper, 2001).
To summarise, from a relational perspective, the development of a governance frame for an 
SSC is essentially a process of economisation of service delivery. The frame is iteratively 
translated in microcosms and a macrocosm through processes of framing and overflowing. 
Through iterative cycles of framing and overflowing, repeated processes of translation 
develop. This research reveals that the process of economisation involves collaboration 
rather than marketisation.
6.3.1 Limitations of viewing the governance structure as a process of economisation 
One aim of this part of the research was to describe the development of a governance 
frame within the organisation of the municipality of The Hague. The aim was to gain an 
understanding of the creation and development of the governance frame. Within this element 
of the research there was an assumption that the ontology is intersubjective, which means 
that reality is believed to be a shared interpretation by humans in a specific time, place, and 
context. This “making meaning” takes place in daily interactions and conversations which 
both the researcher and research participants are part of (Cunliffe, 2011, p. 665). Non-human 
actors, such as the governance frame under scrutiny, also play a role in this process since 
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they guide the thinking and behaviour of actors. In this study, the management accountants 
were invaluable research participants. The researcher, in his position as a management 
accountant, was deeply involved in the research setting and participated in daily interactions 
with these management accountants. The views of the management accountants were 
gathered by the researcher in collective meetings and business talks. However, interviews 
with the management accountants were not conducted; only other key players were 
interviewed. Such interviews could have offered additional insights into, for example, the 
differing interests and preferences of the other management accountants. Specifically, a 
deeper understanding could have been gained of the perceptions and interpretations of the 
management accountants regarding the cost allocation method. 
6.3.2 The practical value of viewing the governance structure as a process of 
economisation 
The exploration of the process of economisation unlocks in a structured manner the network 
in which the cost allocation method and governance structure had to perform. This part of 
the research reveals that the introduction of a new governance frame is a decision with a 
profound impact. The new governance frame interfered with an existing organisational 
architecture in which specific individuals and existing committees had already already had 
established positions. Moreover, in the existing structure it was clear to most people how 
decisions were made, who was authorised to make which decisions, and which roles and 
responsibilities a committee or individual had in this process. The initial governance frame 
was designed mainly on the ‘drawing board’ and under high time pressure. Consequently, 
not all the people involved could participate fully in developing the plans and the ideas that 
guided these plans. This may have caused much of the confusion that occurred during the 
whole process described in this thesis. This confusion should not be considered harmful to 
the development of the governance frame. Instead, it offers an opportunity to involve people 
in shaping the frame so that it is best suited to the present context. Thus, overflows that 
emerge in practice should not be considered as resistance to change. Rather, they provide 
an important source for further development of a frame – in this case, the governance frame. 
Consequently, there seems to be not one best solution to a perceived problem in an 
organisation. Rather, the solution chosen should fit the specific context in which it is to be 
used. Most importantly, the people who use the plan in practice should themselves perceive 
the plan as being of value. Ultimately, these are the people will have to face and deal with 
overflows in real life. Any decision or organisational change is likely to be challenged by other 
views, interests, and alliances. These challenges should not be approached in terms of ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ or resistance to change. 
Valuing different views and interpretations of particular issues may well lead eventually to a 
more accepted or persuasive solution.
525761-L-bw-Jellema
Processed on: 30-11-2018 PDF page: 121
121
Conclusions and suggestions for further research
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 6
6.4 Reflexivity in this research
Reflexivity invites the researcher to think back with hindsight on the research, reflecting about 
how knowledge has been built, the part that the researcher’s position played in that process, 
and the way that the research has been written up (Johnson & Duberley, 2003; Cunliffe, 2003; 
Calás & Smircich, 1999). These aspects of reflexivity are summarized in the table below 
and will be elaborated in this section. Even though they are presented here as being three 
different aspects, they are also interrelated. This means that they have an effect on each 
other and and cannot always be easily separated (Calás & Smircich, 1999). Consequently, 
while dividing the discussion here into three separate sections may seem straightforward, this 
device is used primarily to give structure to the text.
Table 13. Philosophical assumptions of this research relating to aspects of reflexivity
World that I study World of the researcher
Impact of interests on 
knowledge-making
Subjects determine what is 
shown to/shared with the 
researcher  
In this research the subjects 
are also colleagues. This may 
affect the behaviour that is 
shown and the interpretations 
that are shared
The dominant beliefs and 
assumptions within the academic 
network of the researcher affect the 
choices made by the researcher: 
this resulted in the use of the 
theoretical perspectives of TCE and 
‘Callonistics’.
Role of the researcher 
in the constitution of the 
governance structure 
under scrutiny
Researcher is directly 
involved because of the 
management position he 
holds in the process under 
scrutiny 
Researcher fixes signification; he 
is present within the organisation 
under scrutiny and makes inferences 
based on his own preferences, 
beliefs and insights. 
Impact of writings/
language on our 
definition of knowledge
Representations of the 
governance structure and 
corresponding language 
supports collective 
interpretation in practice 
Via chapters, conferences and 
debates the relevant concepts for 
research are discussed and jointly 
interpreted
Note: adapted from Calás and Smircich (1999) and Cunliffe (2004)
Looking back on the research that has been conducted
Looking back on the research, there are several characteristics of this research that are worth 
discussing. One of these characteristics, for example, is my deep involvement as a researcher. 
This involvement came from my position as a practitioner in the field. It gave me ready access to 
‘data’: documents were easy to acquire and key players were more quickly inclined to co-operate 
in the research while I was a colleague. Also, it was easy to attend relevant meetings because 
I was required to be there as a consequence of my position within the municipality. Because of 
my deep involvement in the field I had a thorough understanding of the context of the research. 
525761-L-bw-Jellema
Processed on: 30-11-2018 PDF page: 122
122
Conclusions and suggestions for further research
I was therefore able to ‘to describe the subject and processes under scrutiny in great detail. 
However, because of my position in the field as a practitioner and my knowledge of the 
context. I may potentially have suppressed ‘the ‘voice’ of relevant actors. I was fairly confident 
that I could recognise and acknowledge the different views and perspectives because I was 
deeply engaged in the process. In the next section this will be elaborated upon further
The impact of the position and role of the researcher in the construction of knowledge 
in this research
This study is an example of interventionist research (Lukka & Vinnari, 2017): the researcher 
affects the studied reality actively because he or she is participating in organisational events. 
An aspect of interventionist research clearly recognisable in this study. I have, for example, 
actively used the model presented in chapter 4 as a frame of reference in debates on the 
governance structure. The model, based on Vosselman (1995), was presented in several 
meetings in which people were reflecting upon the governance structure. As such, this 
theoretical model helped to shape the events in practice. Practitioners found that the model 
was helpful in discussing the functioning of the governance structure, because it was based 
on academic research and could therefore serve as a value-free frame of reference. This was 
useful because all the actors involved in the process had their own interests, which affected 
their particular input. A frame of reference that was considered to be value-free stimulated 
debate on the governance structure in a way that did not threaten anyone’s position. 
Through the active use of this model in practice adjustments could be made to the structure, 
as discussed in chapter 4’. In addition, because of the interventionist approach and the 
researcher’s long-term involvement in the process under scrutiny, the development of the 
governance structure could be observed intensively. From this, it became apparent that the 
value attached to the cost settlement method, for example, changed during the implementation 
process. When the research started, cost settlement was based firmly in the management 
accounting procedures of the municipality of The Hague. However, as the research proceeded, 
the added value of cost settlement became appreciated in a different way, and at the end of 
the process cost settlement was even abolished. This research shows a profound insight 
into this process which could only have been achieved because of the deep involvement of 
the researcher. As such, the researcher was able to observe ‘the construction of intellectual 
capital in the making’ (Lukka & Vinnari, 2017, p. 730). 
However, the interventionist approach restricts the possibility of the researcher becoming 
actively involved and suppresses the ‘voice’ of certain actors. As a consequence, theoretically 
interesting phenomena that surround the researcher may potentially be neglected (Lukka & 
Vinnari, 2017, p. 735).
In this research I may have engaged too little with other actors involved, such as the 
management accountants for example, because of my vast experience of the context of the 
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research. I engaged in many conversations with them, individually and in meetings. However, 
during the research I never interviewed them to ask them for their views and opinions on 
the choices made within the governance structure (in the rational economic perspective) or 
their opinions on the process, their interests, and the role of the governance structure (in 
the relational perspective). I did not do this, because I felt confident that I was able, with 
my knowledge of the context, to include the different views. However, with this choice I 
may possibly have discriminated against various views that were not consistent with mine. 
Moreover, I have suppressed the ‘voice’ of some management accountants. It was feasible 
that this happened when I was studying the development of the governance structure from 
a relational perspective. In this part of the research I was studying the development of the 
cost settlement system. At that time there was a lot of debate about the effects the changes 
in the cost settlement method had had on the budgets of the departments. I regarded these 
debates as being disruptive for the most part, because I felt they were driven mainly by 
the financial interests of a single department and not the municipality at large. This opinion 
resounds in that part of the research. As described in this part of the study, the disruptiveness 
of the debate was one reason why the cost settlement system was abolished. Even though 
this may be the case from my perspective, I also know that several of my fellow management 
accountants had a different opinion on this matter. Although they also thought the debates 
were demanding and frustrating at times, they also felt they were functional, because they 
believed that discussing the costs of the shared service centre was an incentive for efficiency. 
This was a voice I did not highlight, however, because I held a different position on this subject 
and also because I did not explore this opinion by interviewing management accountants, for 
example.
The role of language in this research
Research is conducted in two different worlds: the world that the researcher studies and the 
world of the researcher (Cunliffe, 2003). In the world the researcher studies, language guides the 
interpretation of reality, whereas in the world of the researcher it serves as a source of knowledge 
making. Texts are read, interpreted and built upon in order to expand existing knowledge. 
Moreover, the meaning of language in both worlds is different and this is reflected in the way 
language is used.
In the world of the researcher the use of language is embedded in existing interpretations of 
concepts that are also used in this research, such as ‘shared service centre’ or ‘governance 
structure’. These concepts need to be defined in relation to the existing interpretations in 
the academic world in order to be able to build upon existing knowledge of these concepts. 
In practice, language is used as a means to create a common understanding of a subject, 
such as a governance structure. However, the main concern is that the relevant actors within 
a specific understanding should have a common understanding of a given subject. This 
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understanding or definition does not have to fit into any other or a wider context. Rather, the 
definition should fit the specific context in which it performs, because it has to be recognisable 
to relevant actors. If it is recognisable to actors they are able to attach meaning to it and 
value it. If we look at the governance structure again, in academic terms there is mention of 
top management, shared service centres, and business units, for example. In the specific 
context of the municipality of The Hague, this terminology is turned into more local language: 
general management team, Internal Service Centre, and departments. This variation between 
practical language and academic use of language is rather straightforward. However, in 
practice other examples relating to the different meanings of language can also be observed. 
Within the municipality of The Hague the use of the term shared service centre became 
obsolete over time. Several actors attached associations to this concept that had negative 
connotations, such as bureaucracy and expensive service delivery. Consequently, in the last 
reframing of the governance structure the terminology of shared service centre was altered 
to ‘consultative and support processes’. Also expressions like ‘account management’ and 
‘demand management’ were dropped because they were important examples of the perceived 
bureaucracy. New language was thus introduced in order to maintain and renew the energy in 
the process of developing shared services within the municipality of The Hague.
In an academic account, consistent and precise use of language is necessary to be able 
to develop knowledge. In addition, the written text should convince the reader of the 
interpretations the researcher makes. Because of the rather loose handling of language in 
practice a researcher needs to be deeply involved in order to be able to understand the 
meaning of the language in this practice and translate it into academic language. A thorough 
understanding of the subject under scrutiny is needed, because otherwise the interpretation 
of what happens in practice cannot be expressed consistently in academic language. If not, 
the interpretations of the researcher are unpersuasive and the knowledge that is built on 
these interpretations is also fragile. So, deep involvement is needed from the researcher in 
order to provide a convincing account with emic understandings (Lukka & Modell, 2010).
This section shows that my position in the field, my beliefs with regard to the subject under 
scrutiny, and the use of language inevitably had an impact on the text in this thesis. In this way 
it will have an effect on the building of knowledge from this point (Calas & Smircich, 1999). 
However, these types of effects are also an inextricable part of undertaking interventionist 
research. The researcher should be aware of this and should explain these effects. I have 
tried to do this with this section. However, it remains up to the reader to decide whether my 
account is convincing or not (De Loo & Lowe, 2012).
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6.5 Reflections 
In this thesis, two different approaches were employed to address the research questions: 
a perspective based on economic rationality was followed by a relational perspective. 
Both perspectives were used with the aim to build an understanding of why and how the 
governance structure for the shared service centre came into shape. This section describes 
the significance of these different approaches and provides suggestions for further research.
6.5.1 The value of a rational approach and a relational approach to the question of 
governance
The TCE approach was used to search for an answer to the first research question. This 
approach provided an ‘etic’ view on the choices that were made in the governance structure 
of the SSC in the municipality of The Hague. This rational economic perspective had a direct 
impact on the practice of the municipality, because the researcher also had a position as a 
management accountant in the research setting. The rational economic perspective offered him 
a valuable framework to assess the choices that were made and to present and elaborate upon 
the choices in, for example, meetings about governance. The rational economic perspective 
served as a collective frame of reference and became performative by the researcher. In the 
context of the municipality of The Hague, the framework was adjusted to incorporate and 
facilitate collective action. The Integral Customer Council, for example, was established to 
enhance collaboration between the various departments, and between the departments and 
the SSC. However, the choices made on the governance structure were different from what 
might have been expected from a TCE perspective, and the question that followed was why 
were these choices different. A relational approach was applied in an effort to answer this 
question. Here, the focus was on the dynamics of the process of which the governance structure 
became after its introduction into the municipal organisation. In the relational approach, the 
governance structure does not result from individual rational decision-making but from dynamic 
interactions in a network of associations. The ‘emic’ perspective associated with this approach 
(Cunliffe, 2011) indicates that the governance structure emerged in a conflict of interests in 
an arena in which the power of actors differed and shifted over time. In this research, it is this 
conflict that lies at the heart of the process of economisation. This conflict became apparent 
when the results of calculations and funding allocation, for example, were discussed. The final 
decisions on budget and allocation were strongly affected by the interests and relative power 
of the actors involved. Moreover, the budget and allocations were not the result of a neutral 
process. Activities such as calculations and allocations came to be in power and in politics. 
From a relational perspective, the governance structure as such is not seen as a straightforward 
consequence of a blueprint created and implemented by a distant top management. The 
structure is conceived through an iterative process of framing and overflowing in a network. 
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This iterative process produces a governance structure in which collaboration in an 
organisational arrangement is more important than the operation of market forces. Actors 
such as the directors in the general management team consider a governance structure 
that emphasises collaboration to be an economically viable proposition. They consider 
the transaction costs associated with the performance of market-like instruments to be 
relatively high, because these instruments are seen to provoke dispute and bureaucracy. 
This consideration of the general management team shows that economisation does not 
necessarily result in marketisation, as discussed by Çaliskan and Callon (2010). In a hybrid 
governance situation, as examined in this research, a more ‘unified governance’ can be an 
economically viable choice. The Integral Customer Council, for example, can be considered 
to represent an alternative for the internal market that would have emerged in the case of 
marketisation. Given this observation that an alternative for the internal market emerges, 
this study does not support the ‘performativity thesis’ (Callon et al., 2011), at least not in its 
strongest sense. This is because the performativity thesis in its strongest sense assumes 
that economics has the potential to subjectify, to construct the identity of an ‘economic man’, 
and actually succeeds in this. Rather, this study implies the development of co-operative 
relationships and partnerships, particularly in the later stages of development of the ISC. That 
is, the socialising aspects of the management control structure of the ISC were prioritised 
above the disciplining aspects (see also Zahir-ul-Hassan et al., 2016).
In this research, the rational approach demonstrates that within a hybrid governance structure 
adjustments were made to encourage collaboration rather than marketisation. The relational 
approach indicates that the frame is strongly affected by the power and interests of the 
different actors in the network. It also highlights the role and position of the frame itself in 
the process. Thus, each approach offers a different view on the question of why and how 
the governance structure for the shared service centre came into shape. It seems plausible 
therefore that using a combination of these perspectives will lead to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the development of the governance frame than can be gained by using 
either perspective alone. 
6.5.2 Reflections on the practical relevance of this research
SSCs are widespread within public organisations. This means that many practitioners face daily 
questions related to this type of organisation. Public organisations, especially municipalities, 
have distinctive features when compared to private organisations. The most obvious one is that 
they are led by political representatives. Public servants are thus doing their work in quite specific 
circumstances. This research addresses a topic that is highly relevant to public organisations. 
The results offer several insights that are relevant to the practice of such organisations. 
The model presented in chapter 4 is helpful to evaluate the choices that are made in relation 
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to a governance structure. The model may also serve as a common frame of reference. 
According to the model, special attention should be paid to the need for collective action 
in a public organisation. The model also implies that collective action does not emerge 
automatically from the introduction of a hybrid governance structure, but that continuing 
management attention is necessary to achieve that goal. The model, however, does not 
provide insight into why certain choices made in practice deviate from the choices indicated 
by the model. To understand this discrepancy, the findings reported in chapter 5 are relevant. 
That chapter is focused on the effects of introducing a governance frame into an existing 
organisational architecture. The findings show that the governance frame struggled to obtain 
a position due to tensions and different interests and views among actors. The findings also 
show that the governance frame enabled and constrained the actions of other actors and, as 
such, became an actor itself. The notion that introducing a governance frame is a process of 
drifting, instead of a straightforward process of implementation, indicates that any decision 
or organisational change is likely to be consistently challenged by different views, interests, 
and alliances. The main thrust of this thesis is that these challenges should be considered 
as a positive stimulus for further development rather than as a negative cause of resistance.
6.6 Suggestions for further research
Based on this research several suggestions for further research become apparent. From a 
rational economic perspective the suggestion is that the choices made with regard to hybrid 
governance structures should be explored further. It is also suggested we should delve more 
deeply into the factors that influence decisions within a hybrid governance structure. Are these 
choices guided by the character of the transactions? Or, are other economic motives at play 
that relate to the transaction costs, but also to the characteristics of the hierarchy? As was 
the case in this study. Research within public-sector organisations could provide more insight 
regarding these considerations in this specific context and, thus add to the existing literature. 
From a relational perspective, future studies might explore further the processes of
economisation in organisations as they relate to the development of management 
control structures. To what extent do processes of economisation imply the 
constitution of ‘economic men’? To what extent does economisation imply the 
constitution of stewards? Such studies could also explore in more detail the 
performativity of economic theories and their associated behavioural assumptions. 
Research with an interventionist approach, as used within this study, is relatively scarce. 
Therefore, it is suggested that more research of this type should be conducted. By going deep 
into the heart of an organisation, research of this kind can provide great insight and add to our 
understanding of practice.
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Summary
Encouraged by the promise of achieving cost reductions of 25–30% while simultaneously 
improving service delivery, many organisations have introduced shared service centres 
(Bergeron, 2003; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Herbert & Seal, 2012). This promise was also 
tempting for many organisations in the public sector. As a result shared service centres 
are now widespread across the public sector throughout the public sector, including in the 
Netherlands (Strikwerda, 2010). In 2007 the municipality of The Hague decided to establish a 
shared service centre for several support services, such as housing and facilities, personnel 
administration and IT. The author of this thesis took part in this process as a management 
accountant for the shared service centre that was set up. His experiences were an important 
reason to start this research. The performance of the governance structure of the shared 
service centre within the municipality was not without its critics, and the author therefore 
started to search for an understanding of what had happened in practice. The aim was to 
contribute to the scientific discipline of management accounting and control by focussing on 
the overarching question of why and how the governance structure for the shared service 
centre came into shape. The ambition was to contribute to the knowledge production in the 
scientific discipline by theorizing on the governance and control structure on the basis of a 
case study concerning a shared service centre within a public organisation, the municipality of 
The Hague. The first part of the research addresses the choices that were made with regard to 
the design of the governance structure. The focus is on the nature of the decisions that were 
made (the ‘what’) and not on the process through which the decisions were made. Consistent 
with Simon’s description (1982) of ‘substantive rationality’, the underlying assumption is that 
the choices are made by economic actors with specific goals in mind. In this case the goal 
was to provide more efficient and effective support services through the introduction of a 
shared service centre. From such a rational economic perspective, the first research question 
is:
How can the choices made by a municipality on the design of a governance structure for an 
SSC be understood from a rational economic perspective?
This research was based on a relatively straightforward research design. Internal documents 
and interviews with key figures were used to gather data. However, as the research progressed 
it became clear that the development of the governance structure was not a direct result of 
rational choices that were made during the design phase of the structure. Therefore, another 
theoretical perspective was needed to gain a better understanding of the development of the 
governance structure for the SSC within the municipality of The Hague. The study needed a 
perspective that allowed one to address the dynamics that emerged in the network of which the 
governance structure became a part: a relational perspective. Being a practitioner within this 
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network himself, the researcher was part of these dynamics. As a management accountant 
within the municipality of The Hague he had his own inside perceptions of what happened 
in the situation under scrutiny.  As a researcher who aimed to contribute to the management 
accounting discipline he had to take a different perspective. In particular, he chose a relational 
perspective – that is, a perspective that puts the associations between multiple actors and the 
governance structure upfront. The study draws on actor-network theory (Law, 1986; Callon, 
1999; Latour, 2005, 2008) and the concepts of framing, overflowing (Callon, 1998) and, more 
generally, translation (Callon et al., 2012).
From the relational perspective new questions emerged, such as: do the multiple actors 
accept the structure or do they try to change it according to their own needs and interests? 
And how does the governance structure perform and ‘drift’ in the network? 
The second overarching research question addresses these issues and positions the 
governance structure as an actor in the centre of the study. The overarching research 
question is:
How does a governance structure and, more specifically, a cost allocation method develop 
in practice?
The economics of the governance of a shared service centre
In a shared service centre processes that are not considered to be part of the core business of 
organisations are often bundled. Support processes such as IT, HR and finance are processes 
that may be brought together in a shared service centre. These activities can be standardised 
without loss of added value for the business units of the organisation. This standardisation 
is key in organising these processes more efficiently and effectively. The output from the 
processes can be described in measurable parameters that are the basis for a contract 
between the shared centre and the organisational units to which it will deliver the services. 
There are several ways to organise a shared service centre. In public organisations 
two types of arrangements are most common: a joint shared service centre that 
covers several different organisations (inter-organisational) and a shared service 
centre within a single organisation (intra-organisational). In this research an intra-
organisational shared service centre within the municipality of The Hague is studied. 
The introduction of a shared service centre disrupts the existing hierarchy within the 
organisation and the vertical authority structure that goes with this organisational form. 
Horizontal accountability is introduced because the shared service centre will be held 
accountable by its customers. The existing hierarchy is extended with market-like 
instruments such as contracts and settlement of costs. A hybrid governance structure 
emerges which involves the shared service centre (as a supplier), the organisational units 
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that receive its products or services (as customers), and the top management (as owner 
of the shared service centre). The governance structure has to be arranged in such a 
way that the transactions that are executed can be governed effectively and efficiently. 
A governance structure is thus an important part of a shared service centre. 
The introduction of a shared service centre in the municipality of The Hague is considered to 
be a consequence of the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm that has prevailed in the 
public sector over the past few decades. NPM aims to improve public-sector organisations 
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness by introducing ‘best practice’ management styles 
from the private sector. This way of thinking has shifted attention within public-sector 
organisations from an emphasis on policymaking to management skills, from a stress 
on process to a stress on output, and from orderly hierarchies to an intentionally more 
competitive basis for public services, in which targets are specified in management contracts. 
The introduction of a shared service centre in the municipality fits with this line of thinking, 
because it is driven mainly by efficiency and effectiveness arguments: the objective is to 
reduce costs while retaining the same quality of service delivery, and to do this by using 
market instruments such as contracts, transfer pricing and benchmarking. 
From an economic perspective (particularly that of transaction cost economics), it is 
particularly the nature of the transaction that determines the type of governance needed. 
Several forms of governance are possible: market, hierarchy, or a hybrid form that 
contains elements of both market and hierarchy. The shared service centre under scrutiny 
uses a hybrid governance structure. Within the hierarchy of the organisation market-like 
instruments such as contracts, transfer pricing and benchmarking are introduced. These 
are instruments that serve to enhance the economic rationality within the organisation. 
In the hybrid governance structure a triangle of three parties exists: the shared service centre 
(the supplier), the organisational units to which products and services are delivered (the 
customers), and the top management. The top management has a distinctive role, because it 
is responsible for the performance of the municipality as a whole, and it therefore determines 
the ‘rules of the game’ in the internal marketplace. The most fundamental choice top 
management can make is whether or not there will be  an ‘exit threat’: are external suppliers 
allowed to deliver services and products in competition with the shared service centre? From 
the perspective of transaction cost economics, the answer to this question should be guided 
particularly by the nature of the transaction that is executed.
This research illustrates how the choices in the design of the governance structure in the 
municipality of The Hague are in practice based on economies of scale, rather than on 
the character of the transaction (economies of governance). Moreover, in the municipality 
emphasis is put on collective action in order to achieve the goals of the organisation at 
large, rather than on market mechanisms as economic reasoning would lead us to expect. 
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Committees are established with the explicit goal of facilitating the collective performance of 
the governance structure. These findings challenge the existing literature.
In the municipality of The Hague the implementation of the governance structure is not a 
straightforward consequence of decision-making. Rather, there is a process of economisation 
through which the governance structure is translated and transformed and in which this 
structure is a mediator rather than an instrument. In this process, the governance structure 
acts as a mediator between actors (both human and non-human), rather than describing or 
prescribing the actions of others. Power and politics are central to this process, because 
all the actors involved carry their own intentions, values and interests. The governance 
structure is positioned in a network in which it is expected to perform. In a process of 
translation an alliance of actors initiates a process of change in a macrocosm. In this study 
the municipality of The Hague is considered to be the macrocosm. In this macrocosm 
protagonists introduce a shared service centre and an accompanying governance 
structure to achieve budget cuts and improve the quality of support services. A first frame 
of the SSC and its governance structure is produced in a microcosm by a project group. 
This governance frame will have to achieve a relevant position in existing networks, that 
is, in the macrocosm. The extent to which it succeeds in this depends on the power of 
the alliance that introduces the frame and the value that other actors attach to the frame. 
Deviations from the frame (overflows) will, however, always occur, because a frame is never 
complete as it never captures all the interests and intentions of the other actors involved. 
The study focuses particularly on the framing and overflowing of a cost allocation model. It 
reveals the tensions and struggles in a project group of different management accountants 
during the development of the cost allocation model. The management accountants hold 
different beliefs and the departments they represent have different interests, resulting in 
different claims on the design features of the cost allocation model. Arriving at a joint proposal 
proves to be a difficult task because there is an iterative process of framing and overflowing, 
order and disorder. This research shows that the introduction of a management accounting 
instrument such as a cost allocation model is a process of translation that is never finished. 
The interests and power of different actors, alliances of actors, and the position of the cost 
allocation method itself all affect the development of the model. The process of economisation 
is embedded in politics, power, and interests. The process under scrutiny proves to result in 
collaboration rather than marketisation. Collaborative spaces develop, in which the use of 
market-like instruments such as contracts, transfer prices and benchmarking is more or less 
abandoned. These instruments are only used when they are thought to enable debate on the 
collective goals of the organisation. 
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Two complementary perspectives
The combination of the perspectives allows it to be shown that final budget allocations, for 
example, were not the result of a neutral process. Calculations and allocations came to be 
in power and in politics. Thus, economics are in power and in politics. However, while the 
resulting governance structure does not in many aspects conform to organisational economics 
reasoning, it is economically viable in the context of the municipality of The Hague. The 
transaction costs associated with the performance of market-like instruments may indeed 
be relatively high, because these instruments may provoke dispute and bureaucracy. Thus, 
economisation does not necessarily result in marketisation. The Integral Customer Council, 
for example, can be considered to represent an alternative to an internal market that would 
have emerged in the event of marketisation. Because of the observation that an alternative to 
the internal market emerges, this study does not support – at least not in its strongest sense 
– Callon’s ‘performativity thesis’ which states that economisation results in the constitution 
of economic men. Rather, this study reveals that co-operative relationships and partnerships 
develop, particularly in the later stages in the ISC’s development. That is, the socialising 
aspects of the management control structure of the ISC were prioritised above the disciplining 
aspects. 
The practical relevance of the research
Shared service centres are widespread in municipalities and other public organisations 
in the Netherlands. Many practitioners now face the consequences of this type of 
body having been introduced, and may have similar experiences as those presented 
in this study. This study offers several insights that are relevant for these practitioners. 
A significant notion in this research is that the introduction of a governance structure is not a 
matter of straightforward implementation. Rather, it is a process of drifting. In the organisation 
certain actors have more powerful positions than others and there are vested interests. 
The governance structure challenges these existing positions and interests, and actors will 
therefore not always be inclined to accept in advance the invitation that the new governance 
structure offers. The governance structure will have to struggle to obtain a relevant position in 
the network in which it has to perform. Continuing management attention is needed to ensure 
that the governance structure develops in the way that was intended by those who instigated 
the change. Management has then to focus on the functioning of the network, rather than on 
the functioning of specific entities. Another implication of the notion that the introduction of 
a governance structure is a process of drifting is that there will inevitably be deviations from 
the frame that has been introduced. These should not be regarded instantly as denoting 
resistance to the change. Rather, they should be considered a valuable way of developing the 
frame further to fit the specific context.
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Aangemoedigd door de belofte dat de kosten met 25-30% kunnen worden terug gebracht 
terwijl tegelijkertijd de dienstverlening kan worden verbeterd, hebben veel organisaties 
shared service centres (SSC’s) ingevoerd (Bergeron, 2003; Janssen & Joha, 2006; Herbert 
& Seal, 2012). Deze belofte was ook verleidelijk voor veel organisaties in de publieke sector. 
Shared service centres zijn dan ook intussen breed geïmplementeerd in de publieke sector, 
ook in Nederland (Strikwerda, 2010). De Gemeente Den Haag besloot in 2007 een shared 
service centre in te richten voor verschillende ondersteunende diensten, zoals huisvesting & 
facilities, personeelsadministratie en IT. De auteur van dit proefschrift maakte deel uit van dit 
proces als controller van het in te richten shared service centre. Zijn ervaringen waren een 
belangrijke reden voor de start van dit onderzoek. Het opzetten van de governancestructuur 
van het shared service centre in de Gemeente ging niet zonder slag of stoot. Daarom begon 
de auteur een zoektocht naar een manier om meer begrip te krijgen van wat er in de praktijk 
gebeurde. Het doel van dan dit onderzoek was een bijdrage te leveren aan de discipline 
van management accounting & control door aandacht te besteden aan de algemene vraag 
waarom en hoe een governancestructuur van een shared service centre zich ontwikkelt in 
zo’n proces. De ambitie was bij te dragen aan de opbouw van wetenschappelijke kennis door 
te theoretiseren over governance- en controlstructuur, gebaseerd op een case study van een 
shared service centre in een publieke organisatie, in dit geval de Gemeente Den Haag. 
Het eerste deel van dit onderzoek behandelt de keuzes die werden gemaakt ten aanzien 
van de governancestructuur. De focus ligt op de inhoud van de keuzes (het ‘wat’) en niet het 
proces waarlangs de beslissingen tot stand zijn gekomen. De onderliggende aanname is 
dat de keuzes zijn gemaakt door economische actoren die een specifiek doel in gedachten 
hadden. Dit is consistent met de beschrijving van ‘substantive rationality’ van Simon (1982). 
In de Gemeente Den Haag was het doel een meer effectieve en efficiënte organisatie te 
creëren door de introductie van een shared service centre. Vanuit een dergelijk rationeel 
economisch perspectief volgde de eerste onderzoeksvraag:
Hoe kunnen keuzes in de governancestructuur van een shared service centre (SSC) in een 
Gemeente worden begrepen op basis van een rationeel economisch perspectief?
Documentstudies en interviews met sleutelfiguren werden gebruikt om data te verzamelen. 
Toen echter het onderzoek vorderde werd duidelijk dat de ontwikkeling van de 
governancestructuur niet een direct gevolg was van de rationele keuzes die waren gemaakt 
tijdens het ontwerp van de structuur. Hierdoor was er een ander theoretisch perspectief nodig 
om een breder begrip te krijgen van de ontwikkeling van de governancestructuur van het 
SSC in de Gemeente Den Haag. In het onderzoek was een perspectief nodig dat het mogelijk 
maakte de dynamiek te belichten die ontstond in het netwerk waar de governancestructuur 
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onderdeel van werd: een relationeel perspectief. Doordat de onderzoeker zelf ook een positie 
had in dit proces, was hij zelf ook onderdeel van de dynamiek in het netwerk. Als controller 
binnen de Gemeente Den Haag had hij zijn eigen perceptie van de situatie die hij onderzocht. 
Als onderzoeker, met het doel bij te dragen aan de discipline van management accounting, 
moest hij een bepaald perspectief innemen. In deze studie is hiervoor dus het relationeel 
perspectief gekozen, een perspectief dat de verbindingen tussen verschillende actoren en de 
governancestructuur voorop stelt. De concepten framing, overflowing (Callon, 1998) en, meer 
algemeen, translation (Callon et al., 2012) spelen hierin een centrale rol.
Vanuit het relationele perspectief kwamen interessante vragen naar voren: accepteren de 
verschillende actoren de governancestructuur of proberen ze veranderingen aan te brengen 
die in lijn liggen met hun eigen behoeften en belangen? En, hoe werkt de governancestructuur 
in en hoe beweegt de governancestructuur door het netwerk waar het onderdeel van uitmaakt? 
De tweede onderzoeksvraag adresseerde deze onderwerpen en positioneerde de 
governancestructuur in het centrum van het onderzoek. Deze onderzoeksvraag was:
Hoe ontwikkelt een governancestructuur, en meer specifiek een kostenverdeelmodel als 
onderdeel van deze structuur, zich in de praktijk?
De economie van de governance van een shared service centre
In een shared service centre worden vaak werkzaamheden gebundeld die niet als de ‘core 
business’ van de organisatie worden beschouwd. Ondersteunende processen zoals IT, 
HR en financiën komen snel in aanmerking om samen gebracht te worden in een shared 
service centre. Deze activiteiten kunnen worden gestandaardiseerd zonder dat er waarde 
wordt verloren voor de business units van de organisatie. Deze standaardisatie is de sleutel 
om deze processen efficiënter en effectiever te organiseren. De output van deze processen 
wordt beschreven in meetbare parameters die de basis vormen voor een contract tussen het 
shared service centre en de organisatieonderdelen waaraan de diensten worden geleverd. 
Er zijn verschillende manieren om deze shared service centres te organiseren. In 
publieke organisaties worden veelal twee modellen gebruikt: een gezamenlijk shared 
service centre van verschillende organisaties (interorganisationeel) en een shared 
service centre binnen een organisatie (intra-organisationeel). In dit onderzoek ging 
het om een intra-organisationeel shared service centre in de Gemeente Den Haag. 
De introductie van een shared service centre doorbreekt de bestaande hiërarchie binnen een 
organisatie en de verticale gezagsstructuur die daarbij hoort. Horizontale verantwoordelijkheid 
wordt geïntroduceerd, omdat een organisatie als een shared service centre verantwoordelijk 
wordt gehouden voor de dienstverlening door de klanten. De bestaande hiërarchie wordt 
uitgebreid met marktinstrumenten zoals contracten en verrekening van kosten. Hierdoor 
ontstaat een hybride governance waarin het shared service centre (als leverancier), 
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de organisatieonderdelen die diensten en producten ontvangen (als klanten) en het 
topmanagement (als eigenaar van het shared service centre) een plaats hebben. De 
governancestructuur dient zo georganiseerd te zijn dat de transacties die afgesloten worden 
effectief en efficiënt kunnen worden bestuurd. Een governancestructuur is dan ook een 
belangrijk onderdeel van de introductie van een shared service centre.
De introdcutie van een shared service in de Gemeente Den Haag wordt beschouwd 
als een gevolg van het New Public Management (NPM)-denken dat de laatste decennia 
de boventoon heeft gevoerd in de publieke sector. NPM heeft als doel de effectiviteit en 
efficiency van de publieke sector te verbeteren door de introductie van ‘best practice’ 
managementstijlen vanuit de private sector. Deze manier van denken heeft de aandacht in 
organisaties binnen de publieke sector verschoven van het accent op beleidsvorming naar 
het accent op managementvaardigheden, van nadruk op het proces naar nadruk op de 
output, van organisaties op basis van hiërarchie naar organisaties die meer zijn gebaseerd 
op (onderlinge) competitie met doelen die worden vastgelegd in managementcontracten. 
De introductie van een shared service centre past in deze lijn van denken, omdat deze 
introductie vaak wordt gemotiveerd door argumenten als efficiency en effectiviteit: lagere 
kosten terwijl de kwaliteit van dienstverlening op niveau blijft door het gebruik van instrumenten 
uit de markt zoals eerder genoemd: contracten, kostenverrekening en benchmarking.
Vanuit een economisch perspectief (vooral vanuit het perspectief van transactiekosten
economie) bepaalt het karakter van de transactie het type governance dat nodig is. 
Verschillende vormen van governance zijn mogelijk: markt, hiërarchie en een hybride vorm 
die elementen van zowel markt als van hiërarchie heeft. Het shared service centre in dit 
onderzoek had een hybride governancestructuur. Binnen de hiërarchie van de organisatie 
worden marktinstrumenten zoals contracten, verrekening van kosten en benchmarking 
geïntroduceerd. Deze instrumenten zijn bedoeld om de economische rationaliteit binnen 
de organisatie te ondersteunen.
In de inrichting van de hybride governancestructuur bestaat een driehoek van verschillende 
partijen: het shared service centre (de leverancier), de organisatieonderdelen waaraan 
de producten en diensten worden geleverd (de klanten) en het topmanagement. Het 
topmanagement heeft een specifieke rol, omdat deze verantwoordelijk is voor het presteren 
van de Gemeente als geheel en daardoor kan het topmanagement de ‘spelregels’ voor de 
interne markt bepalen. De meest fundamentele keuze die het topmanagement kan maken is 
of er wel of geen ‘exit threat’ is: oftewel, mogen externe leveranciers producten en diensten 
leveren in concurrentie met het shared service centre? Vanuit het perspectief van de 
transactiekosten economie is het antwoord op deze vraag afhankelijk van het type transactie 
dat plaatsvindt tussen het shared service centre en de klanten.
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Dit onderzoek laat zien dat de keuzes in het ontwerp van de governancestructuur in de 
Gemeente Den Haag eerder zijn gebaseerd op schaalvoordelen dan op het karakter van 
transacties. In de Gemeente Den Haag wordt de nadruk gelegd op de noodzaak tot collectieve 
actie om de doelen van de organisatie in totaal te behalen, in plaats van op de werking van 
marktmechanismen zoals verwacht vanuit een economische redenering. Overleggen worden 
ingericht met het expliciete doel het collectief functioneren van de governancestructuur te 
ondersteunen. Deze bevindingen gaan in tegen overtuigingen in de bestaande literatuur. 
In de Gemeente Den Haag is de introdcutie van de governancestructuur niet een logisch 
gevolg van besluitvorming geweest. Het was meer een proces van economisering 
waardoor de governancestructuur is vertaald naar de specifieke context van de 
Gemeente en getransformeerd binnen die specifieke context van de Gemeente. In 
een proces van economisering is de governancestructuur meer een mediator dan een 
instrument. In het beschreven proces is de governancestructuur een mediator tussen 
verschillende actoren (menselijk en niet-menselijk) en beschrijft het geen acties van 
anderen en schrijft ze ook niet voor. Macht en politiek gedrag staan centraal in dit 
proces, omdat alle betrokken actoren eigen intenties, waarden en belangen hebben. De 
governancestructuur wordt gepositioneerd in een netwerk waarin het moet gaan functioneren. 
In een translatieproces start een coalitie van actoren een verandering in de macrokosmos. 
In dit onderzoek wordt de Gemeente Den Haag beschouwd als macrokosmos. In deze 
macrokosmos introduceren kopstukken in de organisatie een shared service centre en 
de bijbehorende governancestructuur om op die manier bezuinigingen te realiseren en 
de kwaliteit van ondersteunende processen te verbeteren. Een eerste frame van het SSC 
en de governancestructuur werd gemaakt in een microkosmos door een projectgroep. Dit 
governanceframe moet een relevante positie zien te veroveren in bestaande netwerken 
in de macrokosmos. De mate waarin dat zal lukken is afhankelijk van de macht van de 
coalitie die het frame introduceert en de waarde die andere actoren aan het frame zullen 
hechten. Afwijkingen van het frame (overflows) zullen echter altijd bestaan, omdat het frame 
niet compleet is: het kan nooit alle belangen en intenties van alle betrokken actoren in zich 
verenigen.
Dit onderzoek kijkt ook met name naar de framing en overflowing van een 
kostenallocatiemodel. Het laat de spanningen en strijd zien in een projectgroep van 
controllers die werken aan de ontwikkeling van het kostenallocatiemodel. De controllers 
hebben verschillende overtuigingen en belangen die zijn gerelateerd aan de diensten die 
ze vertegenwoordigen. Dit resulteert in verschillende eisen ten aanzien van het ontwerp 
van het kostenallocaitemodel. Een gezamenlijk voorstel maken blijkt een lastige opdracht; 
er ontstond een iteratief proces van framing en overflowing, van orde en wanorde. Dit 
onderzoek laat zien dat de introductie van een management accounting instrument zoals 
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een kostenallocatiemodel een translatieproces is dat nooit af is. De belangen en macht van 
verschillende actoren, coalities van actoren en de positie van het kostenallocatiemodel zelf, 
beïnvloeden de ontwikkeling van het kostenallocatiemodel. Het proces van economisering 
is onderdeel van politiek, macht en belangen. Het proces dat is onderzocht blijkt meer 
te resulteren in samenwerking dan in marktwerking. Er ontstaan ruimtes waarin wordt 
samengewerkt, waarin het gebruik van marktinstrumenten zoals contracten, verrekening 
van kosten en benchmarking praktisch wordt verlaten. Deze instrumenten worden alleen 
nog gebruikt wanneer ze het debat over het bereiken van de gezamenlijke doelen van de 
organisatie ondersteunen.
Twee complementaire perspectieven
De combinatie van de beschreven perspectieven maakt het mogelijk te laten zien 
dat budgettoedeling niet het resultaat is van een neutraal proces. Berekeningen en 
budgettoedelingen staan midden in de macht en politiek van een organisatie: economie 
is onderdeel van de macht en politiek in een organisatie. En, ook al beantwoordt de 
governancestructuur op veel aspecten niet aan verwachtingen vanuit de organisatie 
economie, de uitkomst is wel begrijpelijk vanuit een economisch perspectief in de context van 
een arena als die van de Gemeente Den Haag. De transactiekosten die gepaard gaan met het 
gebruik van marktinstrumenten kunnen inderdaad relatief hoog zijn omdat deze instrumenten 
discussie en bureaucratie veroorzaken. Daardoor hoeft economisering niet vanzelfsprekend 
te resulteren in marktwerking. De ingestelde Integrale Klantenraad, bijvoorbeeld, kan als een 
alternatief worden beschouwd voor de interne marktplaats die zou zijn ontstaan in het geval 
van marktwerking. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat er een alternatief ontstaat voor de interne 
markt. Dit onderzoek ondersteunt niet, tenminste niet ten volle, de ‘performativity thesis’ 
zoals die is geformuleerd door Callon waarbij economisering resulteert in het ontstaan van 
economische actoren. Deze studie laat de ontwikkeling van relaties zien die zijn gericht op 
samenwerking en partnership, vooral in de latere ontwikkeling van het shared service centre. 
De sociale aspecten van de managementcontrolstructuur kregen in deze fase voorrang 
boven de disciplinerende aspecten.
De praktische relevantie van dit onderzoek
Shared service centres zijn breed geaccepteerd in Gemeenten en in andere publieke 
organisaties in Nederland. Daardoor krijgen veel mensen in de praktijk te maken met de 
gevolgen van de introductie van dit type organisaties. De betrokkenen hebben mogelijk 
vergelijkbare ervaringen zoals die worden beschreven in dit onderzoek. Daarmee biedt dit 
onderzoek verschillende relevante inzichten.
Een belangrijke notie die volgt uit dit onderzoek is dat de introductie van een governance-
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structuur niet een rechtdoorzee implementatie is. Het is een proces van ‘drifting’ of drijven. 
In een organisatie hebben sommige actoren meer macht dan andere en er is veelal sprake 
van gevestigde belangen. De governancestructuur van een shared service centre stelt deze 
bestaande posities en belangen op een aantal punten ter discussie. Actoren zijn daarom 
niet altijd van plan om de uitnodiging om te participeren in de nieuwe governancestructuur 
zomaar aan te nemen. De governancestructuur zal moeten vechten om een relevante positie 
in het netwerk te veroveren. Continue aandacht van het management is dan ook nodig om te 
bewaken dat de governancestructuur zich ontwikkelt zoals deze was bedoeld door degenen 
die de verandering in gang hebben gezet, oftewel drijft de governancestructuur nog de 
richting op die was bedoeld? Het management zou daarbij vooral aandacht moeten hebben 
voor het functioneren van het netwerk waar de governancestructuur onderdeel van uit is gaan 
maken en niet zozeer op het functioneren van specifieke onderdelen daarvan. Een andere 
belangrijke implicatie van de notie dat de introductie van een governancestructuur een proces 
van ‘drifting’ is, is dat afwijkingen van het frame in de praktijk onontkoombaar zijn. Deze 
moeten dan ook niet direct worden gezien als een bron van weerstand tegen de verandering, 
maar eerder als een bron van verandering van waaruit het frame zich verder kan ontwikkelen 
in de specifieke context waar het onderdeel van uit is gaan maken.
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